'Rumsfeld's Rules': Aphorisms on Analysis

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'Rumsfeld's Rules': Aphorisms on Analysis














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By Vernon Loeb
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, January 9, 2001; Page A21

In "Rumsfeld's Rules," Defense Secretary-designate Donald H. Rumsfeld shows far more than a passing interest in the art of intelligence analysis, quoting Confucius, Machiavelli, Colin L. Powell and others on a discipline made up of "knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns."


Although Rumsfeld began compiling the collection of personal reflections and quotations 40 years ago as he first arrived in Washington, his ruminations on intelligence stem from his role two years ago as chairman of a congressional committee on ballistic missile threats to U.S. national security.


From Machiavelli, Rumsfeld draws insight on how best to view an adversary's propensity to act: "Never assume the other guy will never do something you would never do."



From Confucius, he cites the sage's definition of intellectual honesty: "When you know a thing, to hold that you know it, and when you do not know a thing, to allow that you do not know it: This is knowledge."


And from Powell, President-elect Bush's pick for secretary of state, he defines how analysts should inform the policymakers for whom they toil: "Tell them what you know. Tell them what you don't know. And, only then, tell them what you think."


Rumsfeld also quotes Richard Haver, a former official in Navy intelligence now serving as Bush's transition director for the intelligence community: "Nothing ages so quickly as yesterday's vision of the future."


TOENSING'S RULES: Shortly after terrorists bombed the USS Cole in Yemen three months ago, lawyers at the National Security Council experienced a serious case of heartburn when The Washington Post quoted Gen. Henry H. Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as saying a retaliatory cruise missile attack remained an option, should the ultimate perpetrator be identified.


Any missile strike, they noted in clarification, would be preemptive, not retaliatory. The United Nations' Charter prohibits retaliatory strikes, but permits actions taken in self-defense. Thus, the use of cruise missiles would be to deter a future attack by terrorists as opposed to punishing them for striking in the past.


With a possible preemptive strike still in the offing, Victoria Toensing, a Washington lawyer and former deputy assistant attorney general who created the department's terrorism section, said that "there are no impediments to using force on either legal or moral grounds" in responding to terrorist attacks.


Indeed, long before the U.S. government began using bombs and missiles in the name of self-defense to deter terrorists, Toensing wrote a chapter to a 1995 book "Fighting Back: Winning the War Against Terrorism," in which she argued that the U.N. Charter, strictly interpreted, rendered the United Nations incapable of deterring terrorism.


Article 51 of the Charter, which permits actions in self-defense, says they can be undertaken "if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."


Although many countries argue that acts of self-defense can occur only while an attack is underway, the United States has adopted a more expansive definition and basically reserves the right to respond on an ongoing basis.


Toensing believes this is appropriate, supported by legal precedents that go back to President James Monroe and a multitude of legal and moral arguments back to Cicero.


"All future terrorists should know that the United States has a comprehensive counterterrorism plan, which includes an ability to strike back," Toensing wrote. "No terrorist should ever kidnap or kill again without having to consider seriously whether one of the responses will be force."


WHEN WEN HO LEE?: It's become almost conventional wisdom that Notra Trulock, the former Department of Energy intelligence chief, prematurely "fingered" former Los Alamos physicist Wen Ho Lee in 1996 as the prime suspect in the ill-conceived Chinese espionage probe.


But in his own defense, Trulock has noted in a little-known letter to FBI Director Louis J. Freeh that the bureau's assistant director for national security, Neil Gallagher, told the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee that the FBI suspended another criminal investigation involving Lee in the fall of 1995 -- as soon as it learned the DOE was planning an espionage inquiry at Los Alamos.


"Put simply, there was no DOE inquiry into Wen Ho Lee in October 1995," Trulock wrote. "Mr. Lee's name did not come to my attention until March or April 1996."


So who, the question remains, fingered Wen Ho Lee?



ý 2001 The Washington Post Company






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