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現在地 HOME > 掲示板
> 戦争４０ > 420.html
★阿修羅♪
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●ある意味、皮肉にも絶妙のタイミングです。毎年いまごろはノーベル平和賞
が発表される時期だから……。
ちょうど30年前、10月６日に第４次中東戦争が勃発し、同月23日に停戦に
こぎ着けたのでした。その仲介役を担ったのはヘンリー・キッシンジャー。
彼はこの戦争中に「ヴェトナム戦争の和平の貢献した」としてノーベル平和
賞の受賞者に決まったわけです。
ところが30年たって機密解除の米国政府文書を見たら、キッシンジャーの
イスラエル寄りの「停戦違反黙認」のせいで米ソが核戦争の危機になって
いた……とのこと。
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（共同通信）[10月8日19時46分更新]
http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20031008-00000166-kyodo-int
米の停戦違反黙認が判明 ７３年の中東戦争で核危機
【ワシントン８日共同】
３０年前の第４次中東戦争で、開戦１７日目にこぎつけた停戦をイスラエルが破り、ソ連が強く反発し米ソ核戦争の危機が一時高まった背景には、当時仲介工作をしていたキッシンジャー米国務長官のイスラエルに対する「停戦違反黙認」があったことが、秘密解除された米政府文書で明らかになった。
イスラエルのシリア空爆をめぐり米側のイスラエル寄りの対応が批判を受けている中、当時の米側の姿勢もあらためて論議の的となりそうだ。
米民間調査団体「国家安全保障公文書館」が入手し、７日公表した当時の米国務省文書や公電などから判明した。
それによると、１９７３年１０月２２日、停戦や和平交渉の実施などを求める国連安全保障理事会決議案を米ソ間でまとめたキッシンジャー長官はモスクワからテルアビブ入りし、メイア・イスラエル首相に説明した。
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●上記の記事のネタ元は次の文書（概略）です。
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National Security Archive Update, October 7, 2003
*The October War and U.S. Policy*
Kissinger Gave Green Light for Israeli Offensive Violating 1973 Cease-Fire;
U.S.-Israeli Decisions Touched Off Crisis Leading to 1973 U.S. Nuclear Alert
New Documents Correct Previous Accounts in Kissinger Books
For more information contact William Burr: 202/994-7000
http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98
Washington, D.C., 7 October 2003 - During the 1973 October War, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger secretly gave Israeli authorities a green light to breach a cease-fire agreement arranged with the Soviet Union, according to new documents published by the National Security Archive today on the war's 30th anniversary. Declassified documents detail Kissinger's efforts to buy time for Israeli military advances despite the impending cease-fire deadline. This episode is not discussed in Kissinger's new book, Crisis, and was downplayed in his memoirs.
Kissinger secretly told the Israelis that he could accept them "taking [a] slightly longer" time in observing the deadline (see Document 51). In talks with Golda Meir, Kissinger winked at the prospect of Israeli forces taking military action against Egypt despite the cease-fire:
Meir: The Egyptians and the Syrians haven't said anything [about the cease-fire]. They have said that the fighting continues.
Kissinger: You won't get violent protests from Washington if something happens during the night, while I'm flying. Nothing can happen in Washington until noon tomorrow.
Meir: If they don't stop, we won't.
Kissinger: Even if they do . [from Document 54]
"During the night," Israeli forces launched a major attack and surrounded Egypt's Third Army. Major violations of the cease-fire precipitated a diplomatic crisis with the Soviet Union, whose leaders suspected that Kissinger had made a deal with the Israelis. Diplomatic tensions led to a Soviet bluff to intervene that in turn led to a U.S. Defcon III nuclear alert.
To settle the crisis, Kissinger would have to exert strong pressure against Tel Aviv. This marked the beginning of 30 years of U.S. focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict as a major policy priority.
Drawing on recently declassified material from the National Archives, this briefing book shows the complex role that the Nixon administration played during the crisis, maintaining backchannels with Arabs and Israelis, facilitating an Israeli military edge, while deterring a disastrous Arab defeat. Published here for the first time are documents disclosing:
. advance warnings of a possible Egyptian-Syrian attack received by the Israelis and Kissinger's advice against Israeli preemptive action (documents 7, 9, 10, and 18)
. Kissinger's early decisions to provide military aid to Israel (documents 18 and 21) but stay in touch with Arab leaders, to maximize U.S. diplomatic influence (documents 20, 44, and 63)
. Kissinger's "shock" at, and refusal to follow, Nixon's instruction to establish with Brezhnev a superpower condominium to force a peace settlement (documents 47 and 48)
. Brezhnev's use of the U.S.-Soviet hotline to protest Israeli cease-fire violations and entrapment of Egypt's Third Army (documents 61A and B)
. Brezhnev's 24 October letter that prompted the U.S. Defcon III alert(document 71)
. Kissinger's rage at West European governments, whom he saw acting like"jackals" and "hostile powers," for failing to support U.S. policy (documents 63 and 75)
. tense meetings of NATO's North Atlantic Council where U.S. Ambassador Donald Rumsfeld heard complaints about the lack of advance notice on the Defcon (documents 79A and B)
Follow the link below to read the documents and for expert analysis from Archive Senior Analyst William Burr:
http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98
_________________________________________________________________________
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE is an independent non-governmental research institute and library located at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C. The Archive collects and publishes declassified documents acquired through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). A tax-exempt public charity, the Archive receives no U.S. government funding; its budget is supported by publication royalties and donations from foundations and individuals.
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