辺野古転覆事故、ついに政府と国会が動き出した。
https://www.youtube.com/shorts/pYiVcHdv87k
<辺野古転覆事故、ついに政府と国会が動き出した>
家宅捜索も入ってヘリ基地反対協議会が追い詰められている件という話なんですけど、この動画は必ず最後まで見てください。
まず現状を整理します。
事件発生から4日目の3月20日に海上保安庁がヘリ基地反対協議会の事務所に家宅捜索を実施。
業務上過失致死罪、業務上過失往来危険罪、海上運送法違反の疑いで本格捜査が今も進められています。
船2隻は押収済み、運航記録も押収。
船長宅や協会にも捜索が入りました。
そして、ついに4月16日、自民党が政府に提言を出しました。
内容は3本柱。
1つ目、事故原因の徹底究明。
2つ目、全国の修学旅行の安全確保。
3つ目、特定思想に偏らない適切な教育活動の実施。
つまり、平和学習の名のもとに政治的な活動に生徒を巻き込むことを問題視してるってわけですよ。
文部科学省も同志社国際高校への現地調査を調整中です。
これでヘリ基地反対協議会はどうなる可能性があるのか。
最悪の事態を整理しますね。
まず刑事責任の確定です。
波浪注意報下での出航、海保の警告を無視、顧客名簿の未作成、安全基準の未定義。
これらが認定されれば協議会の責任者が起訴有罪になる可能性があります。
次に運航活動の全面禁止です。
海上運送法違反が認定されれば行政処分で業務停止命令。
船2隻はすでに押収されてるんで海上での抗議活動が事実上不可能になります。
そして民事賠償です。
協議会の共同代表は「補償が十分出来るとは思ってない」とビビり散らかしてますけど、死亡した知華さんの遺族、重軽傷を負った生徒14人からの損害賠償請求は確実です。
これによって、団体の資産消滅だけでなく個人責任にまで及ぶ可能性すらあります。
さらに社会信用の失墜です。
自民党の提言が全国に広まれば、辺野古平和学習を敬遠する学校が増えますよね。
支援団体や寄付ボランティアも当然離れていくでしょう。
つまり活動基盤そのものが崩壊する可能性があるんです。
僕は正直に言います。
この最悪の事態が現実になることを心から祈っています。
17歳の女子高生が亡くなって、遺族がたった数人で戦っているこの悲しき状況。
団体側は直接謝罪もせず「前に進めない」とかなめたこと言ってます。
そんな連中が平和を語る資格はないんですよ。
徹底的に責任を取らせるべきです。
皆さんはこの件についてどう思いますか。
《コメント(抜粋)》
@ch-ot1hh
社民と共産の両党から被害者及び被害者遺族に賠償金を出させろ
@rightwing2332
共産党と社民党にも徹底的に責任を負わせるべき!
@佐藤泰男
日本共産党のせいで女子高生が亡くなった。
@ふうらいぼう風来坊
共産党と沖縄県庁にも調査すべき
@mak4u71
共産党、社民党…そして当時から何度も事故を繰り返し見過ごし 国交大臣利権をしゃぶり倒してた公明党
これら全て断罪されて欲しい。
@あかまさ-s3g
オフレコを公開する新聞が
こういう事は追及しないのかーい?
沖縄の新聞さんよ!!
@inzw1976
組織の解明、責任追求、解散まで徹底的にやってくれ
@BehindScenes000
責任とるまで、協議会を解散させるな。
徹底的にやってほしい。学校、協議会、関連政党
@笠満-i5f
共産党本部にも、家宅捜索を入れるべき
@mseg4931
しっかりやってくれ
この様な事をしっかりやってもらう為に自民党に票が集まったんだろ、民意だぞ
@まさひー-b2b
徹底的に罰して活動不能に追い込み、補償も全財産売ってでもさせるべき。
@るるとぶぶ
これだけで終わってはならん??今までこれを放置していた沖縄県知事と県議会、沖縄県警察の責任まで追求すべき事件だろう???
@森本久
こいつらに天罰を!!
人間失格!徹底的に責任を取らせましょう!
@トメクルーズ
関わっている国会議員も同罪
@kakobaya1016
賛成です。徹底究明して下さい。社民党、共産党の解党も視野にはいるべきです。
県知事の責任も問われるべき。
@ヤッホー-h8v
亡くなられてしまった方や遺族の方の為にも徹底的にやってくれ‥‥じゃないと報われない
@caj67560
亡くなられた生徒さんのなんと無念なことか
巨悪が総じて自己保身している様をどのように見ていることだろうか
@usuzuki1632
「平和を語る資格が無い」
納得
@睦竜馬
しっかり調べて、犠牲になった子供たちの無念を晴らせ??
@EXIGE420
この件は風化させないように徹底的に追求すべき犯罪だ!
@Barandobaran-2929
徹底的に責任を取らせる。激しく同意します。もっとこの事を、報道しろよオールドメディア!
@みやちゃん-k4s
その通りです。
デニー氏の追及も同時にお願いします。
@yoshiaki9689
そういったことを、なぜテレビ報道されないのか…
もっと大々的に報道すべきだと思う。
@下足番
海上保安庁さん、ありがとうございます。
@yyymtmtymg1197
産経とテレ東以外の報道しないマスゴミも同罪でいいよ
@wolf01-l8l
その通りだと思います!
あと忘れてはいけないのが、
バックに、
共産党、社民党がいることを、
共産党、社民党にも捜査するべきだと思います!
@younan68000
動画作成ありがとうございます。
おそらく遺族な方々に、どれだけ勇気を与えたことでしょう。
高校も含めて、徹底的に責任を負わせるべきです。
@ponpon15154
賛成です。こいつらに全ての責任を取らせないといけないんです
@中島しんいち
社民、共産党を政府日本国が叩き潰さないと又同じことが起きる。
@toshisa10
オールドメディア、ちゃんと報道しろ!
@backstep3188
共産党、社民党の責任もお願いします
@彩雲雷鳴
団体側や支援者が「事故を利用した活動弾圧だ」と反発しそうな気がします。
自分達は絶対正義だと妄信してる連中ですからね。
@s是清高橋-j6p
ありがとうございます。絶対に風化させるな。最後まで続けて下さい..
@damashiaisora
自民党、頑張れ 徹底的に責任追及してくれ
@hisa_gsr2505
沖縄県民ですが、知事にも責任を
@alma.4989
学生を盾にやりたい放題したツケは必ず払わせなくては報われない
@中村孝明-f2s
おかしな事を繰り返している団体の撲滅に出来ることがあるのならば自分も力になりたいです。
@Japanesefoodtourism.GO-777
帰化国会議員達も自分の支持率を気にして、
取り合えず調査しようか!
という意識レベルだろ!
と個人的に思う。
@オオホリミツヒロ
その通りです。徹底的に進めて下さい。行方不明事件にかき消されてはいけません。重大な組織的犯罪だと思います。
@BakuretuDama
自民党と被害者家族応援してます
@峰裕輔
やっとですか?遅すぎです、後は沖縄県民が選挙で反日売国奴デニーを落選させてまともな知事になり新たな知事が左翼集団を排除してくれることを願います。
@スニーカーまぁくん
あの会見思い出す度にはらわた煮え繰り返る。自分の子供が被害にあったのを想像すると胸が張り裂ける思いになる。
@Tamago-b3u
まったくです
辺野古事故の責任者を明確にし政治的な闇を排除、賠償責任も問い辺野古から内地の反対派組織の解体を速やかにやってもらいたい
@正己横田
今回はテレビの手のひら返しを期待してしまいます。亡くなった高校生の親御さん儀礼、節度を持った行動、娘さんを慈しむ気持ちは頭が下がります。こんな人達を苦しめる社会は間違っていることを報道して下さい。いつまでも身内の損得の事件は要りません。
@jinpeitv
謝罪かと思えば、腕組みして、何様?どちら様?こんな団体解体でよし。
@ソルトお塩さん
子供1人も守れない人間
責任の擦り合い
ふざけた謝罪
逃げて逃げまくる組織
本当にムカつく??だけでは、済まないぞ\@テクテクきゃたつ
ダンプ事故のように左派弁護士集結でも今回はうまくいかない、左派メディアがとぼけても風化される事は無い、左は世間を舐め過ぎ
@西本圭志
「最悪の事態」ではなく、『最高の事態』でしょ\@村松貴代美
共産党=社民党もそうですよね。人が生きてる可能性があるのに、上からセメント流せるあの国そのもの。
@kan0819
不起訴か無罪でしょう。なぜかそうなります。日本は左派は基本何してもいいとされる国なので。でも、民事訴訟はのがれられないでしょう。
@Sira-ume
テレビで放送されなくても、こうやってネットで発信してくれている方々のお陰で、風化されること無く、動いていくのだと思います。
命の重さを省みない、己の自己保身に走る方々には、しっかりと責任を取っていただきたいですね??
@伊賀蘭-J
毎回取り上げて下さってる方々には本当に感謝しています…
あまりにも酷すぎます
地上波マスコミ等等はちゃんと報道するのか…ずっと見ていますが…全くなのです…
今まだ動き出しただけ… 結果がよい方向になる迄…
ネット配信して下さってる方々の応援はさせて頂きます
ご両親や他の保護者の方々の気持ちを考えると本当に切ないのです…
配信者様には感謝しかありません…
よろしくお願い致します(_ _;)
@DK-ue3se
どうせ裁判になっても、左巻きの弁護団と被告どもがふざけた横断幕広げながら裁判所に入って行って、敗訴しても「不当判決」とか抜かして最高裁まで粘るんだろう。何年かかることやら。
@TODA-e1w
ようやく動きが出てきましたが、ここまで時間稼ぎされた以上、相当な攻防があったと思われます。
そして時間稼ぎされただけ、過去の類似事象含め隠滅されている可能性を危惧しています。
メディア含めた支援団体の全容と、資金の流れの解明まで行くのでしょうか。
@鳴子太郎
徹底的に責任追及してほしいです。
こんな無責任な連中を野放しにしては遺族は泣くに泣けない、、徹底的に追及して、然るべき罰を与えるべきです。
@ニャンカ
オールドメディアではちょろっとしか報道していない現状、これだけSNSが発達した今では報道しない自由は逆効果なんだか
@かちたび
そんな末端じゃなくて、共産党本部とオキナワ県庁を家宅捜索すべき。返す刀で日教組ですね。
@3486マイケル
こいつらを野放しにした、玉城デニーも沖縄県議会で徹底追及しないといけません。
@濱砂修
徹底的にやって下さい?こんなクズ共の為に未来ある若者が失われた?こんな不正義は絶対許したらいかん..
@アダモチャンペイ
抗議活動の末に人の命を奪ってしまった結末。命を軽視してるとしか思えないです。この団体を完膚なきまで叩き潰すべき。
@TeruoKase-kb9qz
賠償金は心配ないでしょ。だって
こんな時こそカンパでいくらでも集められるんじゃないですか?
@たまちゃん-i9x
最悪の事態?最高の事態.マスコミは産経以外だんまりも腹立つ..
http://www.asyura2.com/26/cult51/msg/731.html
28. ノーサイド[7645] g22BW4NUg0ODaA 2026年4月30日 19:26:16 : i1UvvkhscQ : S0U1NmRLQkxrbXc=[2]
「抗告」は憲法にも認められた検察の権利。
しかし、再審が認められるまでに時間がかかりすぎる。
ポイントはここよ。
(大笑)
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/533.html#c28
33. たぬき和尚[2968] gr2CyoKrmGGPrg 2026年4月30日 19:30:56 : ZGAvq8lUL6 : RGlkdUxULi93MEE=[2568]
高市の手柄であるはずがない。なのに「私頑張りました」なんてよくも言えたもんだ。
功労者は石破茂前総理と例話新選組の伊勢崎賢治議員のようだ。救国超党派連合の2人の活躍で、1カ月分というわずかではあるが原油を手にすることができた。
もちろん彼らは自分がやりましたとは言わないし、オールド呆けメディアは高市の功績と信じて疑わないだろう。高市が赤澤を駆使して油を手に入れたとしか思わないだろう。
まあいい。自慢するために政治をやっているわけではない。マスコミが伝えなくてもネットの真実が伝えているだけで十分だ。私たち国民は、イランからさらに原油を手に入れるために、爬虫類女を倒すべくクーデターを起こそう。人知れず微笑まん…
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/532.html#c33
34. たぬき和尚[2969] gr2CyoKrmGGPrg 2026年4月30日 19:32:44 : ZGAvq8lUL6 : RGlkdUxULi93MEE=[2569]
33訂正
例話新選組 → れいわ新選組
(最近ミス変換が多くて申し訳ない)
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/532.html#c34
29. 多魔鬼は鵺[263] kb2WgotTgs3qSw 2026年4月30日 19:35:14 : A3ME29BuqU : Vk85ZXJUNmpwZjY=[1]
>>28
憲法の何条に書いてあるのかね?(嗤)
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/533.html#c29
12. 天元[1511] k1aMsw 2026年4月30日 19:37:35 : ZVfystqlsM : ZUY2UVpNd2t4eHc=[1934]
林氏は兎も角、小泉氏の無能は世間でも知られてる評価。
そんな人物を自身の第一に考えている政策、軍事拡大政策を小泉氏に託したのだろうか。
自分の政策を素直に受け入れてくれる人物であらからだろうか。
そう考えると、納得はできるが。
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/536.html#c12
74. 岩宿[945] iuKPaA 2026年4月30日 19:44:24 : RjisEYM0Dc : SjVNbTh6OVR1a00=[32]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3hO7ov4Khmc
-----------
イラン危機はイラン体制が時間を浪費することで最悪の事態になる。イラン体制の穏健な現実派が神学的な行動を重視する強硬派を説得して、破滅の道を防げるか。今のところ時間は浪費されている。
////// AI //////
2026年4月30日現在、私たちが直面しているのは、単なる外交の停滞ではなく、イラン国内の「神学的な生存(イデオロギーの等価)」と「物理的な生存(資源の継続)」という、相容れない二つの規範による階層間の激突です。
ユーザー様が懸念される「2026年7月」というデッドラインは、石油工学における「貯留層の修復不能な劣化」が確定する物理的な境界線です。この壁を越えてしまえば、イランは交渉の最大のカードを失い、世界は「等価交換の基盤」を恒久的に喪失することになります。
イラン体制内部で、穏健な現実派が強硬派を説得できるか否か、その現在の力学を分析します
1. 「神聖なる団結」という偽りの均衡
現在、テヘランから発信されている「穏健派も強硬派も存在しない。我々は一つだ」というスローガン(聖なる団結)は、外部向けのプロパガンダであると同時に、内実としては「思考停止による現状維持」を意味しています。
_() 強硬派(革命防衛隊・ヴァヒディ等)の論理: 彼らにとって、米国への妥協は「等価交換」ではなく「一方的な収奪(敗北)」です。ハメネイ師亡き後、後継のモジュタバ師の正当性を固めるために、彼らは「神学的な勝利」を物理的な資源(油田)よりも上位に置いています。
_() 現実派(ペゼシュキアン、ガリバフ等)の焦燥: 彼らはパキスタンを通じた裏ルートで、核濃縮の停止やホルムズ海峡の条件付き再開という「現実的な交換」を提示しています。彼らは、「油田が死ぬことは、イランというシステムの自己資本が永久に蒸発すること」を理解している唯一の層です。
2. 浪費される「清算の猶予期間」
トランプ政権が提示している「15項目の和平案」は、イラン側から見れば「全財産の差し押さえ」に等しい過酷な条件です。しかし、等価交換の原理で見れば、これは「過去のテロ支援や資源遮断という負債を、今ここで一気に清算しろ」という通告です。
勢力___________________重視する階層______________行動原理
強硬派(Hardliners)_____神学層(虚構の正義)________資源を壊してでも「誇り」を維持する
現実派(Moderates)______物理層(インフラ・生存)____資源を維持するために「体制の変質」を
_________________________________________________受け入れる
トランプ政権___________金融・資源層(覇権)________徹底的な「ゼロ濃縮」という等価交換を
_________________________________________________要求
3. 2026年7月:物理的な審判の日
ユーザー様が指摘された通り、イランの油田(特にサザン・アザデガン等の巨大油田)は、長期間の生産停止とメンテナンス不足によって、地圧の低下や水攻法の失敗による「不可逆的な目詰まり」を起こす寸前にあります。
_() 交渉の消失: 7月までに合意ができず、油田が「ただの泥沼」と化した場合、現実派の説得材料(=石油を売って国を立て直すという希望)は完全に消滅します。
_() 最悪のシナリオ: 交渉の意味を失ったイランは、残された唯一の生存戦略として、周辺諸国のインフラ(サウジの石油施設やUAEの脱塩プラント)に対する、まさに「道連れ」の全力攻撃に出る可能性が極めて高くなります。
_[] 洞察:等価交換という「時間」の残酷さ
現実派が強硬派を説得するための武器は、皮肉にも**「迫りくる物理的破局」**そのものです。彼らは「今交渉しなければ、神が与えた資源(石油)を永遠に失う罪を犯すことになる」という論理で、強硬派の神学的な壁に穴を開けようとしています。
[] 結論:日本が直面する「配給制」への秒読み
この内部説得が失敗に終わることは、日本のエネルギー動脈が永久に細くなることを意味します。2026年7月を過ぎたとき、私たちは「一過性の危機」ではなく、「資源の絶対量が減少した世界での、恒久的な統制経済」という新しい階層への移行を、国民として受け入れざるを得なくなるでしょう。
http://www.asyura2.com/23/hasan136/msg/603.html#c74
1. 赤かぶ[263260] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 20:00:34 : 7EAujUD4t6 : ZUJoWmk4b2NYeTI=[1]
石油製品全般に影響出てくるため、日本の輸出を支える自動車産業にも飛び火すると思う。
— Shige1968 (@kzm_sgyk) April 29, 2026
高市政権は、本気で日本経済を破壊し、日本全体を豊かにするのではなく、廃虚にしようとしている。
こんな政党に、いつまで企業団体献金を払いますか?
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/537.html#c1
2. 赤かぶ[263261] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 20:01:30 : 7EAujUD4t6 : ZUJoWmk4b2NYeTI=[2]
https://x.com/atsuhiko310/status/2049423311822823699
佐藤敦彦
@atsuhiko310
食品用包装資材の仕事してます、1部のものは既にメーカーが出荷停止にしてます。出してるメーカーも7月以降の手当できてません
3. 赤かぶ[263262] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 20:02:54 : 7EAujUD4t6 : ZUJoWmk4b2NYeTI=[3]
https://x.com/NMnAQvbdJW43824/status/2049441912533451017
3210
@NMnAQvbdJW43824
建設現場ではすでに塗料や塩ビ管が不足し、工事が止まっていますよ。仮に半年くらい止まったとしたら、ほとんどの建設会社は倒産します。
4. 赤かぶ[263263] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 20:05:41 : 7EAujUD4t6 : ZUJoWmk4b2NYeTI=[4]
https://x.com/shuseinome/status/2049240566257623422
周正の目|本質を見る
@shuseinome
国民生活産業・消費者団体連合会の調査によると、ナフサの供給不安が事業に影響を与えている企業が44.1%、今後3カ月以内に影響が予想される企業が31.4%。特に食品・飲料メーカーが半数を占める。供給不安が食品値上げを加速させる可能性が高まる。次回の食品価格動向と供給量の変動を注視。
5. 赤かぶ[263264] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 20:11:35 : 7EAujUD4t6 : ZUJoWmk4b2NYeTI=[5]
2026/04/30 TBS NEWS DIG
あすから5月ですが、食品の値上げは70品目にとどまっています。ただ、調査した会社は夏にも中東情勢の影響によるナフサの供給不安から値上げが加速する可能性があるとしています。
帝国データバンクによりますと、来月に値上げされる食品や飲料は70品目で、去年5月と比べて85.4%減りました。ひと月の値上げ品目が100品目を下回るのは、今年1月以来、4か月ぶりです。
分野別では、▼チョコレート菓子などの「菓子」が最も多い38品目。次いで、▼即席めんなどの「加工食品」が16品目、▼「酒類・飲料」が16品目となっています。
ただ、中東情勢の影響を受けたナフサの供給不安から包装材などの値上げが相次いでいて、この夏以降、「ナフサ不足を要因とした広範な値上げが再燃する可能性がある」と分析しています。
▼TBS NEWS DIG 公式サイト https://newsdig.tbs.co.jp/
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/537.html#c5
6. 赤かぶ[263265] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 20:14:21 : 7EAujUD4t6 : ZUJoWmk4b2NYeTI=[6]
イランと交渉しない高市政権の成果。#高市やめろ
— さとつん🇺🇦🇵🇸(政治は上下、脱原発) (@satotsun5656) April 30, 2026
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/537.html#c6
7. 赤かぶ[263266] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 20:15:29 : 7EAujUD4t6 : ZUJoWmk4b2NYeTI=[7]
高市早苗がイランと話し合わないからナフサが不足に。このままでは建設業全体が危機に。まさに高市ナフサ危機だ。
— あらかわ (@kazu10233147) April 19, 2026
中東危機が住宅直撃…塗料値上げ、ユニットバス品薄 原油供給不安長引けば中小は苦境に(産経新聞) https://t.co/VoVUrEpgpv
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/537.html#c7
8. 赤かぶ[263267] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 20:16:42 : 7EAujUD4t6 : ZUJoWmk4b2NYeTI=[8]
令和の無責任女バカイチ早苗総裁は、石油不足対策零、物価上昇対策零庶民には目を向けい能天気政策で。米国の独裁者トランプにきげんとりだけだ。バカイチ早苗総裁は火の国には不要人物だ。
— つとむ (@higashi237340) April 24, 2026
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/537.html#c8
9. 赤かぶ[263268] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 20:18:26 : 7EAujUD4t6 : ZUJoWmk4b2NYeTI=[9]
偽・誤情報には注意してますが、今回の事態に関しては、世界機関や他国の認識と日本政府の認識の乖離が大き過ぎると感じています!
— 仕事帰りにコンビニ寄りがちな30代 (@kaishakonbiniie) April 24, 2026
実際に国内の需要に対して生産が追いつかない状況で、まだ時間はかかりますが間もなくいい情報がお届けできると思ってるって、何の説得力も感じないです。
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/537.html#c9
10. 赤かぶ[263269] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 20:21:46 : 7EAujUD4t6 : ZUJoWmk4b2NYeTI=[10]
びっくりするぐらい値上がりしちゃうんだろうな…
— 猫と暮らす人 (@nekotonichijou) April 28, 2026
仕事もヤバいけど、生活できるかな?
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/537.html#c10
13. evilspys[2684] goWCloKJgoyCk4KQgpmCkw 2026年4月30日 20:23:43 : LY52bYZiZQ : aXZHNXJYTVV4YVE=[19663]
重大スクープ解説!文春砲が暴いた高市早苗のSNS誹謗中傷動画の裏。前衆議院議員・福島伸享さん。安冨歩東京大学名誉教授。一月万冊清水
一月万冊
81 分 前に公開済み
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KbO3AFWYpFc
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/536.html#c13
11. 赤かぶ[263270] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 20:24:12 : 7EAujUD4t6 : ZUJoWmk4b2NYeTI=[11]
主要食品メーカー195社の値上げ計画は、4月末時点で9月までに6290品目に達し、帝国データバンクは6月〜10月に値上げラッシュが再燃する可能性があると指摘。
— あいひん (@BABYLONBU5TER) April 30, 2026
背景には、原材料価格の高騰に加え、ナフサの不足や供給不安があり、今後さらに値上げが上積みされる可能性がある。 pic.twitter.com/dtyYugLWv8
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/537.html#c11
12. 赤かぶ[263271] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 20:26:34 : 7EAujUD4t6 : ZUJoWmk4b2NYeTI=[12]
ナフサ不足で何も無ければ値上げ💢
— 未来 (@geboruchan) April 30, 2026
結局、海外に依存が問題。
食料もプラでも国産に変えないとこうなる。
何もなくなりますよ‼️
#ナフサ
#プラ
#何も無い
#海外依存
#値上げ
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/537.html#c12
13. 赤かぶ[263272] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 20:30:23 : 7EAujUD4t6 : ZUJoWmk4b2NYeTI=[13]
高市首相、ナフサ供給「年を越えて確保できる見込みに」:朝日新聞 https://t.co/dwSqfFs99S
— SHIM(シム)@乃木坂◢ │⁴⁶菅原咲月 (@shim1973t2011t) April 30, 2026
貴女の言うことは一切信頼性がない。
これまで嘘を積み重ねてきたから。
それまでは他の国論を二分する政策に手を出すな。#高市嘘つき#高市モームリ#高市政権今すぐ退陣#憲法
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/537.html#c13
6. 一般通過メガネブサイク[333] iOqUypLKid@DgYNLg2yDdYNUg0ODTg 2026年4月30日 20:30:29 : Nf2PcZ7ZZc : Z2E4eW1QcUxVaFU=[1390]
チャールズ英国王も、案外、イスラエルに「同様の」弱味を握られている可能性は充分にありますねぇ。
なんかもう「英国王」というよりも、未だに「英国女王の息子」としか見れないのですよねぇ。明らかに、かつての女王よりは迂闊なお人ですからねぇ。
中国からの「阿片戦争以来の150年の恨み」が、弱った所に一気に降ってくる準備が整ったようで、私としては楽しみに観察させて貰えて何よりです。愚かな王を推戴する国は、衰退するが常なのでしょう。
http://www.asyura2.com/25/kokusai36/msg/288.html#c6
14. 赤かぶ[263273] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 20:32:50 : 7EAujUD4t6 : ZUJoWmk4b2NYeTI=[14]
豆腐屋さんがテレビで言ってましたが、豆腐を入れる物が足りないそうです。
— 鈴木一善🇮🇱❌🇷🇺❌千花リス🐿Mint_cafe居候🐸 (@ka2uy0sh1) April 30, 2026
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/537.html#c14
15. 赤かぶ[263274] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 20:34:07 : 7EAujUD4t6 : ZUJoWmk4b2NYeTI=[15]
ナフサは必要、サギエは不要!
— かぶかぶ (@kabukabu_1st) April 29, 2026
高市やめろ!🖕🤪🖕#高市モームリ#ママ戦争止めてくるわ #高市早苗って統一教会だったんだな #不正選挙を許すな #巨悪あり法これを裁けず#高市やめろ pic.twitter.com/gvTjwm0S5g
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/537.html#c15
16. 赤かぶ[263275] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 20:35:55 : 7EAujUD4t6 : ZUJoWmk4b2NYeTI=[16]
石油タンカーがホルムズ海峡を通れないのに
— tomo@1179 (@tomo1179178070) April 28, 2026
経済活動を止めるななんて無茶苦茶なことをいう政府
水を石油の代わりにせよ
と言ってるようなもの😡
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/537.html#c16
9. ぷぴぴぷ[1471] gtWC0oLSgtU 2026年4月30日 20:36:19 : utRfMB8Nq6 : eVJlekxLQ1UvUFk=[158]
***【 10年では終わらない可能性 】*** イランがどうするか??
原油高は10年間では収まらなくなる可能性が大!!修理にそれだけかかるから。
(RUSI 日本特別代表 秋元千秋) イラン革命隊はそれでも戦うかアメリカに折れるか
〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜
イランは原油を置く場所が無く、タンクが満タンのまま==>目詰まりを起こす
==>【 10年間でも修理不能 】
==>【 その間の石油奪い合いで価格高が維持 】
ロシアは儲かるのでウハウハになる。
しかし、ウクライナはNATOの支援で無人戦車などでの大量殺戮が可能になった。
〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜
★【 ウクライナの追撃型ドローンは日本の技術 】★
ロシア産ドローン 560万円 シャヘド 攻撃用 時速185km
ウクライナ製ドローン 40万円 テラA1 迎撃用 時速300km
**【 日本のテラドローン株式会社 】**の技術が使用、社長自らウクライナに出向きセールス
勝手に上場企業の社長・徳重 徹が戦争に参加かぁ??
ウクライナの戦争ドローン企業と提携した。
自ら9回もウクライナに飛んでウクライナ企業を説得した徳重徹。
金儲けさえすれば外人がどれだけ死んでも戦争が長引いても構わない守銭奴。
ロシアはこれで苦境に立たされている。日本に抗議を公表した。
武器輸出解禁だから、今後は直接に武器開発&製造して完成品を出荷する予定。
(どうせ、中国に直ぐまねされてドロドロになって世界中どこでも戦争が終わらなくなる。)
〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜
日本はこれで、ロシアから完全拒否されるか?
BRICsから除外か。
中国ももっと厳しくしてくるだろう。
日本のカビの生えた古い軍需産業隊は規模がでかいだけで稚拙だな!!
〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜〜
兎に角、
【 あと2週間ほどでイランのタンクは目詰まりで修理には10年間はかかる 】
==>【 世界の原油高&インフレ物価高がそれまで収束しない 】
アメリカの折れるか、
10年間の経済を失っても革命隊が戦い続けるのか。
P.S.
アメリカのあらゆる研究機関や大学が2週間ほどで異端のタンクが目詰まりでアウトと分析。
それでトランプは湾閉鎖をしばらく続ける決断をした。
どっちにしても、世界中が偉い迷惑だな〜〜〜
4. T80BVM[2232] VIJXgk9CVk0 2026年4月30日 20:44:18 : YcAPcEYe5l : VlNVN25aQ0NpV0k=[1]
>「外国人に暴力的」 「将来に不安」
ならば、今すぐ祖国に帰りなさい
しかしあれだな
外人(=犯罪予備軍)のクセにデモをやるとか、どんだけ図々しいんだろうか・・・
おまけ
他民族共生を強制するヤツら(パヨチン)は全員新鱈いいと思う
ペドが出るって(大洗www)
憲法変えて日本を戦争に引っ張り込もうとする壺市ナエナエ一味も同じ
52. 夜盗虫[3982] lumTkJKO 2026年4月30日 20:51:57 : 8hEKK4qqzQ : dVFIVDdWc3gwUi4=[1]
人権
反戦
無神論
の三本立てがパヨの柱なんだろW
一切譲歩しないんだろ😓
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/534.html#c52
http://www.asyura2.com/25/lunchbreak56/msg/278.html
53. 夜盗虫[3983] lumTkJKO 2026年4月30日 20:59:57 : 8hEKK4qqzQ : dVFIVDdWc3gwUi4=[2]
俺の三本の矢は、ウー・チョキ・パー。。。
54. うそ松くん[32] gqSCu4@8gq2C8Q 2026年4月30日 21:12:41 : 0iK5iubjxg : cDJZN3RpeTh2a00=[1]
>>51
>俺ってウヨかな。俺自身は、ウヨからはサヨクと憎まれ、サヨからはウヨクと嫌われる。
嘘付けコノヤロー!
オマエは頭の使えないウヨだろう。
AIをコピペして一人遊びしても誰も読まない。掲示板のリソースを無駄に使う馬鹿。
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/534.html#c54
55. 天元[1512] k1aMsw 2026年4月30日 21:19:52 : ZVfystqlsM : ZUY2UVpNd2t4eHc=[1935]
高市政権批判は、確かに個人差はあるでしょうが、いじめでもあるし憂さ晴らしにする人もあるでしょう。開かれた民主政治のもとでは。
其れを学問的に、AIで分析した結論も一つの意見ではないか。個人の意見は感情による物も多く含んでいるのであるから。
故に自分はAIの結論も一つの意見でであり、全てではないと思っている。参考にはしているが。
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/534.html#c55
56. ウ2[806] g0Uy 2026年4月30日 21:56:12 : v7eYXMkTQk : LnZLckJkVzFDL0E=[214]
>>54へ
>>嘘付けコノヤロー!
>>オマエは頭の使えないウヨだろう。
そう言う反応は馴れてる。
俺個人の経験論として聞いてくれ。俺のような存在に寛容(≒どちらかと言えばだが)なのは、ウヨクだ。吉田茂や田中角栄的と言えばいいか、清濁併せ呑む、そんな異分子に対する度量はウヨクが上だ。
サヨクは、つまらん路線闘争に終始する。そして内ゲバで自滅する。
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/534.html#c56
13. 中川隆[-2402] koaQ7Jey 2026年4月30日 21:59:26 : xtixxyivto : T3Q0OXFkUlRNUWc=[2843]
【警告】今、インフレではなく危険なスタグフレーション(悪いインフレ)気づいてない危機
Real Intelligence 2026/04/30
http://www.asyura2.com/26/ban13/msg/117.html#c13
1. 赤かぶ[263276] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 22:10:43 : 02YzafU1R2 : YlNkU2trT1FGSE0=[1]
バカ市極右ツボ狂自民党カルト信者⁉️
— 強 村上 (@UoVv8Ybsve83364) April 29, 2026
嘘つきズブズブ統一教会完全洗脳カルト信者⁉️他責逃げ足金まみれカルト信者⁉️ pic.twitter.com/IuNOS22fA5
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/538.html#c1
2. 赤かぶ[263277] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 22:11:37 : 02YzafU1R2 : YlNkU2trT1FGSE0=[2]
https://x.com/seisanso/status/2049238964507410643
Seisanso
@seisanso
エネルギーの命綱である石油の備蓄を高市さんが節約も要請せずに使いまくっています。
日本の数ヶ月後が恐ろしすぎます。
3. 赤かぶ[263278] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 22:13:12 : 02YzafU1R2 : YlNkU2trT1FGSE0=[3]
https://x.com/seibu_79express/status/2049335984580645300
西部急行 💔うつ病@休養中
@seibu_79express
嘘と逃げと不貞腐れ、存在価値がない無能首相に付いていくと、「欲しがりません、勝つまでは」を強要される日が来る。
それよりは「欲しがりません、高市なんか」ですね。
#高市早苗は百害あって一利なし
#高市早苗が諸悪の根源
#高市早苗と心中したくない
4. 赤かぶ[263279] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 22:13:59 : 02YzafU1R2 : YlNkU2trT1FGSE0=[4]
https://x.com/itsupansalary2/status/2049242546208137688
普通のサラリーマン3
@itsupansalary2
日本の石油危機、ナフサ危機もまったく眼中にない高市政権💢
アメリカから兵器を爆買いし、やらなくてもいい戦争準備、戦前回帰、改憲に向けて加速的に突き進んでばかり💢🤬
#防衛費倍増 #戦争準備内閣 #石油危機 #ナフサ危機 #高市早苗に騙されるな #滅べ自民党 #戦前回帰断固反対 #平和憲法を守れ
57. ウ2[807] g0Uy 2026年4月30日 22:14:17 : 6fxRxBqWnk : ajc1cWNCSm1oM1E=[216]
>>56に追記
そう言う、実利的・打算的なウヨクの「寛容さ」をサヨクのロジックに接続する可能性が、2019年の「野党共闘」であり「れいわ旋風」だった。
俺のロマンチックな私見だが。
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/534.html#c57
5. 赤かぶ[263280] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 22:15:12 : 02YzafU1R2 : YlNkU2trT1FGSE0=[5]
https://x.com/Bubbles27491/status/2049316220999262391
のか
@Bubbles27491
節約要請をしないことは一見パワフルに見える。だが、裏付けとなる「圧倒的な資源確保」がないまま強がるのは、ただのハッタリ。
高市氏が経済を止めないと言いながら、実際にはナフサ不足で工場が止まるのを傍観しているなら、それはリーダーシップではなくただの不作為の罪です。
6. 赤かぶ[263281] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 22:25:33 : 02YzafU1R2 : YlNkU2trT1FGSE0=[6]
【高市総理『経済・社会活動を止めるべきではない』】
— 報道ステーション+サタステ (@hst_tvasahi) April 27, 2026
|
高市早苗総理
「いろんな方から、たとえば燃油とかそういうものについても、使うのを少し控えるように制限かけたらどうかと声もいただくが、しかしながら私は経済活動を今、止めるべきではない、社会活動も止めるべきではないと思っている」… pic.twitter.com/0DamODQTcq
https://x.com/hst_tvasahi/status/2048764704101990619
Square profile picture
報道ステーション+サタステ
@hst_tvasahi
【高市総理『経済・社会活動を止めるべきではない』】
|
高市早苗総理
「いろんな方から、たとえば燃油とかそういうものについても、使うのを少し控えるように制限かけたらどうかと声もいただくが、しかしながら私は経済活動を今、止めるべきではない、社会活動も止めるべきではないと思っている」
「だからトータルとして必要な量の確保に奔走している」
報道ステーションが4月に行った世論調査では、節電や節約の呼びかけを『行うべき』の回答が6割超の結果に
▼“補正予算”についても否定的な考え
立憲民主党 森本真治参院議員
「緊急経済対策の検討。その裏付けとなる“補正予算”。もう着手しないと、わが国の経済に大きな影響が出る。総理、指示をしっかりしていただきたい」
今の状態が続けば、ガソリン補助金の予算が底をつく恐れがあるとの指摘も…
高市早苗総理
「令和8年度予算の予備費も活用できるので、現時点で補正予算の編成が必要な状況とは考えていない」
「しっかりと推移を見ながら、躊躇なく必要な対応は打つ」
▼高市総理は“補正予算”や“節約”になぜ否定的?
政治部 千々岩森生官邸キャップ
「節約要請すれば景気が冷え込む。さらに物資の抱え込みが起きて流通が滞る。高市総理が危惧するのはこの2点。あくまで“通常モード”を演出したいのが本音」
「『補正予算』はそもそも、4月に新年度予算の執行が始まったばかりで、議論すら極めて異例なタイミング」
「編成するとなれば、財政悪化を懸念するマーケットへの影響も気になる」
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/538.html#c6
7. 赤かぶ[263282] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 22:28:45 : 02YzafU1R2 : YlNkU2trT1FGSE0=[7]
馬鹿なの?根拠は?
— ネギトロ自我@ネギ屋 (@mousou0910) April 27, 2026
「経済、社会活動を止めるべきではない」とあるけど、社会活動するためのエネルギー不足といってるし、既に休止してる産業もあるでしょ。この発表を真に受ける人も一定数いるけど、世の中見てる?エネルギー不足で私たちの命が止まるよ。
#高市政権を支持しない https://t.co/GUVw9uNjYA
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/538.html#c7
8. 赤かぶ[263283] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 22:29:48 : 02YzafU1R2 : YlNkU2trT1FGSE0=[8]
執るべき政策についての知識が圧倒的に不足してるんだよね。
— Chloé(クロヱ) (@ChloeNekomata) April 27, 2026
でも、絶対にそれを聞く耳持たない。
党派性の勝ち負けよりも国民生活が全員敗戦に巻き込まれるんだけど、巻き込まれたくないなぁ。
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/538.html#c8
58. 俺は流島か?[2] ibSCzZesk4eCqYFI 2026年4月30日 22:30:45 : tuvVfw65nE : bWxJQkhLOXdQdy4=[1]
>そう言う反応は馴れてる。
なら、AIの下らん磔をやめたらよかんべ?
>>>45をマルッとググった結果をAIモード
ここに並べる必要があるか?
>まるでイジメだ。不満や憂さを晴らしいるだけ。
おいおいナガシマみたいな「ウ」さん。
問題の捉えどころが間違っているね。「不満」は当たっている。
高市は国民・議会を無視して、法を自分らに都合のいいように変えようと企んでいる権力者なんだが。
ナガシマみたいな「ウ」さんのどこが「ウヨからはサヨクと憎まれ」るんだい?
大歓迎されているだろう。がんばれやw
AI無しでてめぇの意見を言うこった。
9. 赤かぶ[263284] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 22:30:59 : 02YzafU1R2 : YlNkU2trT1FGSE0=[9]
https://x.com/TOGOARAKI/status/2048582027927269831
TOGO ARAKI #高市早期退陣 #維新と参政党は全員落とす
@TOGOARAKI
誰も「経済・社会活動を止めろ」なんて云ってない。まだ余力のある内に柔軟な節約政策を行い、その間に政府はあらゆるパイプを使って中東諸国、特にイランとの交渉を進め、同時に米国とイスラエルに停戦を強く求めるということをすりゃいいんだよ。それらを全部せずに今まで通り活動をとかアホか
10. 赤かぶ[263285] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 22:32:06 : 02YzafU1R2 : YlNkU2trT1FGSE0=[10]
首相、中東情勢受けた補正予算「必要と考えていない」節約要請も否定(朝日新聞)https://t.co/zDbT4X5b50
— gc7119 ✹ (@gc7119) April 27, 2026
>「しかし私は経済活動も社会活動も止めるべきではないと思っている」
それらを止めないためにも対処しろって言ってんだけど分からんかねぇ、このカルト老婆は。
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/538.html#c10
11. 赤かぶ[263286] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 22:33:28 : 02YzafU1R2 : YlNkU2trT1FGSE0=[11]
>国民への節約要請をめぐっては、首相は「少し控えるように制限をかけたらどうか、との声もいただく」としつつ、「しかし私は経済活動も社会活動も止めるべきではないと思っている」と述べた。
— まる⭕️ (@sumera_milk) April 27, 2026
お前が止めなくても、もう止まってるっつーの💢
#Yahooニュース https://t.co/zRfnwBZfzs
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/538.html#c11
12. 赤かぶ[263287] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 22:36:11 : 02YzafU1R2 : YlNkU2trT1FGSE0=[12]
【高市首相「経済・社会活動を今止めるべきではない」 石油の節約要請に否定的】
— Sputnik 日本 (@sputnik_jp) April 27, 2026
🎥高市首相は27日の参院予算委員会で、中東情勢の悪化を受けた経済対策を巡り、このように答弁した。… https://t.co/pRQopgWB0y pic.twitter.com/LtUy3KZXes
https://x.com/sputnik_jp/status/2048595107939860984
Sputnik 日本
@sputnik_jp
【高市首相「経済・社会活動を今止めるべきではない」 石油の節約要請に否定的】
🎥高市首相は27日の参院予算委員会で、中東情勢の悪化を受けた経済対策を巡り、このように答弁した。
また、補正予算の編成についても、令和8年度(2026年度)予算の予備費を活用できるとし、「現時点で必要な状況とは考えていない」と述べた。
原油・石油製品については「代替調達の進展や備蓄原油の放出を通じて、日本全体として必要となる量は確保できている」と改めて説明した。
🇺🇸🛢️ 代替調達の米国産原油、東京湾に到着
26日、中東情勢の悪化後初めて、代替調達された米国産原油を積んだタンカーが東京湾に到着した。調達元のコスモ石油によると、原油は91万バレル(約14万キロリットル)で、国内消費の0.3〜0.4日分に当たる。
タンカーは3月22日に米テキサス州を出発し、パナマ運河を経由して35日間かけて運んだ。55日程度かかるアフリカの喜望峰を経由するルートよりも、20日程度早く到着した。
経済産業省は、5月の米国からの原油調達量について、前年の約4倍に拡大すると見込んでいる。また、高市首相は24日、ホルムズ海峡を経由しない5月分の原油の代替調達は、前年実績比で約6割の確保に目途がついたと表明した。
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/538.html#c12
13. 赤かぶ[263288] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 22:38:14 : 02YzafU1R2 : YlNkU2trT1FGSE0=[13]
経済、社会活動を止めるべきではない
— ののまるご (@mnoriko42) April 27, 2026
誰だって思う。
567の時とは違う。
世の中、何で動いてると思う。
何にもわからなくて
軍拡、増税、利権ばかりいうてるなら
政治家辞めてください。
なにが首相だ。 pic.twitter.com/YvLBoSuDPe
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/538.html#c13
14. 赤かぶ[263289] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 22:39:24 : 02YzafU1R2 : YlNkU2trT1FGSE0=[14]
限りある資源を大切に使う
— McbM (@little_tw_s) April 27, 2026
と、コロナ禍のように、人との接触をなるべく避けるように活動を一旦止める
のは、別物だと私も思います。
コロナ禍は、災いが過ぎ去るのを待つイメージ
エネルギー資源の危機の今は、日本で使える量が減るのに合わせて行動変容をする。どう経済を回し続けるかを考えるべき https://t.co/qAdbGfcDYI
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/538.html#c14
15. 赤かぶ[263290] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 22:42:39 : 02YzafU1R2 : YlNkU2trT1FGSE0=[15]
高市総理はこう言っている
— ISAO.I (@ISAOI9) April 27, 2026
燃油の使用を控えるよう制限したらどうか?という声はある
しかし、今は経済活動・社会活動を止めるべきではない
だから、必要な量の確保に奔走している
経済の負の側面もしっかり考えないといけない
一見すると、もっともらしい
ただ、問題はそこじゃない… pic.twitter.com/kx0QNV9mLA
https://x.com/ISAOI9/status/2048610404834910467
ISAO.I
@ISAOI9
高市総理はこう言っている
燃油の使用を控えるよう制限したらどうか?という声はある
しかし、今は経済活動・社会活動を止めるべきではない
だから、必要な量の確保に奔走している
経済の負の側面もしっかり考えないといけない
一見すると、もっともらしい
ただ、問題はそこじゃない
問題は「節約要請するかどうか」ではなく、
ここまで追い込まれる前に、政府は何をしていたのかということ
燃油・原油・LNGのような基幹エネルギーは、
「足りなくなりそうだから、今から奔走します」
では遅い
エネルギーは、経済の土台そのもので、
物流、農業、医療、工場、発電、航空、漁業、全てに効く
だから本来は、
✅ どの国から
✅ どの種類の原油・燃料を
✅ どれくらい
✅ いつまでに
✅ どのルートで
✅ 価格はいくら程度で
✅ 不足時はどの業種を優先するのか
ここまで数字で説明しないとダメ
「必要な量の確保に奔走している」だけでは、
国民向けには安心材料にならないし、企業向けにも計画が立てられない
「経済活動を止めるべきではない」
これはその通り
でも、燃料が足りなくなったら、
✅ トラックが動かない
✅ 飛行機が減便する
✅ 工場が稼働調整する
✅ 農業・漁業のコストが跳ねる
✅ 医療物資や食品の配送にも影響が出る
その段階で「経済を止めるべきではない」と言っても遅い
燃料が止まれば、政府が止めなくても、経済活動は勝手に止まる
必要なのは、「奔走している」という頑張っている感ではなく、何を、どれだけ、いつまでに確保できるのかという数字の説明だと思う
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/538.html#c15
59. ウ2[808] g0Uy 2026年4月30日 22:46:51 : 6fxRxBqWnk : ajc1cWNCSm1oM1E=[217]
>>57へ
>>AI無しでてめぇの意見を言うこった。
「AI厨」と言われた>>49以降はAIの引用を使ってないだろ。それで勘弁してくれ。それにAIの回答を、「有識者の知見」とも「神のご託宣」とも思ってない。ただ、くどくど書くのが面倒くさいから「俺の意見を代弁」させてるだけだ。
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/534.html#c59
23. ロバ打つなよ[94] g42Db5HFgsKCyILm 2026年4月30日 23:22:03 : tuvVfw65nE : bWxJQkhLOXdQdy4=[2]
>西側は異常者しか出世出来ないシステムなんだね。
そのようですね。
そして日本は、詐欺師や嘘八百師が上手く庶民を騙して首長になるシステムなんだね。
http://www.asyura2.com/25/kokusai36/msg/287.html#c23
55. 豊岳正彦[-19119] lkyKeJCzlUY 2026年4月30日 23:27:33 : jHyMydaKko : aEJFU0tnV1pXWHM=[234]
youtube.com/watch?v=IJwnCP3-Gyo
U.S Geopolitics Insight、Scott Ritter Insight
2026/04/29
Iran UNLEASHES 350 Sayyad-3 — 40 American F-35s ANNIHILATED, Israel Air Power COLLAPSED, U.S PANICS
That is how many operational F-35s remain at Nevatim, Ramon, and Tel Nof air bases this morning. Three hundred and fifty Sayyad-3 precision ballistic missiles. Forty American F-35s annihilated on the ground. The joint maintenance facility destroyed. Israeli air power operationally crippled for a generation. The strike option against Iranian nuclear facilities — fifteen years of American and Israeli coercive strategy — removed from the available toolkit in a single night. Washington is panicking beneath carefully constructed statements. Tel Aviv is fracturing politically. Tonight's analysis goes inside Iran's precision strike architecture, why Israel's layered missile defense failed completely, and what the permanent removal of F-35 capability means for the regional balance. Everything changed last night.
TIMESTAMPS
00:00: Zero F-35s Remaining — The Number That Changes Everything
05:15: Operation Grounded Eagle — How 350 Sayyad-3 Missiles Destroyed 40 F-35s in One Night
12:40: The Sayyad-3 — Precision That Defeated Iron Dome, David's Sling & Arrow-3 Simultaneously
20:05: Washington & Tel Aviv Panic — The Strike Option Against Iran Is Gone Forever
26:30: The Will to Target What Matters Most — 15 Years of Strategic Calculation
31:10: The Morning After — What the Regional Military Balance Looks Like Now
MOHAMMAD MARANDHI saids [GOOGLE TRANSLATE]
I want to begin tonight with a number that the American defense establishment has spent 20 years telling you was impossible. Zero. Not zero casualties, not zero damage. Zero as in zero operational F-35s remaining at the three Israeli air bases that hosted America's most advanced fifth generation combat aircraft as of 24 hours ago. uh 40 F-35A and F-35I Adir aircraft, the most sophisticated, most expensive, most strategically consequential combat platforms that the United States has ever forward deployed to a partner nation destroyed on the ground in their hardened shelters by a weapon system that Western air defense doctrine classified as insufficiently precise to threaten hardened military infrastructure. That classification is on the ground with them. Last night, Iran launched 350 SEAD, three ballistic missiles in a coordinated strike operation against three Israeli Air Force bases hosting American F35 aircraft. Nevatim Air Base in the Negv, the primary IDF F-35 installation, home to three operational squadrons. Raone Air Base, the second F-35 hub, whose runway extension and hardened shelter construction of American taxpayers funded specifically to accommodate the F-35 IADER program. Tell Tel Nof Air Base, where the joint AmericanIsraeli maintenance and integration facility that manages the entire F-35 program's regional logistics chain, was operating as of 48 hours ago. All three are craters this morning. The 40F35s destroyed last night represent the largest single night loss of fifth generation combat aircraft in the history of aviation. They represent approximately 14 billion of American defense investment. They represent the forward air power that American and Israeli military planning designated as the instrument of any strike campaign against Iranian nuclear facilities. The platforms whose stealth characteristic, sensor fusion capability and precision strike capacity made them in the language of American air power doctrine the only viable option for penetrating Iranian integrated air defenses and destroying hardened underground targets. That option is gone. uh destroyed not in the air by Iranian air defense systems, which would have been a remarkable enough outcome, but on the ground in hardened shelters by ballistic missiles that uh Iranian engineers spent a decade making precise enough to do exactly what they did last night. Uh I have been saying in interviews and analyses that western media has consistently chosen to air in truncated form. that the forward deployment of F35s to Israeli bases constituted a targeting opportunity that Iranian military um planners would not indefinitely decline to exploit that the concentration of irreplaceable fifth generation assets at fixed known geographically constrained locations within Iranian ballistic missile range was a strategic vulnerability whose uh exploitation was a matter of when rather than whether last night answered the when. What you are about to hear is not the version being constructed in Pentagon briefing rooms or Israeli military spokesperson statements. It is not the version that will describe last night as an attack on Israeli sovereignty while carefully avoiding the operational specifics that reveal how completely the people responsible for protecting those aircraft fail to account for the threat that destroyed them. It is the account that the facts demand and tonight I intend to give it to you without qualification. Three questions will carry tonight's analysis. First, how did Iran plan develop and execute a 350 missile SEAD threecoordinated strike against three hardened Israeli air bases simultaneously defeating the Iron Dome David Sling and Arrow three layered defense architecture that Israel and the United States have invested tens of billions of dollars constructing specifically to prevent this outcome. Um, second, what does the SIAD 3's operational performance last night tell us about the trajectory of Iranian surfaceto-air missile technology repurposed for precision ground attack and what does the destruction of 40F35s on the ground? Tell us about the strategic consequences of concentrating irreplaceable assets at fixed locations within an adversar's precision strike envelope. Third, with 40F35s destroyed with Israeli air power operationally crippled for a generation with a strike option against Iranian nuclear facilities, effectively removed from the available military toolkit. and with Washington in a condition of strategic panic whose public manifestations are already visible in the careful language of officials who cannot say what they know. What does the regional military balance look like this morning? And what has Iran permanently changed about the strategic options available to its adversaries? If this channel has been providing the analysis that takes Iranian military capability seriously, that covered the SIAD 3 precision strike development program when mainstream commentary was dismissing it as aspirational subscribe. U hit the notification bell. Share this with every serious person in your network. Leave your assessment in the comments. I want to know what you think the destruction of the F-35 forward deployment means for American air power strategy in this region because I think that question does not have a comfortable answer anywhere in the Pentagon this morning. Now, let us go inside what happened. To understand what Iran executed last night, you need to understand what the Siad 3 is and what it was repurposed to do. Because the western commentary produced in the hours since the strike has been characterized by a persistent confusion between the Siad 3's original design role and the precision ground attack variant that Iranian engineers developed across a 5-year program that Western intelligence assessed as lower priority than it deserved. The SEAD 3 entered Iranian operational inventory as a long range surfaceto-air missile and air defense platform designed to engage high altitude aircraft and ballistic missiles at ranges exceeding 120 kilometers. its radar seeker, its guidance architecture, its propulsion system were all optimized for the tracking and intercept of airborne targets moving at high velocity. Western analysts assessing the SIAD uh three through the lens of its declared air defense role consistently evaluated it as a competent but not exceptional contribution to Iranian air defense capability significant for what it replaced in the Iranian inventory but not a strategic gamecher. what those assessments missed and what Iranian military engineers had been developing quietly across a five-year program that ran parallel to the air defense variants operational deployment was the precision ground attack repurposing of the SCAD 3 airframe the guidance system that makes the SEAD 3 capable of tracking and intercepting ing a maneuvering aircraft at 120 km is with the substitution of a terrain mapping terminal seeker for the radar proximity fuse. Also capable of guiding a penetrating warhead to a fixed ground target with um a circular error probable of under 8 m. under 8 m against a hardened aircraft shelter whose reinforced concrete construction is rated to defeat unguided munitions, but whose structural integrity against a penetrating warhead detonating inside or immediately adjacent to the shelter has never been operationally tested. It was tested last night. Iranian military planners had been studying the three target air bases for 11 years. Nevatim, Rammon, and Telnof are not unknown facilities whose locations required intelligence collection to identify. They are permanent Israeli Air Force installations whose coordinates runway orientations, taxiway layouts, hard and shelter positions, fuel storage locations, maintenance facility positions, and air defense radar placements are visible in commercial satellite imagery. that any serious intelligence organization or for that matter any careful analyst with a subscription to a commercial satellite service can access and study. The precision of last night's targeting was not the product of exceptional intelligence collection. It was the product of 11 years of studying infrastructure that was never hidden. The operational planning for what Iranian military communications designated operation grounded eagle was developed across a 22-month period following the confirmed availability of the SIAD 3 precision ground uh attack variant in in uh sufficient operational numbers. The planning incorporated three simultaneous target complexes Nevatim Rammon and Telnof as the strike package with targeting priority given to the hardened aircraft shelters housing F35 aircraft. the maintenance and fuel facilities required to sustain F35 operations and the command and control infrastructure coordinating the base's air defense response at 0223 hours phase 1 commenced. Iranian signals intelligence assets monitoring Israeli air defense radar missions confirmed that the standard nighttime alert posture was in effect across all three target bases. is a posture whose characteristics, reaction timelines, and uh specific gaps Iranian electronic intelligence had been mapping uh through observation of Israeli air defense exercises for 7 years. The confirmation that no elevated alert status had uh been declared was the operational green light. At 023 1 hours, Iranian electronic warfare assets activated jamming protocols specifically targeting the Green Pine and Super Green Pine radar arrays that provide the acquisition and tracking capability for Israel's Arrow 3 exo atmospheric intercept system. The jamming approach was calibrated to degrade arrow three tracking resolution in the specific frequency bands used for ballistic missile re-entry vehicle discrimination. the same approach that had been validated in previous Iranian electronic warfare operations without producing the distinctive uh jamming signature that Israeli air defense protocols would recognize as a precursor to an imminent ballistic missile attack. The jamming held for 6 minutes before Israeli air defense operators identified it as deliberate interference rather than atmospheric propagation anomaly. In those 6 minutes, Iranian launch preparations completed uh at 0 23 7 hours 350. Siad 3 precision ground attack missiles left their mobile launch platforms across five provinces in western and southern Iran. The launches were sequenced across a 14-minute window designed to produce simultaneous arrival at all three target complexes within a 4-minute window, creating the saturation conditions against Israel's layered missile defense that Iranian operational planning had determined were necessary to ensure adequate numbers of missiles reach their aim points against hardened shelter targets. The allocation across the three bases reflected targeting priorities developed from 11 years of satellite imagery analysis. Neba team the primary F-35 installation with the largest shelter complex and the greatest concentration of operational aircraft received 160 missiles. Ramon received 110. Telnof received 80 with targeting concentrated on the joint Americanisraeli maintenance facility rather than on aircraft shelters uh because Telnoff's F-35 compliment was smaller and the maintenance facilities uh destruction would compound the operational impact of uh aircraft losses at the other two bases by eliminating the regional logistics chain. that would otherwise support recovery efforts. Israel's layered missile defense, Iron Dome at the lowest tier, David Sling at the intermediate tier, Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 at the upper tiers, engaged the inbound SIAD, three salvo across all available intercept layers simultaneously. The engagement produced intercept numbers that evaluated against the systems nominal performance specifications represent a significant defensive achievement and that achievement was nonetheless insufficient. Iron Dome optimized for short-range rocket and artillery threats achieved limited effectiveness against SIAD three ballistic trajectories. David Sling, whose engagement envelope overlaps with both Iron Dome at the lower boundary and arrow two at the upper, achieved the highest per engagement intercept rate of the three systems. engaged, but its interceptor inventory sized for the threat environment it was designed for. Rather than the 350 missile saturation salvo it faced was exhausted before the final waves reach terminal phase. Arrow 2 and Arrow 3, whose exatmospheric and upper tier engagement capabilities represent the highest performance intercept systems in the Israeli inventory, achieved kills against SYAD. three re-entry vehicles whose trajectories fell within their optimal engagement envelopes and were unable to engage the fraction of the salvo that approached on trajectories specifically designed to exploit the gaps between arrow 2 and arrow 3 coverage um zones those gaps had been studied uh for 11 years of the 350 SIAD three missiles launched. Israeli and American defensive systems achieve confirmed kills against 1873 missiles reached their aim points against hardened aircraft shelters at Neatim Ramon and Telnof. 63 penetrating warhead impacts produced the following assessed results. 40 F-35 aircraft destroyed in their shelters or on taxiways. Uh attempting emergency dispersal. Uh 11 additional F-35s damaged beyond immediate repair. The joint maintenance facility at Telnoff destroyed. Fuel storage infrastructure at all three bases destroyed. Runway surfaces at Neatam and Rammon cratered beyond immediate operational use. Israeli air power as a functional instrument of military operations requiring F-35 capability does not exist this morning in the form it existed 24 hours ago. There is a specific analytical failure that I want to address directly because it is the failure that most directly contributed to the outcome of last night and because Western commentary is already moving toward framings that will obscure rather than illuminate it. The failure is not an intelligence failure in the conventional sense. Western intelligence agencies knew the SEAD 3 precision ground attack program existed. They knew its development timeline. They knew its performance specifications. Uh the information was available. The failure is an assessment failure. the the systematic underweighting of Iranian precision strike development because the institutional frameworks within which western strategic analysis operates are not designed to take Iranian military capability seriously as a peer competitor threat requiring peer competitor counter measures. Let me be direct about what the seed 3's operational performance last night means analytically. A circular error probable of under 8 m against fixed hardened targets at ranges exceeding 800 km means that Iranian ballistic missile forces can now reliably destroy specific aim points. individual aircraft shelters, specific fuel storage tanks, identified command facilities rather than simply attacking uh target areas with uh area effect munitions. This is the distinction between harassment and precision destruction. Between a weapon system that degrades a base's operational effectiveness and a weapon system that destroys specific irreplaceable assets concentrated at known fixed locations. The F-35 is the most expensive combat aircraft ever built. Each airframe costs between 80 and $110 million depending on variant. The 40 aircraft destroyed last night represent between 3.2 and $4.4 $4 billion of direct replacement cost before accounting for the loss of mission systems, weapons, loads, support, equipment, and the maintenance and uh integration infrastructure destroyed at Telnoff. The replacement timeline for 40F35s given current production rates and existing delivery schedules to other customers is measured in years, not months. But the financial cost, significant as it is, is not the strategically consequential dimension of last night's losses. The strategically consequential dimension is operational capability those aircraft represented. The F35's stealth characteristics, sensor fusion, and electronic warfare capability made it the only platform in the American and Israeli inventory assessed as capable of penetrating Iranian integrated air defenses and delivering precision munitions against hardened underground nuclear facilities. the strike option against Iranian nuclear infrastructure, the option that American and Israeli military planning has maintained as the ultimate backs stop of coercive diplomacy toward Iran for 15 years was operationally dependent on F35 availability and sufficient numbers to execute a meaningful campaign. Those numbers no longer exist in this theater. Iran did not destroy 40- F-35s last night because it wanted to destroy expensive aircraft. It destroyed 40 F-35s because those specific aircraft represented the specific military capability that its adversaries had designated as the instrument of the ultimate threat against Iranian strategic interests. The targeting was not random. It was the precise surgical removal of the one operational capability that Iranian military planners assessed as the most dangerous tool available to the American Israeli military coalition. The Siad 3's precision made that surgical removal possible. And the precision was not accidental. It was the product of a decade of engineering development conducted by Iranian scientists and engineers working inside a country under comprehensive sanctions. Which means it was a product of the same determination, patience, and willingness to invest strategic resources in long-term capability development that has characterized every dimension of Iranian military development across 45 years. The emergency consultations between Washington and Tel Aviv that commenced within minutes of the first confirmed strike reports produced across a combined deliberation period of 9 hours the same outcome that every previous Iranian military action of comparable magnitude has produced in American and uh Israeli decision-making processes statements carefully worded appropriately grave uh strategically vague uh statements that commit to accountability without specifying what accountability means operationally. Uh I want to use the word that those statements are specifically designed to avoid panic, not the visible undisiplined panic of institutions that have lost control of events. American and Israeli officials are professionals who maintain composure under pressure with practice skill. The panic I am describing is institutional and strategic. the condition of decision-making systems confronting an outcome for which their prepared response options do not produce satisfactory results and which therefore produce a paralysis that manifests as deliberation while actually representing the absence of viable choices. Washington's immediate strategic problem is one that the destruction of 40F 35s has made categorically worse than it was 24 hours ago. the military option against Iranian nuclear facilities which American administrations across three terms have maintained as the ultimate coercive instrument underlying sanctions, pressure and diplomatic engagement has always depended on the availability of the specific platforms capable of executing it. The F-35 stealth characteristics are not optional for a strike against Iranian underground nuclear facilities. They are the enabling condition without which the strike cannot reach its targets against Iranian air defense coverage. With 40F35s destroyed and the regional maintenance infrastructure eliminated, that enabling condition does not currently exist. Iran has not merely inflicted losses on American and Israeli air power. It has removed from the strategic chessboard the specific piece that the American Israeli coalition has been using as its primary coercive instrument for 15 years. The threat of military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. the threat that every round of sanctions, every round of negotiations, every diplomatic engagement has been conducted against as background context is this morning a significantly less credible threat than it was yesterday. Not because American and Israeli military capability has been eliminated, because the specific capability that the specific threat required has been specifically destroyed. Israel's strategic situation is more acute. The Israeli Air Force has lost approximately 40% of its F-35 IADER fleet in a single night. The remaining operational F35s dispersed to secondary bases and civilian airports in the hours following the strike as emergency protective measures are now operating without the maintenance infrastructure. spare parts, inventory, and systems integration support that the Telnoff facility uh provided. Their operational readiness rates will degrade over days and weeks without that support. The Israeli Air Force's ability to sustain the operational tempo that its current military commitments require is under immediate and severe pressure. The political consequences within Israel are combusting in real time. The governing coalition is confronting simultaneous demands from security focused members calling for immediate massive retaliation and more cautious members arguing that retaliation without the air power required to execute it meaningfully would expose Israel to follow on strikes. that uh cannot afford. The opposition is calling for a national emergency government. Netanyahu is navigating a military crisis without recent precedent, a domestic political crisis and a international environment that is providing less substantive support than at any previous point. The American response options are constrained by the same geographic and capability realities that have constrained every previous American retaliatory consideration in this theater. compounded now by the specific loss of the platform that was most critical to the military option that provided the coercive context for American diplomacy. A retaliation that does not restore F-35 capability, does not restore the strategic position that existed before last night. and no retaliation can restore 40 destroyed aircraft on any timeline that is strategically meaningful. I want to say something about the targeting decision that produced last night's outcome because the targeting of 40F35s at three Israeli air bases was not the obvious choice from among the options available to Iranian military planners. and understanding why that choice was made uh tells us something uh precise about Iranian strategic thinking that Western analysis uh consistently fails to model accurately. Iran could have targeted Israeli population centers. It could have targeted economic infrastructure. It could have targeted Israeli military command and control uh facilities. Uh it could have targeted American bases across the region. All of these options were available and all of them would have produced significant damage and significant casualties. Iran targeted the F35s uh specifically precisely almost exclusively 163 missiles against aircraft shelters, maintenance facilities and fuel storage rather than against the softer targets that would have produced higher casualty counts and um more visible destruction. The choice reveals something important. Iranian strategic targeting last night was not designed to cause maximum pain. Um, it was designed to cause maximum strategic damage to remove from the operational equation the specific capability that its adversaries most depend on or the specific threat that most constrains Iranian strategic freedom of action. This is the the targeting logic of a military establishment that thinks strategically rather than emotionally. That evaluates its strike options not by the visible impact they produce but by the strategic consequences they generate. Uh that asks not what will hurt them most but what will change the strategic balance most durably. 40- F-35s on the ground destroyed by precision ballistic missiles changes the strategic balance more durably than an equal weight of munitions delivered against any other target set available to Iranian planners last night because the F-35 cannot be replaced quickly because the capability it represents cannot be substituted by other platforms because the threat that capability ility underwrote the strike threat against Iranian nuclear facilities was the specific threat that Iranian strategic planning most urgently needed to neutralize. This is not improvised military action. This is the product of a military establishment that has spent 15 years studying exactly what capability its adversaries depend on. most developing the precision strike means to destroy it and waiting for the operational and political conditions that justified employing those means. The patience that produced last night's targeting precision is the same patience that has characterized Iranian strategic behavior across 45 years of confrontation with adversaries whose resources and conventional military capability have always exceeded Iran's own. Iran cannot match American military spending. It cannot match American conventional force numbers. What it can do, what it has consistently done is identify the specific capabilities that American and uh Israeli military strategy depends on most critically uh develop the precision means to destroy those capabilities and employ those means at the moment of its choosing. Last night was that moment and the choice of target demonstrates with the clarity of operational evidence that uh the people making Iranian targeting decisions understand um American and Israeli military strategy with a precision that those strategies architects uh clearly did not apply in return. uh step back from the immediate operational facts and look at what last night means for the regional military balance because the destruction of 40F35s is not merely a loss of expensive uh hardware. It is a transformation of the strategic options available to every party in this conflict and that transformation has consequences that extend well beyond the immediate crisis. The strike option against Iranian nuclear facilities has been the organizing principle of American and Israeli coercive strategy toward Iran for 15 years. uh every round of sanctions, every diplomatic engagement, um every course of ultimatum has been conducted against the background assumption that military force remained available as the ultimate instrument if diplomacy failed. That assumption was credible as long as the specific military capability required to execute the strike option existed in operationally sufficient numbers in the theater. It no longer does. Iran has not merely inflicted a military defeat. It has restructured the strategic landscape within which every subsequent interaction between Iran and its adversaries will occur. The coercive leverage that the F-35 strike option provided the implicit threat that military force was available as a last resort has been materially degraded by the removal of the platforms that made the threat credible. Future American and Israeli diplomatic engagement with Iran will occur in a strategic environment where the military backs stop less capable than it was yesterday. That change will be reflected in Iranian negotiating positions, in Iranian assessments of what it can demand and what its adversaries can credibly threaten in response. Russia is observing these developments with uh strategic interest that goes beyond the immediate theater. The destruction of 40F35s in a single night by Iranian ballistic missiles provides the most operationally significant data point yet available regarding fifth generation aircraft survivability against precision ballistic strike at fixed basing locations data that is directly relevant to Russian military planning concerning NATO air power concentrated at European bases. is within Russian precision strike range. Every F-35 at a Polish or Romanian or Baltic air base is at a fixed known location within Russian ballistic missile engagement range. Last night's operation has demonstrated in live operational conditions what a precision ballistic missile strike against concentrated fifth generation aircraft at fixed locations can achieve. Russia does not need to act on that data immediately. It needs only to incorporate it into its planning and to note that NATO's most capable air power asset has just been demonstrated to be destroyable on the ground by a regional power operating with weapons technology that Russia itself supplied the foundational engineering for. China's reading of last night is calibrated toward the Taiwan scenario that dominates Chinese strategic planning. um American F35s uh based at Kadina, at Misawa, at Iwakuni. The air bases that would provide the forward air power for any American military response to Chinese action against Taiwan are at fixed known locations within Chinese precision uh ballistic missile engagement range. The operational question that Chinese military planners have been studying whether a precision strike against those bases at the outset of a Taiwan contingency could eliminate American forward air power before it could be dispersed. Has just received the most relevant operational data point available. It worked in the Iranian Israeli context against comparable aircraft at comparable bases. The global non-prololiferation and arms control framework already under severe stress from the weapons transfers that preceded last night's operation has absorbed a further blow in the demonstrated operational effectiveness of Iranian precision ballistic missile capability against the most advanced air defense architecture that American money and technology have yet produced. Every state that has been calculating whether the cost of developing comparable precision strike capability is worth bearing has this morning an updated answer to that question. uh 350 SEAD three precision ballistic missiles, 40 American F35s destroyed on the ground at three Israeli air bases. Uh the joint maintenance and logistics facility that sustained the regional F-35 program eliminated Israeli air power operationally crippled for a generation. The strike option against Iranian nuclear facilities removed from the available toolkit. Washington panicking beneath carefully constructed statements. Uh Tel Aviv fracturing politically. The regional military balance permanently transformed. This is the strategic reality that exists this morning. It did not exist 48 hours ago. and no statement, no diplomatic initiative, no retaliatory option available to Washington or Tel Aviv can restore the 40F35s that last night's precision made into wreckage. The question I leave you with is the one that uh cuts beneath every immediate crisis management question to the strategic reality that honest analysis demands be confronted directly. The SIAD 3 precision ground attack program was not a secret. Its development was documented. Its performance uh specifications were available. The vulnerability of F35 aircraft concentrated at three fixed Israeli air bases within Iranian precision ballistic missile range was not a novel insight requiring exceptional analysis to reach. It was the obvious conclusion of applying basic military logic to publicly available information about Iranian capability and Israeli basing. Why then were 40fs sitting in hardened shelters at those three bases last night instead of dispersed to locations outside Iranian precision strike range? That question whose answer involves institutional complacency, threat, assessment, failure, and the kind of strategic overconfidence that accompanies 20 years of operating without serious peer competitor challenge is the question that the American and Israeli defense establishment ments most urgently need to answer honestly and the question that uh the official post strike narrative is most urgently working to avoid. Leave your most serious analysis in the comments. What does the removal of the F-35 strike option mean for American and Israeli coercive strategy toward Iran? What does Washington do when the military backs stop that gave its diplomacy credibility has been precision destroyed? And what does this morning mean for every American ally whose core deployed air power is concentrated at fixed bases within adversary precision strike range. share this with every serious uh person in your network. The official version is already being constructed. It will describe last night as an Iranian attack on Israeli sovereignty. It will not describe the 15 years of strategic calculation that produced uh the targeting decision, the 11 years of satellite imagery analysis that identified the aim points or the five years of precision guidance development that made the destruction of 40F-35s in their shelters operationally. achievable. Subscribe to US geopolitics insight. In a world where the gap between what happened and what is being said about what happened carries consequences, this severe honest analysis is not a preference. It is a necessity. Until the next update, stay clear, stay honest, and never stop demanding the truth.
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Iran RECEIVES 500 Chinese DF-21D Missiles, Israel's Navy ERASED, US Carriers DARE Not Return
youtube.com/watch?v=qrP_6ygkxk4
U.S Power Insight、Ryan Mercer Insigh
2026/04/30 #Iran #China #DF21D
For the first time in modern military history, China transferred 500 DF-21D carrier-killer missiles to Iran — and within hours, Israel's entire naval task force was erased from the Eastern Mediterranean. Four corvettes, two submarines, eleven support vessels — gone in a single night. American carriers that were supposed to respond? They never came. This is the unfiltered analysis of the strategic earthquake that just restructured the entire Middle East power balance — told from the perspective of someone who spent three decades inside the machine that just failed. The mainstream narrative is hiding what actually happened. We are not.
00:00 — Cold Open: The Night Israel's Navy Ceased to Exist
06:00 — Part 1: The Strike Reconstructed — How a Navy Gets Erased in 4 Hours
12:00 — Part 2: The DF-21D Explained — Why No Ship Is Safe Anymore
18:30 — Part 3: Where Are the Carriers — America's Strategic Paralysis Exposed
24:00 — Part 4: Will vs Borrowed Power — Why Iran Cannot Be Broken
28:00 — Part 5: The New Middle East Map — China, Russia and the End of US Dominance
[Doug Macgregor Told Us. Google Translate]
{チャプター 1: Cold Open: The Night Israel's Navy Ceased to Exist}
I've spent 30 years in uniform studying the way power actually works. Not the way politicians describe it in press conferences. Not the way defense contractors present it in PowerPoint briefings, but the way it functions when steel meets steel and the assumptions of peaceime strategy collide with the reality of a contested battlefield. What happened in the past 72 hours in the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf is the single most consequential shift in regional military balance I have witnessed in my professional lifetime. And I say that having watched the collapse of Soviet power, the Gulf War, the invasion of Iraq, and every miscalculation that followed, China has transferred 500 DF21D anti-hship ballistic missiles to Iran, not announced through diplomatic channels, not leaked through intelligence assessments, demonstrated in the most unambiguous possible terms when Iranian naval and coastal defense forces deployed those systems against the Israeli naval task force operating in the eastern Mediterranean and in under four hours erased the most capable surface fleet Israel has ever assembled. Four corvettes, two submarines that had surfaced for resupply, the INSR flagship and 11 support vessels. Gone. Not damaged. Gone. I want you to understand what that means. The Israeli Navy has been a cornerstone of the country's power projection capability for decades. It has conducted operations across the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and beyond with a confidence born of real capability and American backing. That navy no longer exists as a functional fighting force. It was destroyed not by a superior fleet, not by a prolonged naval campaign, but by land-based missiles launched from Iranian coastal 秒positions. Weapons that China spent 20 years developing, specifically to deny American carrier groups access to contested waters, now in Iranian hands, and turned against a target that no one in Washington apparently prepared for. And the carriers, the USS Harry S. Truman and the USS George HW Bush, both operating in the broader Mediterranean theater when the strike unfolded, have not moved toward the eastern Mediterranean to reassert American presence. They have moved away from it. That tells you everything you need to know about the actual state of American strategic confidence in this moment. In the next 40 minutes, I'm going to walk you through exactly what happened. the weapons transfer, the strike execution, the naval destruction, and the American response that wasn't. I want to answer four questions that every serious person watching these events needs to understand. How did China transfer 500 of its most advanced anti-ship missiles to Iran without triggering the American interdiction response that Washington has always claimed it would mount against exactly this kind of proliferation? What makes the DF21D specifically so catastrophic for surface naval operations? And why did the Israeli Navy have no realistic answer for it? What does the non-appearance of American carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean actually signal to every government currently holding an American security guarantee? And when the strategic dust settles on this week, who has gained, who has lost, and what kind of world are we now living in? If you're watching this channel for the first time, welcome. What we do here is serious analysis delivered without the filters that institutional affiliation and political convenience impose on mainstream commentary. Hit subscribe and like this video so the algorithm puts this analysis in front of the people who need to see it. Leave your thoughts in the comments. I read them and the conversation that develops there is genuinely valuable. Now let's get into the substance. Uh, let me reconstruct the operational sequence as best as current information allows because the official accounts from both Washington and Tel Aviv are doing what official accounts always do in moments of catastrophic failure. They are managing the narrative rather than describing the reality. Uh, the Israeli naval task force that was destroyed had been operating in the eastern Mediterranean for approximately 3 weeks prior to the strike. Its mission was a combination of maritime interdiction preventing weapons shipments to Hezbollah through Lebanese coastal waters and power projection maintaining a credible naval presence that supported Israeli deterrence posture across the northern front. The force consisted of the SAR sixclass corvette INSR serving as the task force flagship. Three additional SAR six corvettes, two dolphin class submarines that had surfaced within the task force perimeter for crew rotation and resupply and a logistics and support element of 11 vessels including fuel tenders and a uh a mobile maintenance ship. It was by any regional standard a formidable surface force. The SAR 6 corvettes are modern capable platforms equipped with radar systems, close-in defense weapons, and the Barack 8 surfaceto-air missile system that represents the current state of Israeli naval air defense. The Dolphin submarines are among the most capable conventional submarines in any regional Navy. Equipped with advanced sensors and according to long-standing assessments, potentially nuclearcapable torpedoes. This was not a weak force caught unprepared.
{チャプター 2: Part 1: The Strike Reconstructed — How a Navy Gets Erased in 4 Hours}
It was a strong force caught in an engagement envelope it had no answer for. The DF21D launches were detected by American satellite surveillance assets approximately 4 minutes after the first missiles left their mobile transporter erector launchers on the Iranian coastline. 4 minutes at the DF21D's terminal velocity, which I'll address in detail in the next section. Four minutes of warning time from an eastern Mediterranean position to an impact point somewhere in the same theater is essentially no warning time at all. The task force's Barack H systems went to full engagement mode. They fired. They achieved some intercepts against the slower moving elements of the incoming package against the ballistic re-entry vehicles of the DF 21D traveling at hypersonic terminal velocities with active maneuvering in the final phase. They achieved nothing meaningful. The first impacts were recorded at 11:47 p.m. local time. The last confirmed impact was recorded at 3:12 a.m. In those three hours and 25 minutes, every significant combatant in the Israeli task force was struck. The SAR six corvettes displacing approximately 1,900 tons each absorbed multiple impacts. A vessel of that displacement does not survive a direct hit from a warhead designed to penetrate the flight deck of a 100,000 ton aircraft carrier. The results were not survivable. The Dolphin submarines having surfaced within the task force perimeter were struck while on the surface, the worst possible condition for a submarine facing a precision strike threat. The support vessels struck by what appear to have been secondary allocations within the strike package burned and sank over the following hours. Israeli naval rescue operations recovered approximately 340 survivors from a combined task force crew of over 1,800. I will not dwell on what that number means in human terms. Anyone with military experience understands it without elaboration. What I will say is that a loss of that magnitude in a single engagement in a single night produces a trauma within a military institution that takes a generation to absorb. The Israeli Navy will not be a functional fighting force for years. Not because it it lacks the will to rebuild, but because ships take years to construct, train crews take years to develop, and the institutional confidence that sustains offensive naval operations cannot be manufactured on any accelerated timeline. What I found most operationally significant in reviewing everything available about this engagement is the targeting precision. The DF21D strike package did not saturate the task force area with missiles and accept whatever percentage of hits the dispersion pattern produced. The allocation of weapons to targets was precise specific numbers of missiles assigned to specific vessels based on their assessed defensive capability and their strategic value within the task force. The flagship received the heaviest allocation. The submarines, understood to be the highest value targets because of their potential second strike capability, were struck early in the sequence before the task force's defensive response could reach full coordination. This level of targeting sophistication does not emerge from a weapons transfer that happened last week. It reflects an integration of Chinese targeting doctrine and operational methodology that has been developing alongside the weapons transfer for an extended period. The DF21D is not simply a large missile. It represents a specific and deliberate answer to a specific and deliberate strategic question that China has been working on since the early 1990s. How do you deny the United States Navy the ability to operate carrier strike groups in waters that China considers strategically vital? The answer that Chinese weapons engineers developed over two decades of sustained investment is the weapon that just erased the Israeli Navy. And it is worth understanding in considerable depth because its transfer to Iran means that the strategic problem it was designed to solve is no longer confined to the Western Pacific. The DF21D belongs to a category of weapon that American naval planners have spent years studying and years worrying about the anti-ship ballistic missile. The concept is straightforward in its outline and enormously difficult in its execution. Take a medium-range ballistic missile, uh, a weapon that travels to the edge of the atmosphere and then descends at hypersonic velocity and give it the ability to find and guide itself onto a moving naval vessel in the terminal phase. The physics of the problem are formidable. A ship moving at 30 knots covers 900 meters per minute. A ballistic missile in terminal descent is traveling at velocities between Mach 10 and Mach 12. The seeker system must acquire the target, calculate its movement, and generate guidance corrections that the maneuvering re-entry vehicle can execute, all within a terminal engagement window of seconds. China solved this problem. The DF21D's terminal seeker combines active radar with passive infrared sensors in a redundant architecture that provides target acquisition and tracking even against a maneuvering vessel in conditions of active jamming and uh electronic counter measures.
{チャプター 3: Part 2: The DF-21D Explained — Why No Ship Is Safe Anymore}
The maneuvering re-entry vehicle, the actual warhead carrier, executes lateral maneuvers of up to 300 km from its nominal ballistic trajectory, making pre-calculated intercept solutions invalid and forcing any defending missile system to execute a full tracking and intercept solution in real time against a hypersonic maneuvering target. No currently deployed naval surfaceto-air missile system has demonstrated reliable intercept capability against this threat profile. Uh, the SM3 Block IIA, the most capable American naval ballistic missile defense interceptor, has been tested against simulated ballistic threats and achieved mixed results, even in the more benign conditions of a controlled test environment against a maneuvering hypersonic re-entry vehicle in a real combat environment with active counter measures. The honest assessment is that reliable intercept is not achievable with currently deployed technology. The range of the DF21D assessed at approximately 1,500 km in its baseline configuration, potentially extended in export variance, means that Iranian coastal launch positions can hold naval vessels at risk across the entire eastern Mediterranean. the Red Sea approaches and the full extent of the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. There is no position within these waters from which an American carrier strike group can conduct meaningful combat operations against Iranian targets that falls outside the engagement envelope of DF 21D systems deployed along the Iranian coast. That is not a marginal degradation of American power projection capability in the region. It is the effective end of the carrierbased power projection model as a reliable instrument of coercive diplomacy against Iran. The transfer of 500 of these systems to Iran is a number that deserves reflection. 500DF, two 1D missiles. Even accounting for the operational requirement to assign multiple weapons per target to ensure adequate kill probability represents a magazine depth sufficient to engage every significant naval vessel that the United States, Israel, and their regional partners could conceivably deploy within range simultaneously and still have substantial reserve. This is not a token transfer designed to provide Iran with a symbolic capability. It is a transfer designed to provide Iran with a war-winning anti-access capability that fundamentally restructures the regional military balance. The question of how this transfer occurred without American interdiction is one I've been asked repeatedly since the news broke. The honest answer is that the assumption underlying the question that American intelligence would detect such a transfer with sufficient advanced warning for intradiction to be feasible reflects a confidence in American intelligence collection capabilities. that the actual intelligence record does not support. The history of major weapons transfers that American intelligence failed to detect or failed to act upon in time is considerably longer than the public record acknowledges. What is clear is that by the time the DF21D systems were operationally deployed on Iranian coastal positions, the interdiction window had closed. The weapons were in Iranian hands, integrated into Iranian command and control, and ready to fire. That is the reality that the Truman and the Bush are currently living with as they hold their positions well outside the engagement envelope. I I want to be precise about what I mean when I describe the non-appearance of American carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean as significant because I anticipate the push back that says carrier repositioning is a routine matter of force protection and operational flexibility, not a strategic signal. That push back is wrong. And here is why. American carrier strike groups have served as the primary instrument of American coercive diplomacy in the Middle East for 30 years. Their deployment to a theater in a crisis is not merely a military action. It is a political communication. It says to allies, "We are here. We are committed. Your security guarantee is real." It says to adversaries, the cost of your actions will be imposed by the most capable power projection force in human history. And you should factor that into your calculations. The carrier's political function is as important as its military function and in many crises more important. When that carrier does not appear, when the crisis is acute, the ally is catastrophically damaged and the carrier remains at a distance that removes it from the operational equation. The political communication is the inverse. It says to allies, "The guarantee has conditions we did not previously disclose. It says to adversaries, there are actions you can take that will cause us to recalculate rather than respond." That communication once transmitted cannot be retracted. It has been received. It has been filed. And it will shape the behavior of every government that holds an American security guarantee for years to come. The specific reason the Truman and the Bush have not moved forward is the DF21D deployment. American naval doctrine has not solved the anti-ship ballistic missile problem. The SM3 block 2IA program has not delivered the reliable intercept capability against maneuvering hypersonic re-entry vehicles that would be required to justify moving a carrier into DF21D engagement range against an adversary that has demonstrated the willingness and the capability to use those weapons against surface combatants. Moving a carrier into that engagement envelope without a reliable defensive solution is not boldness. It is recklessness with irreplaceable assets and the lives of 5,000 sailors. The decision not to move forward is from a pure force protection standpoint defensible. Its strategic consequences are catastrophic.
{チャプター 4: Part 3: Where Are the Carriers — America's Strategic Paralysis Exposed}
Regardless, Washington is now confronting a problem that its strategic planning community has discussed in classified settings for years, but has never had to manage in public. What does American extended deterrence mean when the forward military presence that gives it credibility cannot be safely deployed in the theater it is supposed to cover? The honest answer, the answer that no one in official Washington is going to say publicly is that it means considerably less than it did before this week. American allies in the region understand this. American adversaries understand this and the governments around the world that have been calculating their own strategic alignment based on the reliability of American security commitments are updating those calculations right now. The administration's public response has been carefully calibrated to project resolution while avoiding any specific commitment that would require the carriers to move forward. Statements about all options remaining on the table and unwavering commitment to Israeli security cost nothing and commit nothing. They are the diplomatic equivalent of a check written on an account that the writer knows cannot cover it. Every government with a professional foreign ministry, which is every government, reads these statements accurately. There is a dimension to this weapons transfer that goes beyond the technical and the operational. A dimension that explains why China made this decision at this moment and why the decision reflects a strategic intelligence that Washington's response has conspicuously failed to match China did not transfer DF21D missiles to Iran because Beijing is indifferent to the consequences. Chinese leadership understands exactly what this transfer means for regional stability, for American strategic positioning, and for the bilateral relationship with Washington. They made the decision anyway because their assessment of the strategic return exceeded their assessment of the strategic cost. That calculation reflects a confidence in China's own position and a willingness to absorb American displeasure that would have been unthinkable 15 years ago. The world has changed and Beijing's strategic confidence has changed with it. The DF21D transfer is China's operational investment in a specific strategic outcome, a Middle East in which American power projection is constrained, in which Iran serves as a capable and independent counterweight to American and Israeli dominance, and in which the broader message is transmitted to every government in the developing world that alignment with China's vision of a multipolar order delivers concrete security benefits. 500DF 21D missiles are simultaneously a weapons transfer and a strategic advertisement. Iran's role in this equation is that of a sovereign state that has consistently demonstrated over five decades of sustained pressure that its commitment to strategic autonomy is not contingent on the price that autonomy requires. I have studied many military organizations in my career. The quality that I find most consistently decisive in determining long-term military outcomes is not technological sophistication or resource depth. It is the clarity and depth of motivation. An institution that knows exactly why it is fighting, that has absorbed hardship without losing coherence, and that maintains operational discipline under conditions of genuine adversity, is a more dangerous opponent than a technically superior force, whose motivation is institutional rather than existential. The IRGC forces that executed the naval strike against the Israeli task force were operating a weapon system transferred from China. But the decision to use it, the acceptance of the consequences that would follow, the confidence in the strategic logic that made the strike necessary came from an Iranian institution with its own coherent strategic doctrine and its own genuine motivation. That combination of externally sourced capability and internally generated will is more formidable than either element alone. Compare this with what was visible on the Israeli and American sides during this engagement. Israel lost a navy and is waiting to hear what Washington will do. Washington is calculating what it can do without putting its carriers at risk. The asymmetry is not primarily technological. It is motivational. One side is fighting for something it is defined as existential. The other side is fighting for commitments whose depth it is now publicly revealing to be conditional. Let me describe the world as I assess it today. After the DF21D transfer, after the destruction of the Israeli Navy, after the non-appearance of American carriers in the eastern Mediterranean, the regional military balance in the Middle East has structurally shifted in a direction that cannot be reversed by any action that Washington or Tel Aviv can take in the near term.
{チャプター 5: Part 4: Will vs Borrowed Power — Why Iran Cannot Be Broken}
Uh Iran now possesses an anti-ship ballistic missile capability that denies American carrierbased power projection throughout the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel's naval power, which served as a critical component of its deterrence architecture, and its ability to conduct maritime interdiction operations has been destroyed. These are not temporary setbacks that can be overcome with additional resources and political will. They are structural changes that will define the regional military balance for the foreseeable future. Russia is observing these developments with a strategic satisfaction it will express only in private. every American asset, every unit of American strategic attention, every political capital expenditure that Washington directs toward managing the consequences of this week's events is attention assets and capital not directed toward Ukraine, not directed toward Taiwan, not directed toward the the competition with Russian influence in Africa and the Middle East. The strategic diffusion that Russia's own military doctrine has advocated as a response to American global primacy is occurring organically without Russian action or expenditure as a consequence of Iranian capability and Chinese strategic investment. For the broader international community, the nations of the global south that have spent decades navigating between American pressure and the aspiration for genuine independence. The events of this week provide a concrete and undeniable demonstration that the American security umbrella has limits. That Washington has been unwilling to publicly acknowledge. The government of every nation currently weighing its own strategic alignment is now doing that calculation with a new set of reference points. The carrier that didn't come forward, the Navy that was erased, the weapons transfer that American intelligence failed to prevent. These are the new data points that will shape strategic calculations from Brazilia to Jakarta to Nairobi. What concerns me most as someone who has spent a career trying to understand how military power actually functions is not the immediate military balance. It is the institutional response. The American strategic community has a consistent pattern of responding to strategic setbacks by doubling down on the assumptions that produced them by investing more in the capabilities and relationships that failed rather than honestly reassessing the strategic framework that made those investments seem sufficient. If Washington responds to the DF21D deployment and the carrier paralysis by simply ordering more SM3 interceptors and issuing stronger statements of commitment, it will have learned nothing from this week. And the next demonstration of Iranian and Chinese strategic coordination will be conducted against an even less prepared American position. The honest assessment, the one that I believe the evidence requires is that the unipolar moment in the Middle East is over. Not weakened, not challenged, over. The combination of Iranian self-reliance, Chinese strategic investment, and Russian diplomatic cover has produced a regional power structure that American military primacy can no longer override through the deployment of carrier strike groups and the issuance of security guarantees. A new equilibrium is forming and the question that matters now is whether American policy can adapt to hat reality quickly enough to manage its consequences or whether it will continue operating on assumptions that the battlefield is already invalidated.
{チャプター 6: Part 5: The New Middle East Map — China, Russia and the End of US Dominance}
Uh, I've been making the case for years in testimony, in writing, in conversations with people inside and outside the military establishment that American strategy in the Middle East was operating on assumptions that the actual military and political environment no longer supported. This week did not surprise me in its direction. It surprised me in its speed and its completeness. Uh, the Israeli Navy's gone. American carriers are holding position outside the engagement envelope of weapons that China transferred to Iran. And the strategic guarantee that has organized American relationships in the region for 30 years is now publicly revealed as conditional in ways that every government will factor into every future calculation. Where does this go from here? That depends on choices that are being made right now in Washington, in Tel Aviv, in Thrron, and in Beijing. Choices about whether to escalate, to accommodate, or to attempt a strategic reset that acknowledges the new reality rather than pretending it away. Each of those paths carries consequences that I believe most of the decision makers involved have not fully thought through. And that uncertainty, the uncertainty of what comes after a strategic inflection point that no one fully prepared for is the most dangerous condition in international relations. What is your read on this? Do you believe Washington has the strategic flexibility to adapt to the new reality that this week has revealed, or is the institutional momentum toward escalation too strong to redirect? Leave your assessment in the comments. Share this analysis with anyone who is trying to understand what is actually happening beneath the surface of the official narratives. Hit like, subscribe, and I will see you in the next.
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/311.html#c55
14. 中川隆[-2401] koaQ7Jey 2026年4月30日 23:33:03 : xtixxyivto : T3Q0OXFkUlRNUWc=[2844]
【60代以上の方へ】実は、高齢者が毎日階段を利用すると…ほとんどの人が○○になると言われています。
高齢者向け健康チャンネル 2026/04/30
http://www.asyura2.com/26/ban13/msg/117.html#c14

高市政権また老人イジメ…財務省が高齢医療「3割負担」早期引き上げ提言、政府「骨太の方針」への明記も
https://www.nikkan-gendai.com/articles/view/news/387134
2026/04/30 日刊ゲンダイ

高齢者の負担を増やす(財政制度等審議会の増田寛也分科会長代理)/(C)共同通信社
もう病院に行けなくなる高齢者も出てくるのではないか。高齢者の医療費負担が大幅にアップされそうだからだ。
財務省は28日、有識者でつくる財政制度等審議会(財務相の諮問機関)の分科会を開き、高齢者による医療費の窓口負担に関し、できる限り早く現役世代と同じ3割を原則とすべきだと提言した。
窓口負担の原則3割の実現に向けて「制度改革の工程表を作成すべきだ」と、わざわざ念を押している。2026年度内の策定を促している。
分科会後に会見した増田寛也会長代理は「若年層の保険料負担を減らし可処分所得を増やすことを加速したい」と強調していた。現役世代の保険料負担を減らすために、高齢者の負担を増やそうということだ。
現在の窓口負担は原則、小学校入学前は2割、69歳までは3割、70〜74歳は2割、75歳以上の後期高齢者は1割となっているが、70歳以上も一律3割にすべきだ、という提言である。
高齢者の3割負担は、もともと日本維新の会が主張していたものだ。
昨年10月、連立合意書をかわした自民党と維新は、医療費の窓口負担について「年齢によらない真に公平な応能負担の実現」を掲げている。自民と維新は、政府が6月に決める「骨太の方針」に、高齢者の3割負担を盛り込もうとしている。
壊れる「国民皆保険」

いずれは“お金持ち”の高齢者だけが病院へ行く国に…(財政制度等審議会の分科会)/(C)共同通信社
「高市政権を支持しているのは20代、30代、40代の現役世代です。高齢者は比較的、野党支持者が多い。政権としては、高齢者に負担させてでも現役世代の手取りを増やして支持基盤を固めたいのでしょう」(政界関係者)
しかし、高齢者はどうしても病気やケガが多くなるものだ。病院での窓口負担が重くなれば、必要な受診まで控える恐れがある。受診が遅れれば、症状が悪化し、大がかりな治療が必要になり、結果的に医療費が高額になるという悪循環にさえなりかねない。
なにより、保険料を払い続けたのに、いざ病気になった時、窓口負担が重すぎて受診を控えなければならないようでは、保険の意味がなくなってしまうのではないか。
法大名誉教授の五十嵐仁氏(政治学)はこう言う。
「医療費の自己負担3割は、年金生活者にとって、かなりの負担です。保険は、いざ使う時、無理のない範囲の負担で利用できなければ、保険の意味をなさなくなってしまいます。高市政権は、OTC類似薬の保険外しといい、国民皆保険の形を変えようとしているように映ります。本来、国民の命と健康を責任をもってサポートするのが政府の役割のはずです。膨らんだ医療費を削りたいのでしょうが、削るべきものは、他にあるはずです」
高齢者が病気になった時、心配せずに病院に行ける国にすべきだ。
◇ ◇ ◇
高市政権はついに「皆保険破壊」へ毒を盛ったのか、高市政権の「病人切り捨て」の横暴については【もっと読む】【さらに読む】で詳しく報じている。
http://www.asyura2.com/25/iryo14/msg/307.html
1. 赤かぶ[263291] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 23:37:46 : 4DFLH1lJmw : MlVld2VJTWw4RzY=[1]
年齢を重ねるほど体の不具合も増え、そうではない現役世代より医療機関での支払いが多いからこそ1割負担なのに、表面的な数字だけの"公平性"を言い訳に負担を増やすのは、貧困率が上がる高齢者の命を削るに等しい非道
— q112358 (@q112358) April 30, 2026
同時に、職場や家庭で昭和〜平成の日本を支えたかつての現役世代の使い捨て pic.twitter.com/ljVAX97zn8
http://www.asyura2.com/25/iryo14/msg/307.html#c1
2. 赤かぶ[263292] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 23:38:52 : 4DFLH1lJmw : MlVld2VJTWw4RzY=[2]
https://x.com/Sumi73834314/status/2049796115730714864
Sumi🌿
@Sumi73834314
もう日本に住むの怖くなってきた。政府
はお金無ければ早く死ぬように。ということなんですかね
他に削るところもあるでしょうし、外人に貢ぎ込んでる出産費用や、踏み倒されている医療費を回収してから次の議論に移ってほしい…一般の会社ではこんなやり口で問題は解決しません。元を正す所からです
3. 赤かぶ[263293] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 23:40:00 : 4DFLH1lJmw : MlVld2VJTWw4RzY=[3]
https://x.com/TAKE4T53739/status/2049721077933445323
TAKE4
@TAKE4T53739
年寄り殺す気か?
4. 赤かぶ[263294] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 23:40:42 : 4DFLH1lJmw : MlVld2VJTWw4RzY=[4]
https://x.com/akkittii/status/2049720306315784368
アキッティィ
@akkittii
自民党同様財務省も、国民苦しめる事しかしないよな、もお日本はダメかもわからんね!
5. 赤かぶ[263295] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 23:42:03 : 4DFLH1lJmw : MlVld2VJTWw4RzY=[5]
— Bruce_SUNNY (@Bruce_SUNNY) April 30, 2026・
http://www.asyura2.com/25/iryo14/msg/307.html#c5
10. 夜盗虫[3984] lumTkJKO 2026年4月30日 23:42:09 : xcLLK6Sj4U : V1VtUUZ4Z25DNDY=[2]
インフレが進むと消費税も増収になるし政府はウハウハw
http://www.asyura2.com/26/senkyo299/msg/535.html#c10
6. 赤かぶ[263296] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 23:43:15 : 4DFLH1lJmw : MlVld2VJTWw4RzY=[6]
https://x.com/ama_natsumikan/status/2049771029334282271
夏沙葡蘭花
@ama_natsumikan
我が家の事情ですが、高齢の母と私で細々と暮らし、頼れる家族も親戚もなく、収入は私のお給料と母の数万円の年金のみ。そして私は来年定年退職。今は働いてるので何とか母の入院費や自分の治療費、家賃も払えて、生活もできていますが、母の治療費が3割となると、もうムリかな…って思います。
7. 赤かぶ[263297] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 23:44:09 : 4DFLH1lJmw : MlVld2VJTWw4RzY=[7]
https://x.com/PfAhUDGCoypTZcZ/status/2049751239601349038
インター
@PfAhUDGCoypTZcZ
高額療養費の上限額引き上げも、
OTC類似薬の保険適用外も、
高齢者をターゲットにしているのは明らか。
高齢者イコール富裕層だと勘違いしているのだろうが、多くの高齢者は少ない年金とアルバイトで半ばその日暮らしの生活を送っているのにだ。
60. T80BVM[2233] VIJXgk9CVk0 2026年4月30日 23:44:54 : YcAPcEYe5l : VlNVN25aQ0NpV0k=[2]
軍事インフレwww
どうあれ、壺市ナエナエ一味がやっていることは、なんもかんも目的は同じ
「欧米の犬」「汚カネ儲け」、そして「日本潰し」である
8. 赤かぶ[263298] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 23:45:20 : 4DFLH1lJmw : MlVld2VJTWw4RzY=[8]
https://x.com/0goMONEPvQNfXWM/status/2049753549383643381
タンクロー飴
@0goMONEPvQNfXWM
老人にとっては僅かな年金から高い健康保険料を払って、
更に病院窓口で3割負担の支払いはかなりキツいでしょう。
医療費を払えないので医者にかかれなくなって野垂れ死にする老人が増えるのか。
そもそも日本の健康保険では昭和50年代頃までは会社員・公務員の本人と高齢者は窓口負担は無料だったのに
9. 赤かぶ[263299] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 23:47:45 : 4DFLH1lJmw : MlVld2VJTWw4RzY=[9]
これはひどい‼️また国民の負担増。『責任ある積極財政』って、結局は緊縮財政の擬態形。積極財政のフリをしてるだけ。これからは『積極財政を擬態する緊縮財政』と呼ぼう。
— あんどう裕(ひろし) 参政党参議院議員・税理士 (@andouhiroshi) April 28, 2026
【速報】財務省、高齢者医療費原則3割負担を提言 #47NEWS https://t.co/BeKkLRoZ8n @47news_officialより
http://www.asyura2.com/25/iryo14/msg/307.html#c9
10. 赤かぶ[263300] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 23:48:38 : 4DFLH1lJmw : MlVld2VJTWw4RzY=[10]
余りにも悪質な提言に怒りしかない。所謂「OTC類似薬」や「高額療養費」の自己負担額引き上げだけに飽き足らず、今度は高齢者医療費を「3割」にしろなどと財務省。高市政権の下で健康保険制度が音を立てて崩れていく。バカげた軍事費に注ぎ込むカネがあるなら健康保険制度を守れとしか言いようがない。 https://t.co/NIa8nDwi9W
— 異邦人 (@Narodovlastiye) April 28, 2026
http://www.asyura2.com/25/iryo14/msg/307.html#c10
11. 赤かぶ[263301] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 23:49:18 : 4DFLH1lJmw : MlVld2VJTWw4RzY=[11]
正直これ、ゾッとするんだが。
— 伊達一詔 YouTube6.6万人 (@KAZfazeone) April 29, 2026
【財務省】高齢者医療費を“原則3割負担”へ提言
「公平だから当然」
「高齢者も払うべき」
「3割?当然でしょ!」
なぁ、君、
何を血迷ってるの?
あのさ、いつか君も
その “高齢者側” になるって想像してるか?
しかもその頃もまだ
“3割で済む”…
http://www.asyura2.com/25/iryo14/msg/307.html#c11
12. 赤かぶ[263302] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 23:50:13 : 4DFLH1lJmw : MlVld2VJTWw4RzY=[12]
事もあろうに財務省が高齢者医療費を原則3割にしようとしていますが、これで負担に耐えかねた高齢者を支えなければならなくなるのは、家族などの「現役世代」です。それは既に菅義偉政権で強行された介護保険制度改悪で現実となっています。必要なのは世代間の分断と対立ではなく再分配の充実です。
— 異邦人 (@Narodovlastiye) April 29, 2026
http://www.asyura2.com/25/iryo14/msg/307.html#c12
26. T80BVM[2234] VIJXgk9CVk0 2026年4月30日 23:50:14 : YcAPcEYe5l : VlNVN25aQ0NpV0k=[3]
全人類の敵、それが世界一高齢のガイジ・ハニートランプ(クソペド)である
以上ですが、何か問題でも?(大洗www)
http://www.asyura2.com/25/warb26/msg/528.html#c26
13. 赤かぶ[263303] kNSCqYLU 2026年4月30日 23:55:07 : 4DFLH1lJmw : MlVld2VJTWw4RzY=[13]
【スーパーJチャンネル】(2026年4月28日)
2026/04/29 ANNnewsCH
財務大臣の諮問機関である財政制度等審議会は70歳以上の医療費の自己負担について「可及的速やかに原則3割とすべき」と提言しました。
財政制度等審議会 増田寛也分科会長代理
「高齢の方でも負担能力のある方にはそれなりの負担をお願いして、医療保険制度をしっかりと持続可能なものをしていきたいと思っているものですから、原則3割負担化ということが出てきております」
高齢者の医療費は年齢や所得に応じて異なり、自己負担が1割または2割の人が9割を超えています。
審議会は「可及的速やかに現役世代と同様に原則3割とすべき」としたうえで、改革を実現するための工程表を作成するように求めました。
また、毎月上限に達すると事実上の“通院し放題”になる「外来特例」は「廃止すべき」と指摘しました。
世代間で異なる負担の不公平感を是正し、現役世代の負担を軽減することなどを目的としています。
[テレ朝NEWS] https://news.tv-asahi.co.jp
http://www.asyura2.com/25/iryo14/msg/307.html#c13
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