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●先日、米国のいわゆる“イラク調査団”が「やっぱりイラクには大量破壊
　兵器の証拠はない」という中間報告を出したのは周知の通りです。
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米国の“特別査察愚連隊”が「やっぱりイラクには大量破壊兵器の証拠はない」と中間報告（但し最終逆転もありうる）
http://www.asyura.com/0310/war39/msg/271.html
WA39 271 2003/9/25 21:15:56
投稿者: 佐藤雅彦
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●この　米国のイラク調査団は、国連査察団をぶちこわしにしておいて、
　小ブッシュ政権が思うがままの“結果”を出すためにデッチ上げた組織
　だったことも、これまでの経緯で歴然としています。
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国連のイラク査察をぶちこわしにしたのはCIAだった、と米国の民主党上院議員たちがCIAを非難
http://www.asyura.com/2003/war23/msg/896.html
WA23 896 2003/2/14 17:03:33
投稿者: 佐藤雅彦
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●この調査団については、日本のマスコミ報道は各社まちまちの呼び方を
　しています。「イラク調査団」だったり「イラク大量破壊兵器捜査チーム」
　だったり……。

　しかし、元来この組織には固有名詞が付いているのですから、あまりに
　まちまちの呼称というのも奇妙なものです。本当はいったいどう呼べば
　適切なのか？

　それでこの「イラク調査団」の由来を調べてみたのですが（関連記事は
　この投稿の真ん中あたりに寄せ集めてあります）、これは正式名称を
　「Iraq Survey Group」といい、国防総省の下部機関なのですね。

　ですから「米国のイラク調査団」では表現が不十分だということになる。
　「survey」という言葉は語源の由来から考えると「見渡す」という意味です。
　ここから「現地踏査／概観／検分／査定／精査」など、文脈に応じた意味が
　派生してきたわけです。　つまり「調査」というのは「survey」という言葉
　の含意を正確に反映する訳語とはいえません。（調査ならresearch でしょう。）
　そういうわけで「イラク踏査団」という訳語が適切なのではないかと思います。
　その所属も合わせて記せば「米国防総省のイラク踏査団」です。

　「イラク踏査団」は、国連が設置した「UNMOVIC」（国連監視検証査察委員会）
　を骨抜きにする思惑を持ちながら小ブッシュ政権がデッチ上げた“もう一つの
　査察団”です。つまり国連の役割を奪取した「盗査団」でもあるわけ。（笑）

●さて本題です。表題にあるとおり、この「米国防総省イラク踏査団」の
　団長となったCIA特別顧問のデイヴィッド・ケイが、じつは米軍を支える
　重要な軍需企業“サイエンス・アプリケーションズ・インターナショナル社”
（SAIC）の副社長として、政府や米国民や国際社会にイラク脅威論やイラク
　主戦論を吹き込んでいたことが暴露されたのです。

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http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/story.jsp?story=450120

Survey Group head's link to arms industry
【イラク調査団の統領は兵器産業と結びついていた】
By Glen Rangwala
05 October 2003

For at least 10 years David Kay, head of the Iraq Survey Group, has staked his professional and business reputation on the case that Iraq was a serious threat.
【米軍イラク調査団のデイヴィッド・ケイ団長は少なくとも10年にわたり、学問とビジネスの分野で築いた自分の名声をかけて「イラクは重大な脅威だ」という主張をしてきた。】

He was a frequent pundit on US television shows, making the case for regime change in blunt language. He called the attempt by Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, to broker an effective inspections process in 1998 "worse than useless"; claimed in 2002 that Iraq was pursuing its weapons of mass destruction in order to bring about the elimination of the state of Israel; and said before entering Iraq that the Coalition would find not just a "smoking gun", but a "smoking arsenal".
【彼は“斯界の権威”としてたびたびテレビに登場し、ぶしつけな言葉でイラクの体制を転覆すべしと主張してきた。1998年にイラクが国連査察を拒否して査察存続が危ぶまれた際に、国連事務総長コフィ・アナンが実効性のある査察を続けようとイラクとの間で仲介を試みたがケイ氏はこれを「役立たずよりもタチがわるい」とこき下ろした。2002年には、イラクがイスラエルを滅ぼすために大量破壊兵器を購入しようとしている、と主張したものだった。そして今年、対イラク戦争が始まる直前には、“多国籍団子軍”はかの地で「決定的証拠となるわずかな武器」どころか「決定的証拠の山」が見つかるだろうと豪語したものである。】

Until October last year, Mr Kay was the vice-president of a major San Diego-based defence contractor, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), co-ordinating its homeland security and counter-terrorism initiatives. It was while he held this role that he claimed that Iraq could launch terrorist attacks on the US mainland.
【昨年10月までケイ氏はサンディエゴに本拠をおく巨大軍需企業“サイエンス・アプリケーションズ・インターナショナル社”（SAIC）の副社長を務めながら、米国本土防衛構想や対テロ構想の企画調整を行なっていた。彼はまさにそうした役職にある時期に、「イラクが米国本土にテロ攻撃を仕掛けてくるかもしれない」と嘯(うそぶ)いていたのだ。】

SAIC was in the headlines earlier this year when it was revealed that the US government had given it a contract three years ago to produce mobile biological vans for training purposes. Until February SAIC's corporate vice-president was Christopher Ryan Henry, now a senior policy official at the Pentagon.
【SAIC社は今年になってからマスコミを賑わしている。米国政府が３年前、同社に訓練用の移動式生物兵器製造工場の車両を製造発注していたことが発覚したからだ。今年２月までSAIC社の副社長だったクリストファー・ライアン・ヘンリー氏は、現在はペンタゴンの政策担当高官という身分だ。】

SAIC's spokesman acknowledged earlier this year that the company is deeply involved in the current war in Iraq, including its role in leading a $650m contract for services and support for the US army. Among other activities, the company runs the US-funded radio station in Umm Qasr, "Voice of the New Iraq", and helps to provide senior advisers to the US occupation authorities in Baghdad. It is not known if Mr Kay retains financial interests in SAIC.
【SAIC社の広報担当者は、同社が対イラク戦争に深く関与していたことをすでに認めている。たとえば同社は米軍支援サービスの６億5000万ドルにおよぶ請負業務で主導的な役割を果たしている。ウムカスルで米国政府資金によるラジオ局「新生イラクの声」放送の運営をしているし、バグダッドの米国占領当局に上級顧問団を提供している。ただし、ケイ氏がいまでもSAICから報酬を得ているかどうかは定かではない。】

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●もっとも、デイヴィッド・ケイがSAIC社の副社長だということは、これまで
　にもメディアで書かれていたようですから、これが初めての暴露でも
　ないようです。

　この男は湾岸戦争後に1998年までイラクの兵器査察を行なっていたUNSCOM
　（国連大量破壊兵器廃棄特別委員会）の核兵器担当の首席査察官だった
　そうです。つまり核兵器の製造には詳しかったわけですから、下記の
　偽情報工作にも関与していた可能性があるでしょう。
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米国のイラク核兵器脅威デマでデッチ上げ新疑惑がさらに発覚：遠心分離機に適さぬアルミ管を「核兵器の証拠」
http://www.asyura.com/0306/war38/msg/364.html
WA38 364 2003/8/12 21:29:17
投稿者: 佐藤雅彦
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●ところで、SAIC社という名前を聞いて、私はこの会社について言及した
　文章を書いていたことを思い出しました。夏に出版されたニッキー・
　ハーガー著の（これが国際盗聴網エシェロンの存在と詳しい実態を
　初めて世界に知らしめることになったし、対米関係において日本と
　似た状況のニュージーランドがいかにして非核政策を貫き得たかを
　国際諜報関係の側面から解き明かした）非常に重要な軍事諜報ルポ
　ルタージュである『シークレット・　パワー』の訳注で、NSA長官
　だったボビー・インマンの略歴を書いたのですが、彼もまたSAIC社
　の重役だったのです。その訳注の部分をここに紹介しておきます。

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『シークレット・パワー：国際盗聴網エシェロンとＵＫＵＳＡ同盟の闇』
　　　（ニッキー・ハーガー著, 佐藤雅彦訳, リベルタ出版, 2003年）

第５章　政府情報通信保安局、太平洋三国軍事同盟ＡＮＺＵＳ、
　　　　　そして非核ニュージーランド構想
【★訳注２】
　ボビー・インマン（Bobby Ray Inman）は一九三一年にテキサス州の小都市ロウンズボロで生まれ一五歳で高校、一九歳でテキサス大学を卒業し、五一に海軍予備隊に入り翌年に少尉には昇進、以後一九年間、海軍情報部に勤務。七二年に海軍士官学校を卒業して海軍作戦副部長つき補佐官となり、翌七三年には太平洋艦隊参謀長つき諜報担当補佐、七四年に海軍諜報部長、七六年には国防総省・国防諜報庁（ＤＩＡ）の副長官および（平時のおいては米国史上最年少の）海軍副提督とトントン拍子に昇進し、七七年には国家安全保障庁（ＮＳＡ）の長官に任命された。
　この華々しい経歴で海軍から殊勲章、国防諜報庁からも「諜報活動の歴史で比類なき功績をなした」として最高殊勲賞を受けた。八一年二月にレーガン政権下で中央諜報庁（ＣＩＡ）副長官に就任したが翌八二年六月に退任した。しかし諜報畑を歩み続けた海軍の人間として初めて提督の昇進した。九三年一二月にはクリントン政権のレス・アスピン国防長官がソマリア・ボスニア政策の失態を責められる中で辞任し（なおアスピンは九五年五月に五六歳の若さで脳卒中で死去した）、これにともなう後任長官の選考でインマンの名も上がったが彼は辞退した。
　政府高官職を退いた後も、ダラス連邦準備銀行の総裁、軍需企業サイエンス・アプリケーションズ・インターナショナル社（ＳＡＩＣ）の重役など多くの役職を務めていたが、同社は九三年にアメリカ超心理学会の会議の開催に関わった。ＣＩＡが超能力分野を含めたマインドコントロール研究に携わっていたことは七〇年代半ばに議会調査で明らかになっていたが、公的にはすでに終了したと宣伝されていたにもかかわらず、研究を続けていたことが露呈したわけである。
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●なお、この本に収めきれなかったかなり膨大な訳注は、下記のサイトに
　掲載してあります。

『シークレット・パワー』訳注補遺
http://member.nifty.ne.jp/pub-liberta/506note.html
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●米国防総省イラク踏査団の誕生と、デイヴィッド・ケイを迎えることに
　なった経緯についての主なブリーフィング資料など。

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U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Information Programs
http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/text2003/0612cia.htm
12 June 2003
CIA Taps David Kay to Advise in Search for Iraq's WMD

Former UNSCOM chief inspector Kay will be based in Iraq

Former U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) chief nuclear weapons inspector David Kay has been appointed as a special advisor for strategy to assist the United States in searching for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

CIA Director George Tenet announced June 11 that Kay will be based in Iraq and responsible for refining the overall approach to the ongoing search for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The new Department of Defense's Iraq Survey Group will provide direct support to the Special Advisor.

"David Kay's experience and background make him the ideal person for this new role. His understanding of the history of the Iraqi programs and knowledge of past Iraqi efforts to hide WMD will be of inestimable help in determining the current status of Saddam Hussein's illicit weapons," Tenet said in the text of a June 11 CIA news release .

Kay, working for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and UNSCOM, led three arms inspection missions as chief nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1992.

Following is the text of the CIA announcement:
-----------------------------------------------------------
(begin text)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington, D.C.
11 June 2003
【中央諜報庁（ＣＩＡ）、ワシントンＤＣ、2003年６月11日発表】

DCI TENET ANNOUNCES APPOINTMENT OF DAVID KAY AS SPECIAL ADVISOR
【テネットCIA長官が、デイヴィッド・ケイを特別顧問に指名した】

Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet announced today the appointment of Dr. David Kay as Special Advisor for Strategy regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Programs. Dr. Kay, 63, will be based in Iraq and will be in charge of refining the overall approach for the search for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The Department of Defense's Iraq Survey Group will provide direct support to the Special Advisor.
【CIA長官ジョージ・J・テネットは本日、デイヴィッド・ケイ博士をイラク大量破壊兵器プログラムについての戦略担当特別顧問に指名した。ケイ氏（63歳）はイラクを本拠に、イラクの大量破壊兵器の探索するための活動全体を改善する責任を負うことになる。国防総省のイラク踏査団（Iraq Survey Group）がケイ特別顧問をじかに支援することになる。】

In announcing the appointment Director Tenet said: "David Kay's experience and background make him the ideal person for this new role. His understanding of the history of the Iraqi programs and knowledge of past Iraqi efforts to hide WMD will be of inestimable help in determining the current status of Saddam Hussein's illicit weapons."
【この任命を発表するにあたり、テネットCIA長官は次のように語った――「デイヴィッド・ケイ氏は経験と経歴からみてこの新たな役割を担うのに理想的な人物だ。彼はイラクの（大量破壊兵器をめぐる）諸々の計画がこれまでどんな展開を遂げてきたかや、イラクが大量破壊兵器を隠そうしてきた動向を熟知しているので、サダム・フセインの禁制兵器の類いが今どうなっているかを確実に知るうえで計り知れない貢献をしてくれるはずだ。】

Dr. Kay, working for IAEA (the International Atomic Energy Agency) and UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission), led three arms inspection missions as chief nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq during 1991-92. Most recently he has served as a senior fellow at the Arlington, Virginia-based think tank, The Potomac Institute.
【ケイ博士は国際原子力機関（ＩＡＥＡ）とUNSCOM（国連大量破壊兵器廃棄特別委員会）で働き、1991〜92年には核兵器担当の主任査察官として３回の現地兵器査察に参加している。最近ではヴァージニア州アーリントンにあるシンクタンク「ポトマック研究所」の上級特別研究員として活躍している。】

Dr. Kay has a BA degree from the University of Texas at Austin and a Masters in International Affairs and Ph.D. degree from Columbia University. He is a recipient of the IAEA's Distinguished Service Award and the U.S Secretary of State's Commendation.
【ケイ博士はテキサス大学（オースチン）で文学士の学位を取り、コロンビア大学で国際問題修士と博士号を取得した。IAEAの卓越功労賞と国務長官賞を受けている。】

(end text)

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This site is produced and maintained by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Information Programs (usinfo.state.gov). Links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
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The Washington File（米国務省・国際情報事業局の宣伝メディア）
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/05/iraq-030530-usia02.htm

30 May 2003
New WMD Survey Group to Begin Operation in Iraq Soon
(U.S. defense official says group's work will be "very thorough")
【新たな大量破壊兵器踏査団がまもなくイラクで活動開始
　（米国の国防武官がこんどの踏査団は「はるかに徹底的に」仕事を行なうと宣言）】
(620)
By David Anthony Denny
Washington File Staff Writer

Washington -- A senior Defense Intelligence Agency official who will head a new U.S. operation to seek out weapons of mass destruction in Iraq says the effort represents "a significant expansion" of the ongoing work in that area.
【イラクの大量破壊兵器を探し当てるために米国が開始する新たな活動の指揮をとることになっている国防諜報庁（DIA）の高官が、この試みは現在かの地で行なわれている活動を「著しく拡張する」ことを意味している、と語った。】

Major General Keith Dayton, operations director at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), briefed media at the Pentagon May 30 on his new task as head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG). He said that the new organization will begin transitioning with the existing group, the 75th Exploitation Task Force, on June 7 in Iraq.
【国防諜報庁の作戦部長であるキース・デイトン少将は、５月30日にペンタゴンで行なった記者発表で、イラク踏査団（Iraq Survey Group＝ISG）の指揮官という新たな任務について語った。新たに結成されるイラク踏査団は、６月７日にイラクで、これまで現地で任務に当たっていた第75特殊探索部隊から業務を引き継ぐことになっている。】

Not only will the ISG be able to apply more people to the task of finding weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Dayton said, it also will consolidate various intelligence-gathering operations currently under way in Iraq under one national-level headquarters.
【デイトン少将によれば、イラク踏査団は大量破壊兵器を見つけだす仕事にこれまで以上の人員を投入できる。さらに、現在イラクで行なわれているさまざまな諜報収集活動は米国の各種の司令部がばらばらに指揮しているが、これも新たなイラク踏査団では整理統合される予定である。】

"Moreover, the ISG will have a powerful intelligence analytical element forward-deployed in the region, with virtual connectivity to an interagency intelligence community ‘fusion center' here in the[Washington] D.C. area," he said. The goal, Dayton said, is to "put all the pieces together in what is appearing to be a very complex jigsaw puzzle."
【「しかも、イラク踏査団は現地の最前線で強力な諜報要員を使う予定になっています。それはここワシントンＤＣに省庁の枠を超えて設置される“合同センター”と事実上つながった状態で活動することになります」とデイトン少将は述べた。彼によれば、イラク踏査団の目標は「あらゆる断片情報をかきあつめて、複雑きわまりないジグソーパズルのような全貌を解明する」ことだという。】

The ISG will have more to do than searching for and eliminating WMD, Dayton said. It will collect documents and other media related to terrorism and exploit their contents; it will do the same for information on war crimes, POW and MIA issues, and other things related to Saddam Hussein's regime, he said.
【イラク踏査団の任務は大量破壊兵器の探索と除去だけではない。デイトン少将によれば、この踏査団はテロリズム関連の文書や各種情報媒体を探り出して、その内容を知ることや、戦争犯罪・捕虜・行方不明兵士についての情報の収集、サダム・フセイン体制についての他の諸々の事柄の収集なども行なうという。】

"It will interrogate and debrief individuals, both hostile and friendly, and it will exploit captured materiel," Dayton said.
【「敵味方にかかわりなく、人々を尋問したり情報を求めたりもするし、略奪された物品の探索も行ないます」とデイトン少将は言った。】

The ISG will have between 1,300 and 1,400 personnel, Dayton said, drawn from several U.S. government agencies, and from the governments of Britain and Australia. Some former UNSCOM (U.N. Special Commission-- the U.N. weapons inspectors in Iraq until 1998) inspectors will be on the team, he said. Headquarters will be located in Baghdad, with some operations located in Qatar because of the military's existing communications capability there. The overall operation, he said, will include:
【デイトン少将によれば、イラク踏査団は1300〜1400人規模の人員になる予定で、その人員はいくつかの米国省庁と英国およびオーストラリア政府機関から融通する。UNSCOMの査察員（として国連の下で98年までイラクで兵器査察を行なっていた）経験者も若干名だが踏査団に参加するという。踏査団の総本部はバグダッドに置かれ、軍の通信施設があるカタールにも若干の作戦本部が置かれる予定。イラク踏査団の作戦本部は、デイトン少将によればつぎのとおり――　】

-- A joint interrogation/debriefing center;
　　【合同尋問・情報聴取センター】
-- A joint materiel exploitation center;
　　【合同器物探索センター】
-- Chemical and biological intelligence support teams; and
　　【生物化学兵器諜報支援チーム】
-- The ISG operation center.
　　【イラク踏査団作戦センター】

"The ISG represents a major change in the search for WMD in Iraq," Dayton said. "It builds on the work already done ... but with its robust analytical capability [deployed] forward, and consolidation of the various intelligence disciplines operating now under one national-level headquarters [deployed] forward in Iraq, the ISG is well-positioned to achieve some real synergy here as we continue the hunt for weapons of mass destruction and delve into other areas of national interest."

Dayton pointed out that the current WMD searchers, the 75th Exploitation Task Force, have been operating off of a list of 900 sites that was drawn up in January and February. The ISG will have a decreased emphasis on the sites on the list, relying more on the intelligence information that its own component develops, he said.

Asked what his expectations were, Dayton answered, "My personal opinion ... going into this is that there is a lot of information out there that simply hasn't been gathered yet, partly because the Iraqis are reluctant to come forward in some areas, partly because we are still in the process of putting together the necessary pieces and the necessary targeting of individuals so that we can find out....

"[T]his is going to be a deliberate process [and] a long-term process as well. This is not necessarily going to be quick and easy, but it will be very thorough," Dayton said.

(The Washington File is a product of the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)

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●2003年５月30日付けの米軍ニュースサービス
　（国防総省がイラク踏査団の創設を発表したときの“大本営発表”）
American Forces News Service, News Articles
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2003/n05302003_200305305.html
Iraq Survey Group to Take Over Hunt for Iraqi Weapons
By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service

Washington, May 30, 2003 -- A significant expansion of effort in the hunt for weapons of mass destruction will begin to take hold in Iraq in coming days, DoD officials said today.

That presence will come about with startup work by the Iraq Survey Group. Army Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton, who will head the group, said the group will consolidate the efforts of the various collection operations in Iraq under one national-level headquarters. The transition is slated to begin no later than June 7, Dayton said.

The group will ultimately have between 1,300 and 1,400 people from the United States military, other U.S. government agencies, the United Kingdom and Australia. The main headquarters will be in Baghdad. The group's analytical center will be located with U.S. Central Command's forward headquarters in Qatar as will the Combined Media Processing Center.

The group will have a powerful intelligence analytical element in the region with connectivity to an interagency intelligence community fusion center based in Washington, Dayton said. The group's primary goal is to search for and eliminate weapons of mass destruction, he said. But experts with the group will also exploit documents and media related to terrorism, investigate war crimes, gather information on POW/MIA issues and other things related to the former Iraqi regime.

"The goal is to put all the pieces together in what is appearing to be a very complex jigsaw puzzle," Dayton said.

The group will maintain a potent "disablement and elimination capability" for weapons of mass destruction.

Dayton said his group's two-week transition with the 75th Exploitation Task Force in Baghdad will begin by June 7. "During the transition, the ISG operations group … will gather under its control the various intelligence collection operations currently underway, and begin to refocus collection efforts to analytically driven requirements," he said.

Dayton, who serves as director of the Defense Human Service within the Defense Intelligence Agency, said the 75th and "its associated elements have done a truly magnificent job in the two months its been operating under very difficult conditions in Iraq."

Members of the 75th have visited more than 300 sensitive sites. Dayton said all Americans owe the members of the unit a debt of gratitude.

"The ISG represents a major change in the search for WMD in Iraq," he said. "It builds on the work already done by the 75th. But with its robust analytical capability forward and consolidation of the various intelligence disciplines operating in Iraq, now under one national-level headquarters in Iraq, the ISG is well-positioned for some real synergy here as we continue the hunt for weapons of mass destruction and delve into other areas of national interest."

The group will report through military channels through the commander, Combined Joint Task Force 7, to the commander, U.S. Central Command. George Tenet, the director of central intelligence, will help set the protocols for the group's reports, said Steve Cambone, defense undersecretary for intelligence.

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●国防総省が５月30日に行なった記者発表の会見記録
　（国防総省イラク踏査団を創設するという記者発表）

http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030530-0231.html
United States Department of Defense.
News Transcript
On the web: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030530-0231.html
Media contact: media@defenselink.mil or +1 (703) 697-5131
Public contact: http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html or +1 (703) 428-0711

Presenter: Stephen A. Cambone, USD (Intelligence) Friday, May 30, 2003 - 2:00 p.m. EDT
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Briefing on the Iraq Survey Group
(Briefing on the Iraq Survey Group. Participating were Stephen A. Cambone, under secretary of defense for intelligence, and Army Maj. Gen. Keith W. Dayton, director for operations, Defense Intelligence Agency.)

Cambone: Good afternoon, everyone. The first sunny day of the month, as far as I can tell, and a Friday, and you're all here.

I'm here because when last I was here, I made you a promise that when we were getting prepared to stand up the -- formally stand up -- the Iraq Survey Group, that we would come down and tell you what we were going to do and how we were going to do it and who was going to do it.

And so, I have with me today Major General Keith Dayton. General Dayton is going to head the Iraq Survey Group. He is currently the director of the Defense HUMINT [Human Intelligence] Service within the Defense Intelligence Agency. Prior to that, he served as a pol-mil officer down in J-5. And prior to that, he was the Defense attache in Moscow, and in the early 1990s, spent some time -- in the mid-1990s, rather -- spent some time in the Council on Foreign Relations. He is by training an artilleryman, and had the division artillery in the early '90s for the 3rd ID [Infantry Division].

So, what I'd like to do is introduce General Dayton, have him tell you what it is he is going to be doing and have him answer some of your questions. I am unfortunately scheduled to leave here at 2:30; I've got to go off to a -- to Warrenton, of all places.

So, General Dayton --

Dayton: Thank you, Dr. Cambone.

Let me address a few aspects of the ISG so that you all better understand what it is and what it intends to accomplish. As you all know right now, the current hunt for the weapons of mass destruction is being carried out by the 75th Exploitation Task Force. Now to date, they have visited over 300 sensitive sites, many off the master site list that they've been working from, and many based on intelligence tips received in the field. At the same time, there are operations taking place throughout Iraq in the areas of document exploitation and collection, captured materiel exploitation, and interrogations and debriefings.

Now, the Iraq Survey Group [ISG] represents a significant expansion of effort in the hunt for weapons of mass destruction, as we build on the efforts that are ongoing. The ISG will mean more people applied to the task, to be sure. But this is not the most important point. Rather, the ISG will consolidate the efforts of the various intelligence collection operations currently in Iraq under one national-level headquarters. Moreover, the ISG will have a powerful intelligence analytical element forward-deployed in the region, with virtual connectivity to an interagency intelligence community fusion center here in the D.C. area. The ISG also has a pretty potent WMD [weapons of mass destruction] disablement and elimination capability assigned.

So, what's the ISG going to do? Well, the first priority, of course, is the search for and elimination of weapons of mass destruction. But in addition to WMD, the ISG will collect and exploit documents and media related to terrorism, war crimes, POW [prisoner of war] and MIA [missing in action] issues, and other things relating to the former Iraqi regime. It will interrogate and debrief individuals, both hostile and friendly, and it will exploit captured materiel. The goal is to put all the pieces together in what is appearing to be a very complex jigsaw puzzle.

Now, how are we going to do this? The ISG, as currently planned, will be manned by between 1,300 and 1,400 people from the United States government interagency, from the United Kingdom and Australia. The main effort is going to be in Iraq, with the headquarters in Baghdad. This collection operation will include a joint interrogation debriefing center, a joint materiel exploitation center, chemical and biological intelligence support teams and the ISG operation center. The main analytic effort will be co-located with CENTCOM forward, as will the combined media processing center. Furthermore, the ISG is going to have liaison elements with CJTF-7 in Kuwait and with other U.S. government agencies inside Iraq. And finally, the intelligence fusion center will be here in Washington, D.C. And all are going to be linked electronically.

As we speak, the analytic center in Qatar is up and running. And various collection elements are operating in Iraq, as I said before. Significant work has been done already in planning and developing a workable infrastructure for the Baghdad headquarters for the ISG, and we will begin a planned, two-week transformation -- transition with the 75th Exploitation Task Force in Baghdad, beginning no later than 7 June. During the transition period, the ISG operations group, which is really my command post, will gather under its control the various intelligence collection operations that are currently underway and begin to refocus collection efforts to analytically-driven requirements. The fusion center in Washington is also operational presently, and will transition from what it currently does, which is consolidating and reporting information, to a new mission of guiding ISG collection efforts.

And I'm not done here. One final comment, and this comes from the heart. The 75th Exploitation Task Force, as far as I'm concerned, and their associated elements, have done a truly magnificent job in the two months they've been operating in very difficult conditions in Iraq. I think we all owe them a debt of gratitude.

The ISG represents a major change in the search for WMD in Iraq. It builds on the work already done by the 75th, but with its robust analytical capability forward, and consolidation of the various intelligence disciplines operating now under one national-level headquarters forward in Iraq, the ISG is well-positioned to achieve some real synergy here as we continue the hunt for weapons of mass destruction and delve into other areas of national interest.

This will be a deliberate process and it will be a long-term effort. We will be using all sources to put together pieces of an incredibly complex jigsaw puzzle. Some people have likened it to detective work. I'm optimistic we will have success. And I'm leaving Monday to stay.

That's what I have. Are there any questions? Sir?

Q: General, you said 1,300 to 1,400 people. Will virtually all of those be in Iraq?

Dayton: No. It's a split operation. The analytic center, which is about 120 people, about, and the media processing center, which is about another 250 people, will be operating out of Qatar. The reason for that is that Qatar just a well-developed theater of operations. It has all of the communications that I need to get up and running quickly, and it has excellent connectivity back to the United States and throughout the region.

The Baghdad site that I will be occupying with the rest of the folks, which I would call the collection aspect of what the ISG is doing, requires a bit more work to become as fully developed as that. It will be operational fairly quickly, but to get the level of sophistication in the communications networks that are required for digitally transmitting large volumes of information, that's already in place in Qatar, and it didn't make any sense to us to try to recreate that and lose a month in Iraq.

Q: So how many people are you going to have in Iraq? And how does that compare to the current number of people searching?

Dayton: There's about 200-and-some that are searching now, maybe a little bit fewer. As far as searchers are concerned -- and again, I want to make the distinction, the important point about the ISG is not numbers of searchers, it's the process by which the searching will take place. And we'll have probably between 200 and 300 searchers, so it's a small increase in numbers of searchers. But what it is, again, the synergy of getting all of these intelligence disciplines together with the analytic-based collection requirements.

Right now what the ISG has been doing -- or not the ISG, the Exploitation Task Force, because of how it developed and what its mission has been is it's been operating basically off a fixed-site list. It's done a very good job of going out to those locations. There will be a decreased emphasis in fixed sites and a greater emphasis in going to places where the intelligence community's analytic powers tell us that there is a much more probable likelihood of finding something or finding people who know something about what was there.

Q: General?

Dayton: Sir.

Q: U.S. military commanders, having been given intelligence that they were likely to face chemical or biological weapons on the battlefield, are continuing to express surprise -- it happened again today, just happened earlier today -- that they neither encountered them on the battlefield nor have any been found in the two months or so since then. What do you think is the explanation for that?

Dayton: I honestly don't know.

Steve, do you want to take a shot at that?

Cambone: We can come back to that. Let's -- why don't we stay on topic?

Dayton: Yeah, let's try to -- if we can, sir, on ISG issues, and then I'll -- any kind of policy or interpretation issues, I'll pass off.

Sir?

Q: Well, General, you say you're optimistic. Judging by what you've seen so far, the interviews you've looked at as well, what are your expectations going in? Is it possible that you may not find hard chemicals or biological weapons, and may just piece together, as you say, the complex jigsaw puzzle?

Dayton: My personal opinion -- okay? -- going into this is that there is a lot of information out there that simply hasn't been gathered yet, partly because Iraqis are reluctant to come forward in some areas, partly because we are still in the process of putting together the necessary pieces and the necessary targeting of individuals so that we can find out. You know, it may be more important to find out who the guard was and what he knows at a particular site than maybe a high-value target guy who may not want to tell us anything, or a truck driver who may have transported stuff from one place to another; that's what we're looking at, that sort of level of detail, instead of just going to -- again, to fixed sites that may or may not have anything.

Do I think we're going to find something? Yeah, I kind of do, because I think there's a lot of information out there, and that's why I tell you, this is going to be a deliberate process, but it will be a long-term process as well. This is not necessarily going to be quick and easy, but it will be very thorough.

Yes, ma'am?

Q: When you say you're decreasing the emphasis on these fixed sites that may or may not have something, why do you have less confidence in those sites now? These were the sites that I assume were on this master list to begin with, and some sites added since then.

Dayton: Oh, I think we've learned something in the past couple of months. The fact that we've gone to a lot of these sites and haven't found anything that is of value tells us that, okay, we took the top priority sites, didn't find them, so now, before we go to other sites, we're going to want to get a bit more analytic assessment of the site done before we go back and try it again, because things have changed in the last two months. They may well have been excellent targets back in February or March, but, you know, we just want to know more about it before we take resources and send them out there.

Q: But excellent targets in February and March and they're not now, why? Because of looting? Because people have been in there?

Dayton: I really don't know. Could be all the above. And that's what I'm going to try to find out.

Q: And on that same topic, one of the things Dr. Cambone talked about last time was the chain of custody of samples and at some of these sites. Are the sites that have not yet been checked secured by anyone at this point?

Dayton: I don't know the answer to that. I haven't been over there. I'm not -- (Off mike.).

Sir?

Q: General?

Q: To follow up what Martha was talking about, does it indicate that the original intelligence on those primary sites was faulty and that now you're going to have to start from scratch and develop a whole new intelligence database?

Dayton: I don't think so. What it tells to me, and again speaking just from my experience on this, is that things may have changed in the interim time from when we first developed these sites as a location. Things could have been either taken and buried, they could have been transported, or they could have been destroyed. It doesn't mean they weren't there when we thought they were there. That's my personal opinion on this. And that's the assumption I'm going in on.

Yes, ma'am?

Q: General, what would you say to people who would say, well, you're increasing -- you're minimally increasing the staff by small numbers, and yet you're greatly expanding its mission, to not only the weapons of mass destruction, but war crimes, MIA? I mean, I can hear people say that that may be difficult.

Dayton: They're all interrelated. And what I would say that we bring to the equation now is that we are connecting various pieces that really the operational commanders have not had the ability to connect. And they're all interrelated. And so when I talk about interrogating people on war crimes, there's no reason not to suspect that interrogations will reveal information that will be useful coming back to weapons of mass destruction and things like that. They simply haven't been staffed and they haven't had the national-level focus to enable them to do that.

I have an interagency team that's going out with me from all areas of the U.S. government, a lot of tremendous expertise. We have some former UNSCOM [United Nations Special Commission] inspectors who are going out with us. This is a pretty thoroughbred team. And I would tell you that -- you know, I wouldn't focus on the number of collectors, but rather on where the collectors are guided and by what process. I think that's the important thing here.

Q: General, who does the interrogations? Who's going to be doing the interrogations?

Dayton: Well, I'm not sure I understand your question.

Q: Well, you have 200 people who are going to sites. Who actually does --

Dayton: Those are -- let's say, for example, I'm going to go to a village where I know that there are several truck drivers who happened to have worked at a particular WMD facility. Those people, I have a separate team of interrogators and debriefers, we call them. Okay? These are usually Army or civilian people who have been trained to do this. They will go with that team. They are not the people who are currently involved in another aspect of interrogation and debriefing which is happening with the high-value targets. There are other assets that I will have available to me that go do that.

Q: General?

Dayton: Ma'am?

Q: Two questions. Is there any role for U.N. arms inspectors in this to join in the search?

Dayton: That's a policy issue. That goes to him, not me.

Q And then the second question is, on the prisoners issue and the war crimes issue, yesterday Central Command said that they ended up releasing someone that they believe may have killed between 10 and 15 thousand Shi'as 10 years ago. What is it that you-all are going to bring to this that will prevent that from happening? And what more can you tell us about that incident?

Dayton: You know, I can't answer that question, because I read the report that you did. I don't know what -- how he got released, why he got released, whether it was somebody made a mistake or whether it was -- I just don't know.

Q: (Off mike.) -- tell them that he was a war criminal.

Dayton: Well, I don't know. I just can't answer that one.

Sir?

Q: Can I go back to the question of expectations?

Dayton: Yeah.

Q: Can you tell the American people with some certainly you expect to find artillery shells, rocket shells, bulk agent, these thousands of liters we were led to believe existed by the president and Mr. Rumsfeld? What, realistically, should the public be prepared for you to find?

Dayton: I can't answer that question either, because I just don't know. I'm going out there to, as I said before, to put all the pieces together to find what I can. It could be that stuff has been moved somewhere else and we'll find it where it's been moved to. It could be some stuff has been destroyed. There are ways to determine that to, I think, everyone's satisfaction, but it will take time and it will take putting a lot of pieces together.

Q: You're not going to go there blindly. You've had the -- especially in your position as the director of HUMINT, you've seen the intelligence on this from the human perspective, the spy perspective and vector perspective, Don't you have a feel for, now, in terms of how credible that early intelligence was and realistically what you're going to find?

Dayton: Well, I'm one of those that thought that intelligence was pretty credible. Okay? I thought it was credible. I still do. And I think that we may get lucky. We may not. We may find out three months from now that there was a very elaborate deception program going on that resulted in destruction of stuff. I have no idea. That's what I'm going out there to find out.

Q: On the HUMINT issue, there's been a lot of talk, of course, about maybe having relied too much on defectors and exiles who perhaps had their own agendas. When you say you feel pretty good about that intelligence, are you saying you felt pretty good about the HUMINT that you were getting from defectors and exiles?

Dayton: I'm not saying anything like that. I'm just saying I felt good about what I understood to be the intelligence that was collected through all means of intelligence collection.

Q: Can you comment on the HUMINT issue?

Dayton: Not really, no, I can't.

Q General?

Dayton: (Inaudible.) -- sir.

Q Two questions. First, just to be clear, the answers from the podium so far on this issue have been that the search was going to go systematically through the 900 sites or 600 sites which were WMD-related and we should be patient. You seem to be announcing that that search is going to be phased out. I just wanted to be clear about that. You're not going to plod through the 600 sites on your list?

Dayton: What I'm going to do, if the intelligence community analytic base -- which is pretty darn powerful when we combined yours and ours together -- if they tell me that this site that hasn't been looked at yet is a good target, then I'll go take a look at it. Okay? But if they say that site No. 353, based on everything we know now, and based on our interviews with people, and based on, you know, other kinds of intelligence, that it's not a good place to go, then I'm not going to go to there just because it's on a list. Okay?

So, in that sense, we're not going to mechanically go down the list and check off locations. We're going to try to gather a lot more information on stuff before we go do that.

Q: (Off mike.) -- but you say that the basis of these searches would be analytically based. But, of course, the basis of the drawing up of the original list was analytically based; it was based upon the analyses of the information available to the intelligence community at the time. Given the failure to find materials, even at the sites which were all first priority in the list, which was said to be the sites you should go to first in the triage operation, have you gone back and looked at -- done a second look at the analysis and the information that led to those sites being on that list? And what conclusions do you draw, if you have gone back?

Dayton: No, I haven't done that. But I will tell you that we know a lot more now than we did back in February or January, when these lists were originally developed, and that we are in much better shape now, based on interviews of a lot of people that we had never had the opportunity to talk to, to refine what we think we're going to find and where we think we're going to find it.

Q: But the information reaching our people out in the theater is that the interviews, so far, have produced nothing by way of solid information from people who say, "Yes, we have ongoing weapons programs; this is what we were doing." So far, they've said no --

Dayton: I can't comment on that. I'm not privy to that.

Q: You said you know a lot more now. Do you mean by that you know a lot more of what you don't know?

Dayton: No, we know a lot more --

Q: If you know a lot more, you would have found these things; is that right?

Dayton: Remember, my mission is not only WMD, but it's all kinds of things. And we know more about what people think they saw, we know more about where people were, we know more about -- again, it's a beginning process. We've put a lot of pieces together on this. And so, yes, of course we know more. We've interviewed a lot of people. Hasn't always been successful? Of course, hasn't been successful in many cases, but that's not the issue here.

Steve, I'm going to turn it over to you.

Cambone: I got time for about two questions, if you got 'em. Who's got --

(Cross talk.)

Q: Actually, Jamie first, and then I have another question. (Laughter.)

Q: Wow! That's very good.

Q: Jamie asked the one earlier that you had --

Q: My question was answered, actually, within this whole discussion.

Cambone: Okay. There you go.

Q: Oh, then I have -- I actually have one that's more of a general question, on the reason that the U.S. went to war. And I raise it because of the remarks by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, who was quoted as saying, "For bureaucratic reasons, we settled on one issue -- weapons of mass destruction -- because it was the one reason everyone could agree on." And he lists other reasons. And he said one that was almost unnoticed, but huge, was the war allowed the U.S. to withdraw forces from Saudi Arabia.

And as a close associate of the Defense secretary, I wondered what your thoughts are; why did the U.S. go to war?

Cambone: I'm not here to talk about that today. And if you're going to want to follow up with that, you'll have to find an occasion through the Public Affairs Office to talk to the deputy secretary.

Q: Would you answer the question about whether or not the remaining six sites have been secured?

Cambone: I think what we have is a situation where there is, as Keith said -- and I didn't bring my numbers with me, and I meant to do that for you -- there were some 900-some-odd sites. They have been through 200 and something. It is my expectation that over a period of time, all of those sites will be gone through. I mean, the question was asked, are we abandoning that sort of thing --

Q: But right now they're not secure?

Cambone: Hang on. So, what happens is, they go into them, and in some places, you will find that there are things of interest, in which case, they are either secured and moved, if they have the transport, or people are left until such time -- to secure them -- until such time as the team can get packed, finish whatever it is they need to do in the facility, and then once they're finished with a facility, and they no longer believe there is any value to sustaining its security, they will move the teams on to another place.

So, there are still some places on that list that they have been through which have security at them. There are other sites which they have completed their review of and no longer believe they need to be secured, and therefore, are not secured.

Q: But it would seem obvious, then, that from the beginning, when Baghdad fell, that you didn't immediately go out and --

Cambone: To all 900 and something sites --

Q: (Inaudible.)

Cambone: Given the number of sites there were, and let's not forget what we're still engaged in, all right? We've got, you know, five people killed this week alone. So, they're still engaged in operations to stabilize the country, even as they are doing the kind of work that we've described to you here. So, there is a balance that the command is trying to strike, and what we're trying to do with the work that General Dayton is undertaking is give a little more precision to this exercise. So, it's not a question of giving them up. It's a question of: All right, we've been through some of them, we know that there are more; we also know that there are other opportunities to gain this information and knowledge. Let's start to combine all of that and see if, with the resources we have available, we can be more efficient in the way we've gone through this.

Q: And when, specifically, was it decided to form the Iraq Survey Group?

Cambone: I recall having this conversation with people in -- just after the beginning of hostilities, as we were thinking through what happens when we get from what the military calls phase three into its phase four operations, and we go from -- and remember what we have over there.

We have a combat support group in the 75th, whose job it was to support the combat forces. And so, their job was to be able to give information to the combat forces about things to either avoid, precautions to be taken, events that they may have to prepare for. They weren't prepared, organized and equipped to do the kind of wide- scale analytic work that General Dayton's group is designed to do.

And so, therefore, once you go from a state where hostilities are the norm, to one where you have a more secure environment, you can take the kind of approach that's being discussed here.

(Cross talk.)

Cambone: I got two more.

Q: U.N. arms inspectors, why not bring them in to help -- (Off mike.) --

Cambone: I don't know -- you asked me that the last time, and I know people are talking about that. As you know, there's an IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] team that will go in next week sometime. And so the people in -- who work that problem are working that problem, and I'm not quite sure when they're going to --

Q: That doesn't fall under you?

Cambone: No. We're -- we're in the "let's get the job and the execution done." The question of who participates, and so forth, is done elsewhere.

Charlie, last one.

Q: Seems the secretary and other senior administration officials have for months been saying that they were confident that chemical and biological weapons would be found in the country. This week, in a speech in New York, the secretary suggested perhaps Iraq had destroyed its chemical weapons. Is the administration beginning to back away from its long and firmly held stand that there were chemical and biological weapons in Iraq when this war started? Are you still convinced of that?

Cambone: I do not believe the administration is backing away from that position, Charlie. I think -- no. I don't think that at all.

Q: So you're still convinced that there were chemical and biological weapons --

Cambone: Nothing that has happened over the last month --

Q: -- in that country when the war began?

Cambone: -- has changed my view or, as far as I know, the view of others on the subject. So -- last one.

Q: To whom will this group report? I mean, will they be under the command of General Franks? Will they report back here to Washington? Who has op com and to who do they report?

Cambone: It will belong to CJTF-7, or the Joint Task Force Iraq, or whatever the name is going to be, reporting up through that chain to General Franks and into the secretary of Defense. The DCI [Director, Central Intelligence], as the head of national intelligence, will have an interest in seeing that the product, that the work of the group, in terms of their reports and finished reports, are done to meet the standards that are imposed by the protocols, if you will, for this kind of work. So there will be -- both of them will have a very keen interest in making sure that the work of the group gets done properly.

Okay, I've really got to go. I thank you for being here this afternoon. And as this unfolds over the course of time, we'll continue to keep you apprised. Okay? Thanks.

Q: Thank you.

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●国連の大量破壊兵器査察団について、国連自身はどのように呼んでいるのか
　調べてみましたが、正式には「査察官たち（inspectors）を送った」という
　言い回しのようです。

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98年のイラクによる国連査察拒否をうけて国連で再編成され、UNSCOM（国連大量破壊兵器廃棄特別委員会）に代わるものとして2000年に発足し、イラク侵略戦争を挟みながらも現在も続いているUNMOVIC（国連監視検証査察委員会）についての自己紹介文書
http://www.unmovic.org/
UNMOVIC : Basic facts

The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was created through the adoption of Security Council resolution 1284 of 17 December 1999. UNMOVIC was to replace the former UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and continue with the latter’s mandate to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological weapons and missiles with a range of more than 150 km), and to operate a system of ongoing monitoring and verification to check Iraq’s compliance with its obligations not to reacquire the same weapons prohibited to it by the Security Council.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations appointed Dr. Hans Blix of Sweden to be the Commission’s Executive Chairman. In addition, the Secretary-General appointed 16 individuals to serve on the College of Commissioners of UNMOVIC which provides advice and guidance to the Chairman in the execution of his duties. In conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, the Commission’s staff are selected on the basis of securing the highest standard of efficiency, competence and integrity, taking into consideration the importance of recruiting staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible. The Commission’s staff include weapons specialists, analysts, scientists, engineers and operational planners.

The Commission is financed from a small portion of the monies raised from the export of oil from Iraq (the “oil-for-food” programme). Unlike its predecessor, UNSCOM, the staff of UNMOVIC are employees of the United Nations. In addition to the Office of the Chairman with executive, legal and liaison functions, UNMOVIC comprises four divisions (Planning and Operations, Analysis and Assessment, Information, Technical Support and Training) as well as an administrative service. The Commission maintains its headquarters at the United Nations in New York. The Organisational Plan and structure chart of the Commission are available in document S/2000/292
【 UNMOVIC には、イラク石油の輸出代金からも（「食糧のための石油」プログラムにもとづいて）若干の活動資金が付与されている。だが前身の UNSCOM と違うのは UNMOVIC の職員たちが国連に雇用されているということだ。】

The Executive Chairman is required to report to the Security Council on the activities of UNMOVIC every three months. In accordance with the resolution establishing UNMOVIC, he must consult the College of Commissioners on written reports to the Council. Thus, the College of Commissioners of UNMOVIC meets at least four times a year in closed session to discussion the report and other organizational and operational activities

-----------------------------------------------------------
●UNMOVIC 発足と、米国による骨抜きの経緯
http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/pages/chronology.asp

The UNMOVIC College of Commissioners

26 January 2000
The Secretary-General writes to President of the Security Council proposing Dr. Hans Blix as Chairman of UNMOVIC (document S/2000/60).

6 March 2000
Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, writes to the President of the Council, stating that following consultations with the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, the Secretary-General has directed him to consult with the Council on the list of UNMOVIC Commissioners whom the Secretary-General proposes to appoint.

10 March 2000
The Secretary-General writes to the President of the Security Council, informing him that he has appointed 16 individuals to serve as Commissioners for UNMOVIC (document S/2000/207).

10 March 2000
The Secretary-General writes to the President of the Security Council, informing him that he has appointed 16 individuals to serve as Commissioners for UNMOVIC (document S/2000/207).

《中略》

18 March 2003
UNMOVIC inspectors withdraw from Iraq.

19 June 2003
Mr John Wolf (United States of America) resigns from the College of Commissioners.

30 June 2003
Dr Blix ends his appointment as Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC.

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●SAIC社についてのいくつかの補足情報

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●冒頭の「イラク踏査団のケイ団長がSAIC社副社長だった」ニュース記事
　のなかで言及されている「米国は３年前に移動式細菌兵器工場の建造を
　SAIC社に発注していた」という部分についての報道――

http://www.iht.com/articles/101424.htm

A secret project, and a suspect

William J. Broad, David Johnston and Judith Miller/NYT NYT
Wednesday, July 2, 2003 (The New York Times)

Three years ago, the United States began a secret project to train Special Operations units to detect and disarm mobile germ factories of the sort that Iraq and some other countries were suspected of building, according to administration officials and experts in germ weaponry.
【生物兵器に詳しい複数の政府職員と専門家によれば、米国は３年前に、複数の特殊作戦部隊に訓練を施す秘密プロジェクトを開始したという。それらの部隊は、イラクその他の国々が建造している疑いのある移動式細菌兵器工場の探知と無力化を行なうことを任務にしている。】

The heart of the effort, the officials said, was a covert American plan to construct a mobile germ plant, real in all its parts but never actually "plugged in" to make weapons. In the months before the war against Iraq, American commandos trained on this factory.
【このプロジェクトの中核を成すのは、政府職員たちの証言によると、米国自身が移動式細菌兵器工場を建造するというものだった。これは実物そのものを建造したわけだが、ただし兵器製造のための「稼働」は決してしなかったという。対イラク戦争の数ヵ月前に、米軍の奇襲隊員たちがこの工場を使って訓練をした。】

The tale of the mobile unit provides a glimpse into one of the most secretive of military and intelligence worlds - that of germ warfare defense. But here, two stories intersect. The first involves this previously unknown aspect of the Iraq war. The second involves the investigation into who sent letters containing anthrax that killed five people in the United States in late 2001.

Officials familiar with the secret project say that to design an American training version of a mobile germ factory, the government turned to Steven Hatfill, then a rising star in the world of biological defense but more recently publicly identified by the Justice Department as "a person of interest" in the anthrax investigation.

It was unclear why investigators focused on Hatfill. Officials now say a major reason he came under suspicion was his work on the mobile factory.

Hatfill has been subjected to greater scrutiny than anyone else in the anthrax investigation but the government has brought no charges. He has repeatedly denied any role in the attacks and has said he knows nothing about anthrax production.

Hatfill, people close to him say, is proud of his work on the mobile unit and says it demonstrates his desire to assist the government in biodefense, even though investigators tried to use his work against him. In any case, investigators found no evidence suggesting that the plant ever made anthrax, his friends, government experts and investigators all agree. The secret trainer is similar to the mobile units that the Bush administration has accused Iraq of building to produce biological weapons. Neither its existence nor Hatfill's work on it has previously been disclosed publicly. Pat Clawson, Hatfill's spokesman and friend, said Hatfill would not comment on any secret project or any role that he might have played. Hatfill helped develop the mobile plant while working for Science Applications International Corp., a leading contractor for the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency, the officials and the experts said. They said the unit was set up at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, last autumn, months before the Iraq invasion, to help Delta Force, the army's elite Special Operations unit, learn what to look for in Iraq and how to react if its members found dangerous mobile gear. Several people familiar with the mobile unit, including senior counterterrorism officials, said it was intended purely for training. They emphasized that its components were not connected and that it could not have made lethal germs. Even after the FBI began investigating Hatfill, the Pentagon continued to draw on his expertise. But the weapons experts said tensions arose between the Justice Department and the Defense Department over their access to the mobile unit. The trainer has a fermenter, a centrifuge and a mill for grinding clumps of anthrax into the best size for penetrating human lungs, the experts said. The FBI, suspecting that components from the Delta Force trainer might have been used to make the anthrax mailed in late 2001, examined the unit, officials and experts said.

But investigators found no spores or other evidence linking it to the crime, they said. The mobile unit is part of the government's secretive effort to develop germ defenses. Critics say such biodefense projects often test the limits of the 1975 global ban on germ weapons, which the United States championed. But the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and the anthrax letters only weeks later prompted the Bush administration to greatly expand the number of such clandestine projects. Elisa Harris, a Clinton administration arms control official now at the University of Maryland, said developing a mobile germ trainer would not violate the treaty. But she questioned its wisdom. "It will raise concerns in other capitals," Harris said, "in part because the United States has fought tooth and nail to prevent the international community from strengthening the germ treaty." Senior Pentagon officials declined to discuss the mobile unit.

An administration official said the Pentagon had reviewed the factory to ensure legal compliance with the germ treaty. The American mobile unit was not a first. About 50 years ago, when the United States made germ weapons, scientists drew up plans for mobile units that could produce enough anthrax to kill almost everyone in a large city, said William Patrick III, former head of product development at Fort Detrick, Maryland, then the military's center for developing germ weapons. The goal, Patrick said in an interview, was to create a reserve in case an enemy destroyed the nation's germ factories, in Arkansas and Maryland.

Over the decades, other countries, including Iraq, have also sought such mobile gear. After Iraq lost the 1991 Gulf war and agreed to destroy its unconventional arms, Iraqi officials told United Nations inspectors that Baghdad had once considered making mobile germ plants. A UN official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that inspectors "kept that in the back of their minds" while looking for evidence of mobile germ plants in Iraq. They found none. In the fall of 1997, Hatfill, a medical doctor, entered the world of germ defense by taking a job at Fort Detrick, where he studied protections against deadly viruses like Ebola. In late 1998, he began working at Science Applications International Corp., based in San Diego. Among other things, the company helps the government develop defenses against germ weapons. In response to rising anthrax hoaxes, Hatfill, working at a suburban Washington office of Science Applications, helped commission a paper from Patrick, the former germ weapons official, to assess the risks of spores sent through the mail. The February 1999 paper compared the probable physical characteristics of anthrax that could be produced by amateurs to the known traits of American weapon-grade anthrax; it said nothing about anthrax production. Secretary of State Colin Powell and other senior American officials have said that in late 1999 a defecting Iraqi chemical engineer told U.S. officials that he had supervised operations at a mobile germ unit, and that Baghdad was making a fleet of them. By 2000, the United States appears to have concluded that the rumored Iraqi mobile plants were probably real. At his job, Hatfill took on the mobile trainer project with enthusiasm, colleagues recalled. At times, one said, he claimed to be its instigator. Military officials said the effort was financed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, an arm of the Pentagon that works to counter biological, radiological and chemical weapons. Experts said that Science Applications assigned the project to Hatfill and Joseph Soukup, a vice president for biomedical science, who helped commission the 1999 anthrax report. Science Applications declined to discuss the project or Hatfill's involvement. "It's highly classified," Ron Zollars, a company spokesman, said. Soukup did not return phone calls. To learn about mobile production, Hatfill again called on Patrick and his encyclopedic knowledge, said experts familiar with their work. Patrick, who also declined to comment on the Hatfill project, is said to have described the old American plans in detail. The collaboration, experts said, produced a novel design that demonstrated a number of ways to multiply viruses and bacteria, including the use of fermentation, chicken eggs and tissue culture. It was not meant to replicate Iraqi or U.S. designs but instead to illustrate a range of mobile biological threats. In 2000, Hatfill began gathering parts for the mobile factory, an expert said. Another quoted Hatfill as saying he had bought parts for the Delta Force trainer long before its construction and stored them in a warehouse. "It's all the ordering of equipment that in hindsight looks suspicious," said a third expert, who is familiar with the secret federal projects Hatfill worked on. The trainer's construction began in September 2001, an expert said. Hatfill supervised it at AFW Fabrication, a metalworking plant on the outskirts of Frederick, Maryland. The shop was a mile from Hatfill's apartment outside Fort Detrick's main gate. Although Hatfill seemed fully engaged in biodefense work, his world began unraveling. That summer, the CIA had rejected his application for a high-level intelligence clearance after he failed a polygraph test, friends and officials said. Then, in September 2001, the anthrax attacks began and Hatfill soon found himself under scrutiny. Science Applications fired him in March 2002. The secret Delta trainer, a person close to Hatfill said, was then half-built. Zollars, the Science Applications spokesman, said Hatfill did no further work for the company and got no further pay. Experts familiar with Hatfill said he continued working on the germ trainer. "He was doing it on his own, using his own money," one recalled.

Later, as the Delta trainer was being hauled to Fort Bragg, FBI agents and experts pulled it over and thoroughly checked it for anthrax and other deadly germs. "The FBI wanted to confiscate it," one expert recalled. After tense discussions, the Pentagon kept the Delta trainer, which was set up at Fort Bragg last fall in preparation for the war with Iraq. Experts said many troops used it in training sessions run at times by Hatfill and at other times by Patrick.

"This is a sensitive thing," Colonel Bill Darley, spokesman for the U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida, said of the mobile unit in an interview. He declined to disclose details, other than to say it was used exclusively for training.
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米軍の契約企業紹介サイトからSAIC社の紹介記事
http://www.arofe.army.mil/Conferences/CWD2001/85-Sponsors.htm

Science Applications International Corporation.

●●Corporate Overview
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) is the largest employee-owned, high-technology research and engineering company in the United States, providing products and services to government and commercial customers worldwide in engineering, national security, information technology (IT), telecommunications, environmental systems, health systems and services, energy, space, and law enforcement. SAIC and our subsidiaries now have more than 40,000 employees at offices in more than 150 locations worldwide, and revenues of more than US$ 5 billion. Founded by a small group of scientists in 1969, SAIC has had a continuous record of growth in financial performance and technical scope. SAIC attributes our success to a decentralized, flexible working environment that promotes and rewards technical excellence, individual initiative, and entrepreneurship. Our ability to attract and retain the best qualified people, coupled with an environment that fosters team building, has led to SAIC's continued growth.

●SAIC Contract History
SAIC has a long history of successful completion of contracts in both the public and private sectors. Customer confidence in our performance has earned SAIC a reputation for the highest quality and has resulted in a steady growth in business since our founding in 1969. Our contract experience has varied from consulting engagements of less than $5,000 to major engineering development projects of several hundred million dollars.

SAIC's successful contract performance includes over 3,019 contracts in SAIC core companies with a value of US$1 million or more. More than 50 of these contracts are large-scale design and systems integration contracts valued at more that US$ 100 million each. As a result of this extensive contract experience, SAIC has

　・Established itself as a leader in the application of advanced technology to critical programs within both government and private sectors
　・Provided solutions to problems of national and international significance and made widely recognized contributions to many government programs
　・Become a recognized leader in major program support and systems integration programs

●Technology Management and integration Group
SAIC’s Technology Management and Integration Group (TMIG) provides products and services to government and commercial customers in program management, systems integration, information technology (IT), telecommunications, engineering, test and evaluation, risk management, logistics, quality assurance, environmental services and monitoring, and safety.
TMIG has more than 900 employees at offices in 15 locations ranging from Moscow to
Johnston Island in the mid-Pacific. Revenues for FY00 were more than US$105 million. Our primary customers are:

　・The U.S. Army Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization (PMCD)
　・The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
　・Clark County School District (Nevada)
　・The Defense Occupational Health Readiness System (DOHRS)
　・The U.S. Army Environmental Center (USAEC)

●Some of our larger projects include:

・ Providing program management and technical integration support to the United States Chemical Demilitarization Program since 1991. Our work includes program planning and documentation, life cycle cost estimating, cost and schedule performance analysis, earned value management system implementation, environmental permitting, and risk management. These services support the U.S. Army’s successful effort to dispose of chemical weapons cost-effectively while providing maximum protection to the public and the environment.

・SAIC has been providing similar program management and technical integration services supporting the U.S. Department of Energy at its high-level radioactive waste repository.

・As part of our support of chemical weapons disposal in the United States, we have designed, developed, produced, and managed the testing for a broad range of equipment and tools used by the Army and its other contractors. Examples include:

- The Munitions Management Device (MMD), a robotic system used in the disposal of chemical munitions recovered from burial sites.
- A mobile filter system to extract chemical agent vapors from chemical weapon storage igloos and chemical agent laboratory facilities.
- A near-real-time monitor for the chemical warfare agent lewisite.
- Prototype small-scale systems to test non-incineration processes (alternative technologies) for the disposal of chemical warfare agents.
- Web-based information systems that support the management of chemical weapons disposal including an enterprise system to support the disposal of non-stockpile chemical materiel and a tool that enables experts in various locations to collaborate on the identification of recovered munitions.

SAIC will plan, design, and implement a consolidated voice, video, and data telecommunications network for the Clarke County School District. The network will connect more than 100 facilities spread across an area larger than the state of Rhode Island.

We are also developing the DoD’s enterprise-level management information system for occupational health. This web-based system collects, and supports the analysis of occupational exposure, hearing acuity, and other health-related information for Defense Department employees at every location around the globe.

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●小ブッシュ政権が生物戦争と経済戦争の“混合作戦”を企んでいる
　という告発記事（全文は下記参照）のなかにも SAIC社 の名前が登場する――

In the late 1990s, Hatfill worked at Fort Detrick as a U.S. Army employee and later as a contractor for Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), a company with a number of CIA and Pentagon classified contracts. Later, Attorney General John Ashcroft called Hatfill a "person of interest" in the investigation surrounding the 2001 anthrax mailings. Hatfill graduated from the University of Zimbabwe Medical School in 1983. In July 2002, South Africa's Daily News reported that in 1987 or early 1988, Hatfill trained elite Aquila Brigade members of neo-Nazi leader Eugene Terre'blanche's Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), a notorious paramilitary group.

After Hatfill was identified by the FBI as a "person of interest," Pat Clawson became the scientist's spokesman. According to The Baltimore Sun, Clawson is a close associate of Oliver North, the right-wing politician, Fox News reporter, talk show host, and convicted Iran-contra criminal. In fact, Clawson is a program director for North's radio show. Also coming to Hatfill's defense was National Review writer Joel Mowbray, a right-wing defender of the Likud government of Ariel Sharon and Bush administration policies in Iraq. Mowbray, who is quite content with Ashcroft's anti-Arab and anti-immigrant policies, uncharacteristically criticized Ashcroft for leaks to the press about the investigation of Hatfill. Bill Kristol's Weekly Standard reported that much of the "evidence" against Hatfill emanated from the Jewish Defense Organization, a radical offshoot of the extreme right-wing Jewish Defense League.

After Fort Detrick and SAIC severed their ties with Hatfill, he wound up working for Louisiana State University's Academy of Counter-Terrorist Education, an entity that receives most of its funding from U.S. government grants, and, interestingly, SAIC, Hatfill's one-time employer at Fort Detrick. When Hatfill's name surfaced as a continuing "person of interest" for the FBI, LSU fired him. Ironically, during his stint at LSU, Louisiana suffered a huge outbreak of West Nile virus, which, according to New African magazine, was one of the pathogens weaponized by South Africa's Project Coast, the program that the FBI was investigating for its prior links to Hatfill.

-----------------------------------------------------------
●上記でSAICへの言及部分を出した記事の全文

http://www.onlinejournal.com/Special_Reports/050303Madsen/050303madsen.html

Another first for the Bush regime?
Combining biological and economic warfare

By Wayne Madsen
Online Journal Contributing Writer

May 3, 2003 -- Evidence is mounting that the Bush administration may be engaging in a new form of warfare: bio-economic attacks against countries that either opposed the U.S. war on Iraq or were showing signs of surpassing the United States in economic vitality and growth. Revelations that the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) does not occur naturally and that anthrax may have been introduced onto an Egyptian merchant vessel bound for Canada from Brazil has raised eyebrows among biological warfare experts.

The use of bio-economic warfare as a weapon of mass destruction was first suggested by Dr. Edgar J. DaSilva, the Director for the Division of Life Sciences of the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Da Silva stated in a 1999 article in the Electronic Journal of Biotechnology that bio-economic warfare?"the undermining and destruction of economic progress and stability" -- can be traced to "the development and use of biological agents against economic targets such as crops, livestock and ecosystems." DaSilva also noted that such warfare can often be perceived by the public as naturally-occurring because "such warfare can always be carried out under the pretexts that such traumatic occurrences are the result of natural circumstances that lead to outbreaks of diseases and disasters of either endemic or epidemic proportions."

The United States, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency -- through its joint efforts with the U.S. Army's biological warfare laboratory at Fort Detrick, Maryland -- has pioneered in the field of bio-economic warfare. In the 1970s, the CIA directed a bio-economic warfare campaign against Cuba. In his book, Biological Warfare in the 21st Century, author Malcolm Dando describes the Cuba campaign as involving the use of blue mold against the nation's tobacco crop, cane smut against the sugar crop, African swine fever against the livestock population, and a hemorrhagic strain of dengue fever against the human population. These attacks were designed to destabilize Cuba's agricultural based economy. The Cuba operations were conducted after President Richard Nixon, in a 1969 Executive Order, banned the use of biological warfare agents. Nixon's order and his 1972 signing of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention with Britain and the Soviet Union outlawing bio-weapons were systematically ignored by the CIA and Pentagon.

Almost at the same time that Western financial institutions were forecasting a record growth in China's gross domestic product -- estimates ranged from 7.5 to 7.6 percent -- the country's southern Guangdong Province experienced its first outbreak of SARS. After the disease began spreading and Chinese officials scurried to deal with the virus, the economic cost to mainland China was devastating -- $2.2 billion according to the Far Eastern Economic Review. In addition, SARS cost Hong Kong $1.7 billion. For the Bush administration, which was experiencing America's worst economic downturn in 10 years and was spending billions on the war against Iraq, the idea of a booming Chinese economy did not sit well. In addition, China was in the final stages of planning its first manned space launch at a time when the United States lost its second space shuttle due to incompetence. The contrasts between a economically vitalized China and a United States caught in the malaise of recession, war, and technological failure could not have been more stark. Then we heard about the first outbreak of SARS.

In January 2002, the Hartford Courant reported that Fort Detrick had lost several specimens of deadly viruses and bacteria. These included the Ames strain of anthrax bacteria (the same strain used to terrify the Congress during its deliberations over the USA PATRIOT Act in late 2001), Hanta virus, Ebola virus, simian AIDS and two "unknown" specimens -- agents that were actually classified as "Secret" by the military and CIA. Based on recent suggestions by Russia's top biological warfare experts, SARS may have been created as a bio- economic weapon of mass destruction.

Nikolai Filatov, the head of epidemiological services for Moscow, told Russia's Gazeta newspaper that he thought SARS was man-made. Russian Academy of Medicine member Sergei Kolesnikov agreed with his colleague. He was quoted by the RIA-Novosti news agency that SARS is a "cocktail" of mumps and measles. He added that such a mixture could never appear naturally.

Considering the fact it was a right-wing group known as the Minutemen that originally planned on conducting a bio-terrorism campaign involving the distribution of an unknown virus in major airline terminals throughout the United States, the culpability of the United States government in the SARS outbreak must be seriously considered. A number right-wing extremists, including those with ties to racist and religious zealot organizations, have found high-level jobs within the Bush administration. The Minutemen plot was the idea of Robert DePugh, the leader of the organization who also happened to own a veterinary drug firm called Biolab Corporation, headquartered in Norborne, Missouri.

In 1972, members of an extreme right-wing group, the "Order of the Rising Sun," were arrested in Chicago after it was discovered they were going to contaminate the water supplies of Chicago, St. Louis, and other Midwestern cities with 30 to 40 kilograms of typhoid bacteria cultures. In May 1995, Larry Wayne Harris, a member of the neo-Nazi Aryan Nations, was arrested for a probation violation when he told a police informant that he had enough anthrax to wipe out the entire population of Las Vegas. The FBI discovered that Harris's car contained several bags containing a strain of anthrax that was not dangerous to humans.

Another right-winger, Dr. Larry Ford, a Mormon gynecologist with the University of California at Los Angeles, maintained a close relationship with the director of South Africa's bio-weapons program, Dr. Wouter Basson. According to CourtTV.com, Ford was often accompanied on his trips to South Africa by Dr, Jerry Nilsson, a fellow Mormon and UCLA colleague. A former lab assistant of Ford's told The New York Times in November 2002 that she saw Ford carry a vial on the plane to South Africa. She said the vial contained a deadly bacteria that could have endangered everyone on the plane had it leaked. The vial was turned over to a South African official. Two FBI informants reportedly attended a 1986 meeting in South Africa with Niels Knobel, South Africa's Surgeon General, and Ford. The agents reported that Knobel received toxins from Ford and Nilsson. These toxins were later used in South Africa's deadly top secret bio-weapons program, code- named Project Coast. On February 28, 2000, James Patrick Riley, Ford's partner in the firm Biofem Pharmaceuticals, was shot and critically wounded at its Irvine, California headquarters. After one of Ford's friends was charged in the shooting, Ford committed suicide at his Irvine home. Canisters later dug up in Ford's backyard were discovered to contain cultures of cholera, salmonella, botulism, and typhoid fever. When reports emerged that Ford worked for the CIA, FBI agent Doug Baker confirmed the story but later quickly recanted.

An April 20, 2003 article in The Washington Post revealed that Don Mayes, a retired CIA officer, acted as a go-between between Daan Goosen, a former employee of Basson, and the CIA and FBI. Goosen was trying to sell the CIA and FBI a pathogen that genetically fused the genes of an ordinary intestinal bacteria with those that result in lethal gas gangrene. Some samples of the pathogen were actually shipped to the United States via the CIA in a toothpaste tube. The tube was delivered to the FBI's Key West office by Robert Zlockie, another retired CIA officer. The CIA and FBI eventually declined Goosen's offer to sell them his deadly bugs as well as his offer to work in the United States on biowar defenses. Prior to the breakdown in negotiations between Goosen and the CIA and FBI, the Pentagon set up a meeting between Goosen and Bioport, the Michigan-based firm that provides anthrax vaccines to the military. Bioport has refused to comment on reports that The Carlyle Group, a controversial international investment firm on whose board former President George H. W. Bush sits, owns shares of stock in Bioport.

The Washington Post also reported that Zlockie was given a receipt on FBI letterhead acknowledging that it had taken custody of "one toothpaste tube containing one ampul of E. coli genetically coded with epsilon toxin." The tube was then sent to Fort Detrick, which concluded that Goosen's pathogen was a legacy from Project Coast, the same program on which Ford and Nilsson worked. Against the wishes of some in the CIA and Defense Department, the FBI declined to play ball with Goosen and it alerted the South African police to the fact that Goosen had attempted to sell virulent strains of bacteria and viruses to the United States. The South Africans declined to prosecute Goosen. In addition, in April 2002, a South African court cleared Basson, Goosen's one-time boss, of 46 criminal charges, including attempted murder of anti-apartheid activists. Earlier, Basson was cleared of 15 charges, including murder and attempted murder.

In October 2002, the Sunday Mirror of Zimbabwe reported that FBI agents traveled to Zimbabwe and South Africa to examine Dr. Steven Hatfill's role during the 1970s in the Rhodesian Selous Scout's biological warfare program and South Africa's bio-war program. Hatfill, a native of Missouri who was briefly a Marine Corps reservist, emigrated to Rhodesia at a time the United Nations and United States imposed severe sanctions against the breakaway minority government of Ian Smith. However, Hatfill claims he served in the Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard from 1975 to 1981 at the same time he claimed to have been in the Rhodesian military. In an article in The American Prospect, writer Laura Rosen postulates that Hatfill may have been a double agent, working for both the Selous Scouts and the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance in Fort Bragg. In fact, Hatfill bragged to his colleagues about being a double agent.

The idea that the CIA and the U.S. Special Forces could have been running Hatfill as an agent in Rhodesia is all the more troubling when considering that the Rhodesian bio-war program targeted black Zimbabwean rebels with anthrax during the 1970s. Hatfill's resume claims he served in the South African Defense Forces after leaving Rhodesia. The FBI was particularly interested in Hatfill's work for Project Coast, a program that included experiments on applying anthrax to the gummed flaps of envelopes sent through the mail.

In the late 1990s, Hatfill worked at Fort Detrick as a U.S. Army employee and later as a contractor for Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), a company with a number of CIA and Pentagon classified contracts. Later, Attorney General John Ashcroft called Hatfill a "person of interest" in the investigation surrounding the 2001 anthrax mailings. Hatfill graduated from the University of Zimbabwe Medical School in 1983. In July 2002, South Africa's Daily News reported that in 1987 or early 1988, Hatfill trained elite Aquila Brigade members of neo-Nazi leader Eugene Terre'blanche's Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), a notorious paramilitary group.

After Hatfill was identified by the FBI as a "person of interest," Pat Clawson became the scientist's spokesman. According to The Baltimore Sun, Clawson is a close associate of Oliver North, the right-wing politician, Fox News reporter, talk show host, and convicted Iran-contra criminal. In fact, Clawson is a program director for North's radio show. Also coming to Hatfill's defense was National Review writer Joel Mowbray, a right-wing defender of the Likud government of Ariel Sharon and Bush administration policies in Iraq. Mowbray, who is quite content with Ashcroft's anti-Arab and anti-immigrant policies, uncharacteristically criticized Ashcroft for leaks to the press about the investigation of Hatfill. Bill Kristol's Weekly Standard reported that much of the "evidence" against Hatfill emanated from the Jewish Defense Organization, a radical offshoot of the extreme right-wing Jewish Defense League.

After Fort Detrick and SAIC severed their ties with Hatfill, he wound up working for Louisiana State University's Academy of Counter-Terrorist Education, an entity that receives most of its funding from U.S. government grants, and, interestingly, SAIC, Hatfill's one-time employer at Fort Detrick. When Hatfill's name surfaced as a continuing "person of interest" for the FBI, LSU fired him. Ironically, during his stint at LSU, Louisiana suffered a huge outbreak of West Nile virus, which, according to New African magazine, was one of the pathogens weaponized by South Africa's Project Coast, the program that the FBI was investigating for its prior links to Hatfill.

There is definitely a right-wing element involving scientists, military, intelligence, and government contractor personnel in the study, production, and distribution of biological weapons, including anthrax, gas gangrene, Dengue fever, and other pathogens. As the right-wing in the United States calls for retaliation against countries that failed to support America's war on Iraq, it may be more than coincidental that SARS has broken out in China and the virus has been transmitted to Canada via the busy travel routes existing between China, Hong Kong, and major Canadian cities like Toronto and Vancouver due to Canada's large Asian population. Not only has China's economy drastically suffered but Toronto, Canada's most populous city, is facing an economic disaster. After the SARS outbreak in Canada, it is discovered that an Egyptian vessel carrying bauxite from Brazil to an Alcan aluminum plant in Saguenay, Quebec, suffered the death of its first mate from anthrax just prior to departing Brazil for Canada. The Brazilian police have reported that the man contracted anthrax when he opened up a suitcase containing the bacteria. Fortunately, Canadian authorities were alerted before the ship docked in Quebec, whose majority French-speaking population has been just as outspoken against America's war policies as their kinfolk in France.

Considering Dr. DaSilva's warnings about bio-economic warfare, the world should be on guard against a deliberate policy by the right-wing elements that populate the Bush administration to use bio-weapons to punish countries for failure to cooperate with the United States. Considering that the CIA and Pentagon considered buying genetically-fused bacteria and viruses from South African freelance bio-war scientists and Russian scientists now claim that SARS is a similarly genetically-fused mumps and measles pathogen, an immediate investigation of Fort Detrick's stockpiles and their points of origin should be initiated by the Congress, which has shown an amazing lack of oversight for all the questionable activities of the Bush administration, including 9 -- 11, Enron, and even the anthrax mailings that targeted two of the Senate's top leaders.

Although the Bush administration contends that the anthrax mailings, like the hijacking of commercial planes and turning them into virtual cruise missiles, were unprecedented and a surprise, history refutes such claims. In 1988, the Foundation on Economic Trends warned that Fort Detrick and the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta were shipping some of the "deadliest diseases known to man" through the U.S. postal system. One such shipment in 1987 from the CDC to Fort Detrick contained the Crimea-Congo virus, a deadly pathogen carried by ticks. The shipment was "lost" somewhere in the main Philadelphia post office.

In 1988, Postmaster General Anthony Frank banned U.S. government bio-toxin shipments through the mail after the U.S. Army said it would increase its postal shipments to its new bio-war laboratory at Utah's Dugway Proving Grounds, a facility that has the only aerosolized anthrax laboratory in the United States. The Army also wanted to ship anthrax, botulism, Q fever, and dengue fever through the mail, a frightening idea considering the reports that Fort Detrick was missing several pathogenic strains after the commencement of the anthrax mailings.

Unless Congress begins asking the tough questions, we will never know what went missing from Fort Detrick. Could the missing "bugs" have been West Nile virus, AIDS, bubonic plague (there have been several recent "mysterious" outbreaks of this disease in India, Kazakhstan, Libya, Congo, and Brazil), or even SARS? Why can't the American people expect a full investigation of and accounting for America's supposedly "banned" bio-weapons program?

The U.S. Congress, which is now in the hands of some of the most right-wing and venal ideologues in its history, will probably not want to delve into America's secret labyrinth of bio-weapons progenitors and dispensers, especially since it involves a number of their ideological soul mates. The vitriol spewing from the mouths of the congressional leadership is strictly reserved for gays, African Americans, the French, Hollywood liberals, the drug addicted, and abortion rights advocates. As far as the right-wing leadership is concerned, there is no questioning the military, Justice Department, or the intelligence agencies. Those who dared are no longer in a position to do so. Senators Graham and Shelby are off of the Senate Intelligence Committee. They have been replaced by dupes and yes-men for Langley and Detrick.

China and Canada are now suffering from the SARS virus. Quebec almost received a possible deadly blow from ship-born anthrax spores. The Bush administration is now deciding how best to punish France, Germany, Russia, and other countries for their lack of support. Nothing, including the use of bio-economic warfare, should be put past the Bush administration. In the absence of an independent U.S. Congress, the world should demand that UN inspectors be given access to all U.S. bio-weapons laboratories. There is still no evidence that Saddam Hussein used bio-weapons but there is a lot of actual and circumstantial evidence that the United States has and continues to do so with possibly disastrous consequences for the entire world.

Wayne Madsen is a Washington, DC-based investigative reporter. He was also the Operations Officer at Naval Facility Coos Head, Oregon from 1980 to 1982 and assisted the FBI and NIS in the investigation as a temporary special agent.

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