現在地 HOME > 掲示板
> 戦争３３ > 102.html
★阿修羅♪
|
現在地 HOME > 掲示板
> 戦争３３ > 102.html
★阿修羅♪
|
|
イラクの戦争 さまざまな考え ５ [iraqwar.ru]
iraqwar.ruの主催者の一人、Venikのまとまっていない論考の続きです。
ちょっと時間がないので、前半だけまずアップします。
イラク軍司令部と、米国との間の「戦時下取引」はありえないだろう、
しかし米側とイラク側が事前になんらかの取引をしていたかもしれない、
ということをさまざまな戦況の分析から論じています。
後半は、戦争前に既に取引が終わっていたという見かたをサポートする詳細な分析です。一言でいうと、米軍はイラク空軍の戦闘機をわざわざ無傷で残した、とのことです。特に、戦略爆撃機で核爆弾を投下する能力のあるMiG25を無傷で残したのは、戦略的にあまりに不自然、逆にいうとわざわざ残したのではないか、と見ています。
Venikは結論はしていませんが、私の読み方では彼が言いたいことは、次のようなことだと思います。米軍はイラク空軍の航空機を全て温存し（すなわち、米軍の攻撃に使用されることはないと「知っていた」からこそ攻撃しなかった）、占領後に米軍（ないしはその勢力下になる新イラク軍）が使用する、という筋書きがあった、ということです。バース党員の“再利用”が目下進行中ですが、同じく空軍兵力も中東における米のプレゼンスに使用されるわけです。
--------------------------------------------------
この戦争の教え
教えその１：ドルの力を過小評価してはいけない。数多くの防衛専門家はカブールやアフガニスタンの他の地域での血まみれの戦闘を予測していた。しかしタリバンは最も少ない抵抗をしただけで、ほとんどその痕跡を残さずに消えた。全ての大きな都市や街 −それは敵の技術的優越に少ない長所しか与えない市街戦の最適な場所ー は少ない抵抗だけで捨てられた。米軍兵士達に与えられたバクダットの抵抗は、メンツを保つための見世物にもならないようなものだった。すべての人々がなぜかと疑問に思っている・・・タリバンが全滅したなどとは全くいえない。もしあるとしたら、天気が温暖になるにつれて活発になるアフガニスタンでの活動で、ラムシュタインやドーバーに向けて送られる米軍兵士の棺が増えているということだ。そしてタリバンが壊滅したのを本当には見たことがない。捕獲されたり殺されたタリバン兵士の数は、戦争前の政権の軍の規模に近づいていない。ほとんどのタリバン勢力は寝返っていまやアメリカ軍を支援している。しかしそうじゃないかもしれない。
いってみれば、おなじ状況がイラクでも繰り返されている。イラク軍とその装備の消滅、長期的な防衛の用意がなかった都市、初期の堅固な抵抗とそれに続く整然とした全軍の退却。アフガニスタンの時と同様に、戦争前のイラクの文言は国に立ち入るやいなや地の地獄をアメリカが見るであろうと約束していた。多くの軍事分析による予測にもかかわらず、戦争の最初の二週間、イラクは堅固な抵抗を見せた。しかしなにかが起きた −まずアフガニスタンで、そしてイラクでー そして全ての抵抗が溶け去った。米国の秘密マインドコントロール兵器について話すものさえいる。
しかしワシントンが持っている唯一のマインドコントロール兵器 −そしてとても効果のあるーは古きよきドルである。もし勝利を買うことができるのならわざわざ闘う必要があるだろうか？それは無駄遣いではないー投資だ。アフガニスタンでは、テロの脅威に対する守護者としてのブッシュのイメージへの投資だった。一方でイラクにおける投資はもっと現実的だ。見返りとして安定、石油とその他さまざまな、商売人のセンスのない人間にはすぐにはわからない利点を得る。例えば：バクダットの博物館からの略奪 −その抑圧された過去の国家遺産からイラク人を自由にするための、よく計画が練られた作戦。そしてもしかしたらこれが未来かもしれない：片方がカネを持ちすぎていて、もう片方が十分持っていないときの人道的な戦争・・・しかしそこにはまだ解決すべき問題がのこっている（たとえば市民が殺されたり、同様の小さな問題）。
イラクで本当になにが起きたのか（そしてまだおきつづけている）ということは、未だに疑問として残っている。米国とイラク軍の高官の間で、確実にイラク軍が降伏するような取引があったと議論することもできる。私はこれが不可能なことだというわけではない。しかし、この議論を正当化するだけの証拠は存在していない、と私はいいたい。我々は、師団や軍の部隊が丸ごと降伏した話を聞いたが、米国が公に言っている捕虜の数は一万以下である（そしてその多くが市民や民兵であることがすでにわかっている）。思い出して欲しいのだが、戦争前のイラク軍の兵は35万から40万2千の間だった。そして、意味あるほどの数のイラク軍の装備が捕獲されたのを見ていない −少なくとも千程度の戦車やAPCだ。ここでのキーワードは“千”である。
米国とイラク軍司令部との間の戦時下取引という意見を擁護する事柄はなにか？捕獲されたイラク政府高官のうち、軍の司令部の人間はたった一人である。防衛司令官のムザヒム・サブ・ハッサーン・アル・ティクリティだ。軍情報部の管理者のかつての長であったズハイル・タリブ・アブドゥ・アルサットラー・アル・ナギブ将軍は自首したが、軍の司令部であるとは評価できない。イラク軍の司令官 −空軍や共和国防衛隊を含むすべての部署のー はペンタゴンがイラク軍を全て降伏させたといっていることを念頭に考えれば、奇跡的にも捕獲を逃れている。そして他に？イラク軍の装備の数が顕著ではないということ：無傷の兵器や武器を見せると、栄光ある勝利を薮蛇にもテーブルの下での取引に堕させてしまうことになるので、ペンタゴンはそうしない。結局、一般的な意見はイラクと米国の司令官の間の戦時下取引の存在を支持している。Iraqwar.ruが行った調査では、他の意見に対して、取引があったという意見を52%以上の人が支持している（4月の26日までに1296人が投票した）。
とはいっても、この戦時下におけるイラクと米国の間の取引に対する反証がかなりあり、戦争前の取引を示唆している。まず第一に、多くの防衛分析家たちが指摘するバクダット、ティクリートやその他のイラクの大都市における真剣な防衛が存在しなかったことである。真剣な防衛はウム・カサールで行われ、団子軍はこの国境の人口1200人の村を制圧するのに二週間以上かかった。バスラ周辺における防衛は手ごわく、英軍を数週間湾にくぎ付けにした。アン・ナジャフとアン・ナシリヤの防衛軍は、多くの日数に渡って米軍の攻撃を退けつづけた。サダムは米軍兵士達がバクダットまでたどり着くとは考えていず、あんなに早くバクダットに到達するとは思いもよらなかったのだ、と反論する人もいるかもしれない。しかしサダムはそう思っていた！サダムは事実上、米軍兵士達をバクダットに招待したのであり、そこで市街戦に巻き込まれるはずだった。米軍のバクダットへの到達は速くはなかった。むしろ団子軍の陸上の進軍速度は、ほとんどの軍事分析が予測したよりもかなり遅かった。いずれにしろイラクはG.W.（訳注 小ブッシュ）が米国の権力を握ってから、戦争の用意をするために数年はあったのである。
この戦争のもう一つの興味深い面は、イラクの統率力についてだ： サダム政府が使うことのできるカネと影響力を考えれば、かれらは今どこにいても不思議ではない。しかし、彼らはイラクにいる。そしてこれはすべてのレベルのイラク官僚にいえる −タリク・アジズのようなトップの人間から、中程度のバース党の職員まで。この事実が米国とイラク軍の間の取引があったという一番目の意見を擁護する、と議論する人もいるだろう：サダム政府は単に逃亡する時間がなかったのだ、と。しかしこの議論は完璧ではない：サダムは米国をやっつけることができると考えていたか？ほとんどありえないだろう。活発だった戦争の時期があれだけ続いたという事実は、まさにイラク軍の成果そのものであるが、しかしその成果は主に非正規兵のフェダイーンによるものだった。取引の交渉が進んでいる間、イラク軍がウム・カサール、バスラ、アン・ナジャフ、アン・ナシリアや他の場所で二週間持ちこたえていたと仮定したとしても、このスケールでの陰謀は不可能だろう。イラク軍の兵力は数十万であり、我々はその一部しか目にしていない。数千の高級あるいは中級の司令官がいて、サダムに忠誠を誓っており、米軍の占領によって彼らになにかいいことがあると期待する理由はどこにもない。これらの司令官や兵士の多くが、クルド人に対する虐殺で訴えられている。アメリカと取引するはずであるこの司令官達にとって、部族的な忠誠心、全ての人間が他の全ての人間と事柄に対して恐怖と不信を抱いていることが特徴の社会で取引のような行動をすることは恐ろしすぎるだろう。
http://www1.iraqwar.ru/iraq-read_article.php?articleId=3967&lang=en
War in Iraq: Random Thoughts, Part V
25.04.2003 [05:16]
Lessons of the war
Lesson number one: never underestimate the power of the dollar. Numerous defense experts predicted bloody battles in Kabul and the rest of Afghanistan. But the Taliban has disappeared almost without a trace offering only minimal resistance. All large cities and towns – ideal places for close-quarters combat where the enemy’s technological superiority offers few advantages – were abandoned with little resistance. Resistance offered to the US troops in Baghdad didn’t even qualify as a face-saving show. Everyone is still wondering why… Taliban is far from extinct: if anything, we see increasingly more action in Afghanistan as the weather gets warmer and more coffins with US soldiers head to Ramstein and to Dover. And we have never really seen the Taliban destroyed: the number of killed and captured Taliban troops was nowhere near the pre-war strength of the regime’s forces. Most of the Taliban fighters have simply switched sides and now support the US forces. Or maybe not.
In a way this situation is repeating itself in Iraq: disappearance of the Iraqi army and its equipment; cities absolutely unprepared for long-term defense; stiff initial resistance followed by organized total withdrawal. Just like in Afghanistan the pre-war rhetoric in Iraq promised the US a bloody hell should they come into the country. And initially it seemed like this promise may come true. Despite predictions by many military analysts Iraq actually offered stiff resistance during the first two weeks of the war. But then something happened – first in Afghanistan, then in Iraq – and all resistance melted away. Some are even talking about some secret mind-control weapon used by the US.
But it seems that the only mind-control weapon – and a very effective one – that Washington has is the good old dollar. Why fight for victory when you can buy it? It’s not a waste of money – it’s an investment. In Afghanistan it was an investment in Bush’s image as the protector of the world against the threat of terrorism; while in Iraq the reasons are far more trivial. In return you get stability, oil and many other benefits not immediately apparent to non-business types. For example: the loot from Baghdad museums – a well-planned out operation to free the Iraqis from the national heritage of their oppressed past. Maybe this is the future: a humane war when one side has too much money and the other side – not enough… But there are still some problems to works out (like civilians getting killed and similar small issues).
The question of what exactly happened (and is still happening) in Iraq remains open. One may argue that some sort of a deal might have been reached between the US and the top Iraqi military commanders to secure the Iraqi army’s surrender. I am not saying this is not possible. But I am saying that there is no evidence to support this theory. We’ve heard about entire divisions and army corps surrendering, yet, officially the US claims just under 10,000 POWs (many of which are already known to be civilians and paramilitary fighters). Just a reminder, Iraq’s pre-war army strength was put at between 350,000 and 402,000. And we are yet to see captured Iraq’s military hardware in any significant numbers – at least a few thousand tanks and APCs. The keyword here is “thousand”.
What supports the theory of a wartime deal between the US and the Iraqi military commanders? Of all the reportedly captured Iraqi government officials there is only one military commander: Muzahim Sa'b Hassan al-Tikriti, Iraq’s air defense commander. Gen. Zuhayr Talib Abd al-Sattar al-Naqib, the former head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence surrendered on his own accord and hardly qualifies as an army commander. Top command of the Iraqi army – all branches including the Air Force and the Republican Guard – have escaped capture somewhat miraculously, considering that, according to Pentagon, the entire Iraqi army has surrendered. What else? Absence of any significant numbers of Iraqi military hardware: Pentagon does not want to show large number of intact equipment realizing that doing so would let the cat out of the bag and turn the glorious victory into an under-the-table arrangement. Finally, the public opinion seems to support this theory of a wartime deal between the Iraqi and the US commanders. A poll conducted by Iraqwar.ru shows that this theory is favored by more than 52% (as of April 24 1296 people have cast their votes) over other possible explanations.
Nevertheless, significant evidence goes against the theory of a wartime deal between Iraq and the US and instead suggests a pre-war arrangement. First, many defense analysts point to complete absence of any serious defenses in Baghdad, Tikrit, and most of the other large Iraqi cities. Significant defenses were deployed in Umm Quasar and it took the coalition forces more than two weeks to capture this borderline village with the population of about 1,200. Defense around Basra were formidable and held the British forces at bay for weeks. Defenders in An Najaf and An Nassiriyah held back the US assaults for many days. One may counter that Saddam did not expect the US troops to get to Baghdad at all, let alone so quickly. But he did! Saddam practically invited the US troops to Baghdad, where they should have gotten embroiled in urban fighting. US troops did not arrive to Baghdad quickly. If anything, the coalition’s military progress on the ground was much slower than expected by most military analysts. In any case, Iraq had years to prepare for the war, which was inevitable since G.W. came to power in the US.
Another interesting aspect of the war is the Iraqi leadership: with the money and influence available to Saddam’s government they could have been anywhere by now. But they are in Iraq. And this goes for Iraqi officials of all levels – from the top figures like Tarik Aziz to mid-level Baath functionaries. Some will argue that this supports the first theory of a wartime deal between the US and the Iraqi army: Saddam’s government simply had no time to escape. This argument holds no water: did Saddam expect to defeat the US? Hardly. The fact the active part of the war lasted for as long as it did is in itself quite an accomplishment by the Iraqi military but mainly by the Fedayeen irregulars. Even if we are to suppose that the Iraqi army held out in Umm Quasar, Basra, An Najaf, An Nassiriyah and other places for two weeks while a deal was negotiated, a conspiracy on this scale would have been impossible. Iraqi army numbered hundreds of thousands of which we have seen just a fraction. There are thousands of top- and mid-level commanders many of whom are loyal to Saddam and have no reasons to expect anything good from the US occupation. Many of these commanders and troops have been accused of genocide against the Kurds. Those military commanders who might have considered a deal with the US would be too afraid to act in the society characterized by clan loyalties, all-embracing fear and mistrust of everyone and everything. Several military commanders corrupted by US dollars? Entirely possible. An entire army in a secret deal with the Anglo-American coalition? Absolutely out of the question.
Iraqi army is still missing
During the third week of April the Australian military released several dozen photos of what it claims to be an Iraqi MiG-25 found by the Australian Special Forces hidden at some “major Iraqi Air Force base in western Iraq.” The MiG-25 is a relatively rare aircraft. Other than Russia only a handful of countries operate this type in very small numbers. The Mikoyan MiG-25 (NATO designation: “Foxbat”, first prototype flown in 1964) is a supersonic high-altitude interceptor originally developed to counter the US XB-70 Valkyrie intercontinental supersonic bomber project. In addition to the interceptor role the MiG-25 can double as a bomber but its forte is the reconnaissance role.
Calling MiG-25 a “fighter” would be a stretch: the aircraft was not built close combat against other fighter aircraft. The primary role played by the MiG-25 in and outside of Russia today is strategic reconnaissance. The aircraft’s speed, high-altitude performance and electronic countermeasure suit allow it to evade even the most modern air defense systems. During the past several years Iraqi MiG-25s were continuously challenging British and the US fighters patrolling the ‘no-fly’ zones over northern and southern Iraq. No once did the coalition fighters come even close to intercepting the “Foxbats”.
As a bomber the MiG-25 is believed to have nuclear capability and thus it represents a weapon of strategic importance. The aircraft can carry bombs specifically designed for high-speed deployment. A MiG-25 was known to deploy conventional HE bombs at over Mach 2. The top speed for the aircraft has been confirmed at Mach 3.1 during its overflights of Israel in the 1970s. During the 1991 Gulf War a single air-to-air victory against the Coalition aviation was scored by an Iraqi MiG-25, which downed a US Navy’s F/A-18 Hornet with an AAM.
Why all of this is significant? Several reasons: first, MiG-25’s capability as a reconnaissance aircraft and, potentially, as an effective platform for delivering nuclear weapons makes this aircraft a point of particular interest for various foreign intelligence services and a prime target for the US military. The effective range of Iraq’s available ballistic missiles is just over a hundred kilometers: you might as well put that warhead in the trunk of your Toyota and go for an hour-long drive across the desert – a lesser chance of being intercepted and a better chance of finding the target. A MiG-25 with a 5,300-liter external fuel tank, on the other hand, can carry between 2,000 kg and 5,000 kg of 500-kg bombs to a distance of over 2,100 km at supersonic speeds. The MiG-25 is equipped with an automatic bombing system allowing for precision supersonic strikes against targets with known coordinates from altitudes of over 20 km – at the very edge of the Raytheon MIM-104 Patriot’s maximum altitude and well over the F-15’s service ceiling of 15km. The MiG-25 set 29 world records including the absolute altitude record in 1977 (37,650 meters) – fourteen of the records still stood in 1993. Intercepting a MiG-25 flying at speed and high-altitude is far from being a trivial task.
Let’s say you are attacking a country which, you claim, may have nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. You admit that this country lacks the long-range means of delivery for these weapons. The MiG-25 remains the only possible effective means of delivery. And you ignore it completely along with all other Iraqi aircraft, like the Mirage F-1, which in 1987 killed 37 US Navy personnel and nearly sank the USS Stark Perry-class frigate with a pair of AM39 Exocet anti-ship missiles in the Persian Gulf. You completely ignore the MiG-23s and Su-25s – both are capable ground attack aircraft capable of carrying a huge array of air-to-ground weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, and both are excellent low-altitude performers able to slip under air defense radars. You ignore these threats not because you can’t locate any of these aircraft (you don’t even bother attacking the airbases) but because you somehow know they will not be used.
The story with the MiG-25 found by the Australians has raised a number of questions. The aircraft pictured on the photos released by the Australian military is a MiG-25PU (NATO: ‘Foxbat-C’) – a two-seat trainer aircraft. Iraq was not known to have any of these planes. The “PU” stands for “Perekhvatchik Uchebnyj” or Interceptor-Trainer. In addition to the trainer role the MiG-25PU was also designed to carry a cruise missile. No MiG-25PUs were ever sold to Iraq, which purchased only 20 MiG-25s – 12 export-version MiG-25PD improved interceptors and 8 MiG-25RB (reconnaissance/bomber) following Soviet VVS pilot Belenko’s defection to Japan aboard his MiG-25 and the resulting lifting of Soviet export restrictions on this type. The only country other than Russia known to operate the “PU” model is India and it is believed that Syria also has this aircraft. The Australian military says that the MiG-25 they found was one of 51 MiG planes discovered. According to the Australians, this particular MiG-25 was found at some “major airbase in western Iraq” at an undisclosed location.
The problem is there are no major Iraqi AF airbases in the western part of the country. The only exception (and it’s quite a stretch to call this a major airbase) is the airbase near Ardamah located not far from the Baghdad-Jordan highway going through Ar Ramadi and Ar Rutbah. All of Iraq’s major air bases are located in the eastern part of the country along the border with Iran (for obvious reasons). Iraq’s six operational single-seat MiG-25Ps belong to the 96th Squadron and are based at Al Quadisiya airbase commanded by Gen. Ismail Al Sheiks and the Air Wing Commander Brig. Gen. Amer Shaheen. The MiG-21 combat/training wing is located at the same airbase and commanded by Brig. Mohamed Mansour. The Al Quadisiya airbase is located about 200 km south of Baghdad between An Najaf and An Nassiriyah along the Euphrates River – territory occupied by the coalition forces weeks ago, according to Pentagon. So, once again, there is what seems to be a major event in this war – 51 MiGs supposedly found – and once again there are more questions than answers. Why don’t we see more of the captured Iraqi planes? Why weren’t the planes destroyed during the bombing campaign? Why the only public photo of a captured Iraqi MiG is that of a type Iraq did not have? Where was the photo taken and why is it such a secret?
Finally the Australian SAS has revealed the name of the airbase it occupies: the al-Asad. A 150-strong Australian SAS force claimed to have found and captured practically the entire Iraqi Air Force – “57 Soviet-made MiGs, helicopters, anti-aircraft batteries, helicopters and 7.9 million kilograms of munitions and ordnance” [ “SAS reveal the war they fought”, by Tom Allard, with the 1st SAS regiment in Iraq, The Sydney Morning Herald, April 24, 2003]. Naturally and as usual all of this equipment is intact and “will form the basis of the ‘free Iraq air force’” [Tom Allard]. How convenient. It’s worth mentioning that the al-Asad airbase is a small patch of paved sand located on the edge of the Syrian Desert just west of the Hawijat Arban railroad station near the Euphrates. At best this is a support airfield with a few small service buildings and no significant aircraft storage facilities. 57 MiGs and 7.9 million kilograms of ammo? Convenient indeed!
題名には必ず「阿修羅さんへ」と記述してください。