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★阿修羅♪
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ワシントンポスト：ブレア顧問がイラク文書を成形。ケリーの死はapparent suicide表現。
似非紳士朝日新聞は、「見せかけ」で、むしろ、疑わしいという意味のpparent suicideを「自殺」断定報道し、この誤訳だか曲訳だかを、いまだに甘えっ子「優等生」駄々っ子の典型症状として、突っ張っている。
これも意図的な「粉飾」である。
朝日新聞社広報には、この米報道例をも伝え、訂正しないと、私一人の力でも、潰してやると通告した。 同様に、911以後、私一人の力でも、潰してやると通告した日本共産党は、目下、政策委員長・書記局次長だったかな、代行だったかなの筆坂の糞餓鬼のセクハラで、没落中なり。
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A34236-2003Aug22.html
British Prime Minister Tony Blair's communication director, Alastair Campbell, arrives at the Royal Courts of Justice in London to testify at the inquiry into the death of David Kelly. (Richard Lewis -- AP)
washingtonpost.com
Blair Aides Shaped Iraq Dossier
Inquiry Into Expert's Death Reveals How Intelligence Services Were Used
By Glenn Frankel
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, August 23, 2003; Page A14
LONDON, Aug. 22 -- The public inquiry into the apparent suicide of a British weapons expert has opened a rare window on how Prime Minister Tony Blair used Britain's intelligence services to help sell the case for war in Iraq to a reluctant public.
Eight days of testimony have shown how Blair's top aides worked closely with senior intelligence officials in compiling a dossier for public distribution, pressing for changes that sharpened the language and conclusions in the document.
The judicial inquiry has heard testimony that at least two intelligence officials raised objections to this process, as did David Kelly, the weapons expert. He told a BBC reporter that the process of turning raw intelligence data into a polished document had led to distortions that made the threat posed by Iraq appear more imminent and alarming than it really was.
Officials sought to ensure that the objections did not reach the House of Commons committee that oversees intelligence agencies, according to internal Defense Ministry documents. A memo from Martin Howard, deputy chief of defense intelligence, recommended that the ministry "resist any calls" from the committee "to disclose the identities of the individuals concerned, call them as witnesses or have access to their written comments."
The British government is known for guarding its inner workings from public scrutiny. The disclosure about the process of compiling the dossier was one of several revelations that have emerged since Lord Justice Brian Hutton began hearing evidence two weeks ago.
The controversy has been compared with the debate in the United States over the Bush administration's use of intelligence, but has been more damaging politically for Blair than for President Bush. An ICM poll for the Guardian newspaper this week found 68 percent of respondents believed the government mistreated Kelly and only 24 percent believed the government's claim that it had not embellished the intelligence dossier.
The hearings have shed light on Blair's involvement in the government's campaign to discredit a controversial BBC report on the intelligence dossier, which was published last September and became a key part of the government's case for participating in the U.S.-led war. They have shown how government officials pressed Kelly in the days leading up to his apparent suicide to renounce the BBC report. But they have also disclosed flaws in the BBC's original reporting. And they have suggested that Kelly may have had other reasons for suicide besides the controversy over the dossier.
Kelly's body was found on July 18 near his home in Oxfordshire, about 50 miles northwest of London, three days after he testified before a parliamentary committee about his meeting with Andrew Gilligan, a BBC reporter.
Gilligan's original report, on May 29, cited a confidential source in alleging that the government had "sexed up" the dossier by ordering intelligence officials to insert a claim that officials knew was probably wrong: namely, that Iraq could deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes. In his testimony, Gilligan acknowledged that he had misspoken in alleging that officials knew the claim was wrong.
Kelly's actual allegation was more subtle. He told another BBC reporter, Susan Watts, who tape-recorded the interview, that Blair's aides had seized upon the 45-minute claim to make the dossier more dramatic.
"It was a statement that was made and it just got out of all proportion," Kelly told Watts, according to the transcript entered into evidence. Blair's aides "were pushing hard for information which could be released, [and] that was one that popped up and it was seized on."
Blair's top aide, communications director Alastair Campbell, insisted in his testimony that he and his aides had provided only "presentational" advice on the dossier, which he said was solely the work of the top-secret Joint Intelligence Committee, headed by John Scarlett. But memos between the two men suggest Campbell helped "tighten" the language of the 45-minute claim, changing the phrase "may be able to deploy" to "are able to deploy."
Other analysts said the very process of turning intelligence data into a public document distorted its meaning because the data often consist of clues, suppositions and inferences rather than solid facts, "Intelligence is all about interpretation," said Garth Whitty, defense analyst for the Royal United Services Institute, a London research organization. "When you start changing words to make them more palatable or readable, you're introducing another level of interpretation, and you risk the intelligence being read as fact, which it rarely is."
Rupert Allason, a former Conservative Member of Parliament who has written on intelligence under the name Nigel West, said the dossier process had damaged the reputation and morale of the intelligence community. "To have the JIC involved in writing what was a political pamphlet undermines its authority in every possible way," said Allason, who has been a strong critic of the Blair government.
Kelly told reporters that he had no doubt that Saddam Hussein's government was seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction. But he said the threat was not imminent, and he believed the dossier was manipulated to make it appear so. "It was not so much what they have now, but what they would have in the future," he told Watts, referring to the Iraqis. "But that unfortunately wasn't expressed strongly in the dossier because that takes away the case for war, to a certain extent.
"In the end it was just a flurry of activity and it was very difficult to get comments in because people at the top of the ladder didn't want to hear some of the things."
Two intelligence officials agreed, including one unnamed senior official who wrote a memo to his superior stating: "I was so concerned about the manner in which intelligence assessments for which I had some responsibility were being presented in the dossier" that he was moved to write formally "recording and explaining my reservations."
Deputy intelligence chief Howard testified that another dissenter said that the wording of a section claiming Iraq had 20 tons of biological growth agent was "not wrong but it has [a] lot of spin on it."
Testimony has indicated that Blair was personally involved in determining how to proceed from the moment in late June when Kelly told his superiors at the Defense Ministry that he might have been Gilligan's source. The prime minister ordered Kelly to be questioned a second time to find out what he might say if called before the Foreign Affairs Committee.
He also participated in a discussion about whether it would be possible to keep Kelly's name confidential. In the end, the Defense Ministry devised a strategy of describing Kelly in sufficient detail to reporters that they were able to guess his name, which the ministry then confirmed.
Kelly himself expressed shock that his name was divulged. "I was told it would all be confidential," he told Sunday Times journalist Nick Rufford, who testified Thursday. Rufford said Kelly looked wan and tired when he saw him on July 8. "Off the record, I have been through the wringer," he told Rufford.
But a colleague of Kelly's suggested another possible motive for suicide. In February Kelly told David Broucher, a British diplomat working on disarmament issues, that he was still in contact with senior Iraqi officials and was seeking to persuade them to cooperate with U.N. weapons inspectors. Kelly said he assured them they had nothing to fear.
But he told Broucher that he was worried an invasion would proceed anyway, and feared some of his contacts would be killed and that others would believe he had betrayed them.
"As Dr. Kelly was leaving, I said to him, 'What will happen if Iraq is invaded?' and his reply was, 'I will probably be found dead in the woods.' "
Broucher said he believed at the time it was a "throwaway line" that might have referred to being tracked down by Iraqi agents. "I now see that he may have been thinking on rather different lines."
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