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ワシントンポスト:米議会911報告書詳報:pdfファイルで全文:CIA, FBI、ハイジャッカー逮捕に失敗。
http://www.asyura.com/0306/war37/msg/466.html
投稿者 木村愛二 日時 2003 年 7 月 25 日 07:43:15:

ワシントンポスト:米議会911報告書詳報:pdfファイルで全文:CIA, FBI、ハイジャッカー逮捕に失敗。

表紙(日替わり)と記事の見出しが少し違う。

http://www.washingtonpost.com/
Thursday, July 24, 2003 | Updated 5:39 p.m. ET

CIA, FBI Flubbed Chances To Net Two 9/11 Hijackers
Congressional report finds catching key figures might have stopped attacks before they happened.
-- David Von Drehle
Full Report | Conclusions (PDF)

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40946-2003Jul24.html?nav=hptop_tb

washingtonpost.com

FBI, CIA Bungled Chances to Catch 2 Sept. 11 Hijackers, Report Says
Congressional Findings Cite Lack of Communication Between Agencies

By David Von Drehle
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, July 24, 2003; 4:02 PM

The FBI and CIA bungled chances to capture two key figures in the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and possibly stop the catastrophe before it happened, according to a report released today on the joint investigation by the congressional select committees on intelligence.

The two men, conspirators who died when they rammed a hijacked airplane into the Pentagon, had links to as many as 14 people in the United States who had been investigated by the FBI over possible terrorist links. For a time, the two men, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, lived with an FBI informant.

At the same time, the committees concluded, the CIA was accumulating reports that the two men were linked to the al Qaeda terror network and that al Qaeda was planning a big attack in the United States, possibly involving airplanes.

Nevertheless, when the CIA belatedly realized that the men were inside the United States and tried to find them in late August and early September of 2001, the FBI agents best positioned to find them never received word.

"It would have made a huge difference" if the intelligence had been properly analyzed and shared, one of those agents testified to the committees in a closed-door session. Another FBI official, the head of the Financial Crimes Section, told the investigators that he could have found the two men if he had been asked.

Capturing the two men would have been "the intelligence community's best chance to unravel the September 11 plot," the committee concluded -- and it was missed.

The report on the congressional investigation represents the fullest examination so far of the U.S. response to the growing threat from Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorist network. Based on an examination of more than 500,000 documents and testimony at nine public hearings and 13 closed sessions last year, the report paints a picture of a poorly organized, understaffed and uncoordinated effort that missed the warning signs and failed to add up the clues.

Committee staff members have wrangled with the administration and intelligence agencies over how much of the classified investigation could be made public. More than 800 pages of findings, recommendations and narrative detail were published at 2 p.m. today. Even so, long passages were deleted, especially those dealing with possible connections between the terrorists and the government of Saudi Arabia.

Just enough was declassified to make clear that the joint committee, which was co-chaired by Sen. Bob Graham (D-Fla.) during the investigation, was highly concerned about suggestions that Saudi Arabian government money was going to support at least some of the hijackers. The investigators quoted several unnamed U.S. government officials who said Saudi Arabia has not been cooperative with efforts to halt terrorism and track down bin Laden, the al Qaeda leader.

In general, the report describes an unfocused and poorly organized intelligence community awakening on Sept. 11 to a realization that the issue of al Qaeda terror was far more serious than they realized. Even though bin Laden called for a holy war against the U.S. in 1998, and intelligence began arriving around the same time of plans for attacks on the U.S. homeland, little was actually done to better protect the public.

None of the intelligence available to U.S. agents specified the "time, place or specific nature" of the attacks, the joint committee reported.

Nevertheless, a senior congressional source said of the report: "The message should be that we cannot wait for a formal announcement" of terrorist plans. "We need an intelligence community that can connect the dots."

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