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Invading Iraq not a new idea for Bush clique
4 years before 9/11, plan was set
●もうちょっと正確に言うと、97年当時誕生した“アメリカ帝国主義”維持拡張をスローガンにかかげたパワーエリートたちの政治的圧力集団「米国の新世紀のためのプロジェクト」（Project for the New American Century, 略称 PNAC ）が、結成早々の98年１月に当時のクロントン政権にサダム・フセイン排除政策を実行するように圧力をかけていたわけです。最近さかんに言われている「フセイン体制打倒」ということです。英語では単純明快に「Toppling Saddam」と呼んだり、「toppling of Saddam's regime」とか「toppling of Saddam Hussein」と呼ばれています。「topple」というのは「top」を叩いて全体を転覆させる、という意味です。つまり「ボスを排除すれば、それに追従している体制全体が倒れる」という発想ですね。サルの社会とか、独裁的なリーダー（president）を立てなければ政体が成り立たないアメリカのような組織には当てはまることですね。（もちろん、アメリカほどの独裁政体になりきれていない“未熟な独裁国家”には簡単に当てはまることですが。）
●“サダム・フセインのトップリング”というアイディアは、キューバへの陰謀以来の米国の野蛮人どもの基本的な発想だったようです。そしてこの手垢の付いたアイディアを“骸骨団”（Skull & Bones）の親子が実現しようとしているなんて、まさにマフィアのような“ファミリービジネス”ですな。（苦笑）
日刊ゲンダイ Dailymail Digest 2003年 2月 5日号（平日毎日発行）
▼ 中東全域支配の突破口 ▼
Posted on Mon, Jan. 27, 2003
Invading Iraq not a new idea for Bush clique
4 years before 9/11, plan was set
By WILLIAM BUNCH
THE WAR CABINET
It was 2:40 p.m. on Sept. 11, 2001, and rescue crews were still scouring the ravaged section of the Pentagon that hijacked American Airlines Flight 77 had destroyed just five hours earlier.
On the other side of the still-smoldering Pentagon complex, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was poring through incoming intelligence reports and jotting down notes. Although most Americans were still shell-shocked, Rumsfeld's thoughts had already turned to a longstanding foe.
Rumsfeld wrote, according to a later CBS News report, that he wanted "best info fast. Judge whether good enough [to] hit S.H. at the same time. Not only UBL" - meaning Osama bin Laden. He added: "Go massive. Sweep it all up. Things related and not."
"S.H.," of course, is Saddam Hussein. The White House has long insisted its strategy for a war against Saddam's Iraq - a war that could now begin in a matter of days - arose from the rubble of the deadly attack that day.
But in reality, Rumsfeld, Vice President Dick Cheney, and a small band of conservative ideologues had begun making the case for an American invasion of Iraq as early as 1997 - nearly four years before the Sept. 11 attacks and three years before President Bush took office.
An obscure, ominous-sounding right-wing policy group called Project for the New American Century, or PNAC - affiliated with Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rumsfeld's top deputy Paul Wolfowitz and Bush's brother Jeb - even urged then-President Clinton to invade Iraq back in January 1998.
"We urge you to... enunciate a new strategy that would secure the interests of the U.S. and our friends and allies around the world," stated the letter to Clinton, signed by Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and others. "That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power." (For full text of the letter, see www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm)
The saga of Project for the New American Century may help answer some of the questions being asked both across the nation and around the world as Bush seems increasingly likely to call for military action to remove Saddam from power.
Why does the Bush administration seem hell-bent on war in the Middle East when key world powers and U.S. allies - such as France, Germany, Russia and China - don't support it right now? Or when most Americans say they don't want war, either, as long as the United Nations won't endorse one?
Why the rush, and why now, when Saddam seems weakened by a decade of economic sanctions?
The answers are complicated, but most arise from the concept - endorsed by many of the key players in the Bush administration - that America, as the world's lone superpower, should be putting that power to use.
"The history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire," says the PNAC's statement of principles. "The history of this century should have taught us to embrace the cause of American leadership."
Ian Lustick, a University of Pennsylvania political science professor and Middle East expert, calls the Cheney-Rumsfeld group "a cabal" - a band of conservative ideologues whose grand notions of American unilateral military might are out of touch and dangerous.
"What happened was 9/11, which had nothing to do with Iraq but produced an enormous amount of political capital which allowed the government to do anything it wanted as long as they could relate it to national security and the Middle East," Lustick said.
Gary Schmitt, the executive director of PNAC, laughs at the notion that his group is a secretive force driving U.S. policy, even as he acknowledges that the current plan for ousting Saddam differs little from what the group proposed in early 1998.
"We're not the puppeteer behind it all," said Schmitt, noting that before Sept. 11, 2001, the Bush administration had adopted the moderate policies on Iraq favored by Secretary of State Colin Powell.
Policy draft on U.S. power
Still, the most hawkish members of the Bush administration, who are clearly in the driver's seat, have ties to PNAC. Their ideas about the aggressive use of American clout and military force arose more than a decade ago, in the wake of the collapse of communism and victory in the Persian Gulf War.
When the United States routed Saddam's occupying army from Kuwait in March 1991, most aides - including Cheney - approved of the senior Bush's decision to not push forward to Baghdad and oust Saddam.
Cheney asked at a May 1992 briefing: "How many additional American lives is Saddam Hussein worth? And the answer I would give is not very damn many."
Yet shortly before that, in February 1992, staffers for Wolfowitz - who was deputy defense secretary under Cheney at the time - drafted an American defense policy that called for the United States to aggressively use its military might. The draft made no mention of a role for the United Nations.
The proposed policy urged the United States to "establish and protect a new order" that accounts "sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership," while at the same time maintaining a military dominance capable of "deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role." The draft caused an outcry and was not adopted by Cheney and Wolfowitz.
But in the years immediately following Bush's election defeat by Bill Clinton in 1992, Saddam's tight grip on power in Iraq, and his defiance of U.N. weapons inspectors, began to grate on the former Bush aides.
"They wanted revenge - they felt humiliated," said Penn's Lustick. He recalled the now infamous 1983 picture of Rumsfeld as an American envoy shaking hands with Saddam, at a time when U.S. officials had thought the secular dictator to be a "moderating" force in the Arab world.
At the same time, the heady years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall gave rise to the notion that the removal of Saddam and the establishment of an Arab-run, pro-American democracy might have a kind of "domino effect" in the Middle East, influencing neighbors like Saudi Arabia or Syria.
At the United Nations last November, Bush said that if Iraqis are liberated, "they can one day join a democratic Afghanistan and a democratic Palestine, inspiring reforms throughout the Muslim world."
The neo-conservative ideas about Iraq began to come together around the time that PNAC was formed, in spring 1997. Although the group's overriding goal was expanding the U.S. military and American influence around the globe, the group placed a strong early emphasis on Iraq.
In addition to Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, early backers of the group included Jeb Bush, the president's brother; Richard Armitage, now deputy secretary of state; Robert Zoellick, now U.S. trade commissioner; I. Lewis Libby, now Cheney's top aide; and Zalmay Khalilzad, now America's special envoy to Afghanistan.
In addition to Clinton, the group lobbied GOP leaders in Congress to push for Saddam's removal - by force if necessary.
"We should establish and maintain a strong U.S. military presence in the region, and be prepared to use that force to protect our vital interests in the Gulf - and, if necessary, to help remove Saddam from power," the group wrote to Rep. Newt Gingrich and Sen. Trent Lott in May 1998.
Many of the best-known supporters have ties to the oil industry - most notably Cheney, who at the time was CEO of Halliburton, which makes oil-field equipment and would likely profit from the need to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure.
While oil is a backdrop to PNAC's policy pronouncements on Iraq, it doesn't seem to be the driving force. Lustick, while a critic of the Bush policy, says oil is viewed by the war's proponents primarily as a way to pay for the costly military operation.
"I'm from Texas, and every oil man that I know is against military action in Iraq," said PNAC's Schmitt. "The oil market doesn't need disruption."
Lustick believes that a more powerful hidden motivator may be Israel. He said Bush administration hawks believe that a show of force in Iraq would somehow convince Palestinians to accept a peace plan on terms favorable to Israel - an idea he scoffs at.
Both supporters and opponents of a war in Iraq agree on one thing: That the events of Sept. 11 were the trigger that finally put the theory in action.
"That pulled the shades off the president's eyes very quickly," said Schmitt, who'd been unhappy with Bush's initial policies. "He came to the conclusion that the meaning of 9/11 was broader than a particular group of terrorists striking a particular group of cities."
The fact that many U.S. allies, particularly in western Europe, and millions of American citizens haven't reached the same conclusion seems to matter little as the war plan pushes forward.
A frustrated Lustick sees the war plan as the triumph of a simple ideology over the messy realities of global politics.
"This is not a war on fanatics," he said. "This is a war of fanatics - our fanatics."
Invading Iraq not a new idea for Bush clique：4 years before 9/11, plan was set
U.S./Iraq History：A timeline
Posted on Mon, Jan. 27, 2003
U.S. Iraq history
June 1979: Saddam Hussein, a leader of a coup that had seized power in Iraq 10 years earlier, officially becomes the nation’s leader. He launches war on neighboring Iran the next year.
Dec. 20, 1983: Then-President Ronald Reagan dispatches a former defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, as a special envoy to Baghdad, where he is photographed shaking hands with Saddam. The U.S. sees Iraq as a possible buffer against Iran’s radical Islamic fundamentalism.
1988: George H.W. Bush is elected president, while the Iran- Iraq war finally ends.
Aug. 2, 1990: Iraq invades and occupies oil-rich Kuwait, its neighbor. The United States and other allies vow to dislodge Saddam.
March 3, 1991: U.S.-led Operation Desert Storm retakes Kuwait and routs the Iraqi army. Then- President Bush decides not to oust Saddam, fearing a power vacuum and uncertainty if he is dislodged.
February 1992: A team working with deputy defense secretary Paul Wolfowitz drafts a policy to more aggressively use American military power around the globe, both to rout unfriendly regimes and to keep potential rivals in check. The plan is rejected after public outcry. Later that year, Bush is defeated for re-election by Bill Clinton.
June 3, 1997: A new conservative policy group with close ties to a number of former members of the Bush administration is formed, calling itself the Project for the New American Century, or PNAC. The group supports more funding for the military and pre-emptive use of American might, if necessary.
Jan. 26, 1998: PNAC sends a letter to President Clinton, urging him to make removing Saddam Hussein the cornerstone of American policy. It writes: “We believe the U.S. has the authority under existing U.N. resolutions to take the necessary steps, including military steps, to protect our vital interests in the Gulf.”
December 1998: Clinton launches Operation Desert Fox, a four- day bombing campaign to punish Baghdad for kicking out weapons inspectors.
Dec. 12, 2000: George W. Bush wins the disputed 2000 presidential election after the Supreme Court halts Florida recount. Bush brings a number of PNAC backers, including Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Dick Cheney, into his administration.
Feb. 16, 2001: Bush orders bombing of Iraqi command-and- control centers near Baghdad and signals that the United States will take a much tougher line toward Saddam.
Sept. 11, 2001: Terrorists hijack four U.S. jets and attack the World Trade Center and Pentagon, killing nearly 3,000 in the worst terror attack in U.S. history. Although there’s no known link between the terrorists and Iraq, Rumsfeld, Cheney and other top Bush aides say the attacks justify their strategy of pre-emptive strikes.
Sept. 13, 2001: Wolfowitz tells a Pentagon news conference that there is now a need for “ending states who sponsor terrorism” ―― widely viewed as a reference to Iraq.
February 2002: Bush gives his approval to a U.S. campaign to topple Saddam from power, including use of the military if necessary.
Sept. 12, 2002: One year and one day after the al Qaeda attack on America, Bush tells the United Nations it must rid the world of Iraq’s biological, chemical and nuclear arsenals, or stand aside as the United States acts.
PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY
January 26, 1998
The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
Dear Mr. President:
We are writing you because we are convinced that current American policy toward Iraq is not succeeding, and that we may soon face a threat in the Middle East more serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold War. In your upcoming State of the Union Address, you have an opportunity to chart a clear and determined course for meeting this threat. We urge you to seize that opportunity, and to enunciate a new strategy that would secure the interests of the U.S. and our friends and allies around the world. That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power. We stand ready to offer our full support in this difficult but necessary endeavor.
The policy of “containment” of Saddam Hussein has been steadily eroding over the past several months. As recent events have demonstrated, we can no longer depend on our partners in the Gulf War coalition to continue to uphold the sanctions or to punish Saddam when he blocks or evades UN inspections. Our ability to ensure that Saddam Hussein is not producing weapons of mass destruction, therefore, has substantially diminished. Even if full inspections were eventually to resume, which now seems highly unlikely, experience has shown that it is difficult if not impossible to monitor Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons production. The lengthy period during which the inspectors will have been unable to enter many Iraqi facilities has made it even less likely that they will be able to uncover all of Saddam’s secrets. As a result, in the not-too-distant future we will be unable to determine with any reasonable level of confidence whether Iraq does or does not possess such weapons.
Such uncertainty will, by itself, have a seriously destabilizing effect on the entire Middle East. It hardly needs to be added that if Saddam does acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, as he is almost certain to do if we continue along the present course, the safety of American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world’s supply of oil will all be put at hazard. As you have rightly declared, Mr. President, the security of the world in the first part of the 21st century will be determined largely by how we handle this threat.
Given the magnitude of the threat, the current policy, which depends for its success upon the steadfastness of our coalition partners and upon the cooperation of Saddam Hussein, is dangerously inadequate. The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the near term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy.
We urge you to articulate this aim, and to turn your Administration's attention to implementing a strategy for removing Saddam's regime from power. This will require a full complement of diplomatic, political and military efforts. Although we are fully aware of the dangers and difficulties in implementing this policy, we believe the dangers of failing to do so are far greater. We believe the U.S. has the authority under existing UN resolutions to take the necessary steps, including military steps, to protect our vital interests in the Gulf. In any case, American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council.
We urge you to act decisively. If you act now to end the threat of weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. or its allies, you will be acting in the most fundamental national security interests of the country. If we accept a course of weakness and drift, we put our interests and our future at risk.
Elliott Abrams Richard L. Armitage William J. Bennett
Jeffrey Bergner John Bolton Paula Dobriansky
Francis Fukuyama Robert Kagan Zalmay Khalilzad
William Kristol Richard Perle Peter W. Rodman
Donald Rumsfeld William Schneider, Jr. Vin Weber
Paul Wolfowitz R. James Woolsey Robert B. Zoellick
THE PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
June 3, 1997
American foreign and defense policy is adrift. Conservatives have criticized the incoherent policies of the Clinton Administration. They have also resisted isolationist impulses from within their own ranks. But conservatives have not confidently advanced a strategic vision of America's role in the world. They have not set forth guiding principles for American foreign policy. They have allowed differences over tactics to obscure potential agreement on strategic objectives. And they have not fought for a defense budget that would maintain American security and advance American interests in the new century.
We aim to change this. We aim to make the case and rally support for American global leadership.
As the 20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world's preeminent power.
Having led the West to victory in the Cold War, America faces an opportunity and a challenge: Does the United States have the vision to build upon the achievements of past decades? Does the United States have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests?
We are in danger of squandering the opportunity and failing the challenge. We are living off the
capital -- both the military investments and the foreign policy achievements -- built up by past administrations. Cuts in foreign affairs and defense spending, inattention to the tools of statecraft, and inconstant leadership are making it increasingly difficult to sustain American influence around the world. And the promise of short-term commercial benefits threatens to override strategic considerations. As a consequence, we are jeopardizing the nation's ability to meet present threats and to deal with potentially greater challenges that lie ahead.
We seem to have forgotten the essential elements of the Reagan Administration's success: a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities.
Of course, the United States must be prudent in how it exercises its power. But we cannot safely
avoid the responsibilities of global leadership or the costs that are associated with its exercise. America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. If we shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges to our fundamental interests. The history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire. The history of this century should have taught us to embrace the cause of American leadership.
Our aim is to remind Americans of these lessons and to draw their consequences for today. Here are four consequences:
● we need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global
responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces for the future;
● we need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our
interests and values;
● we need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad;
● we need to accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.
Such a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity may not be fashionable today. But it is necessary if the United States is to build on the successes of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next.
Elliott Abrams Gary Bauer William J. Bennett Jeb Bush
Dick Cheney Eliot A. Cohen Midge Decter Paula Dobriansky Steve Forbes
Aaron Friedberg Francis Fukuyama Frank Gaffney Fred C. Ikle
Donald Kagan Zalmay Khalilzad I. Lewis Libby Norman Podhoretz
Dan Quayle Peter W. Rodman Stephen P. Rosen Henry S. Rowen
Donald Rumsfeld Vin Weber George Weigel Paul Wolfowitz