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【戦争板リンク】イラン大統領選挙:西側機関による事前の世論調査でもアフマディジャッドの圧勝
http://www.asyura2.com/09/asia13/msg/311.html
投稿者 ワヤクチャ 日時 2009 年 6 月 21 日 18:08:02: YdRawkln5F9XQ
 

(回答先: 【戦争板リンク】西側マスコミによるイラン「グリーン革命」茶番プロパガンダ【バルセロナより愛を込めて さん】 投稿者 ワヤクチャ 日時 2009 年 6 月 21 日 17:56:01)

http://www.asyura2.com/09/wara9/msg/385.html

イラン大統領選挙:西側機関による事前の世論調査でもアフマディネジャッドの圧勝


ご覧に入れるのは、「A LIVING DIARY OF OBAMA PRESIDENCY」と銘打つ米国のウエッブ紙POLITICO44の記事です。どうやら相当に熱心なオバマ支持派が立ち上げたもののようです。この新聞名のPliticoは英語ではなくスペイン語の「政治的、政治家」を意味する単語なので、おそらくオバマ支持のヒスパニック系米国人が作ったものなのでしょう。

HPは次です。
http://www.politico.com/politico44/

このPOLITICO44の、6月15日付の記事ですが、米国の多くの政治家と「イラン専門家」たちが、アフマディネジャッドを再選させたイラン大統領選挙の結果を何の証拠も無しにはねつけていることに強い疑義を呈し、警戒感を強めています。

この記事を書いたのは、The New America Foundation’s Iran Projectのディレクターでありペンシルバニア州立大学で国際関係の教鞭を執るFlynt Leverett氏、および政策研究所STRATEGAのCEOであるHillary Mann Leverett氏です。(夫婦なのかな?)両者とも、長年にわたって米国政府の中東政策に関わり続け、国家安全保障委員会のメンバーも務めています。

彼らの文章は、米国国内とオバマ政権内部にあるさまざまな分裂を示唆しています。翻訳の時間が取れないのですが、イラン大統領選挙に関して重要なポイントだけを指摘しておきます。

米国の、特に親イスラエル系の政治家と、亡命イラン人(元のパーレビ国王派残党の親イスラエル人士)を中心にした「イラン問題専門家」たちは、アフマディネジャッドが62.6%の票を集めたことに「不自然に多すぎる」かのような言い方をして、「不正があったに違いない」という何一つ根拠の無い言いがかりをつけています。

(日本にもこんな言い方をする奴がいるかもしれないが、《お里》が知れるネ。)

亡命イラン人といえば、ブッシュ政権とイスラエル・ロビーが対イラン戦争熱に浮かれる2006年に、「イラン=ナチ」情報をでっち上げたアミル・タヘリが有名で、ブッシュはその情報でっち上げがばれてしまった後に、タヘリを「イラン専門家」として米国政府に招き入れています。
(参照)
各国政府とメディアによる対イラン情報偽造の実体
http://doujibar.ganriki.net/translations/1-06,rumouragainstiran.html
ついでに、これも。
http://asyura2.com/0601/war80/msg/1163.html
この「イラン=ナチ」キャンペーンとマイケル・レディーンについて

(2005年の選挙で正当に選ばれ2期目に立候補しただけのアフマディネジャッドを「独裁者」呼ばわりするような政治的痴呆症のヤカラは、このときにシオニストどもが印象付けようとして失敗した「アフマディネジャッド=ヒトラー」インチキ・キャンペーンを蒸し返そうとしているんじゃないのかな? 強引な手を使って半永久大統領の席を確保したベネズエラのチャベスに対してなら、まだ理論的には筋が通ってはいるが。もちろんチャベスは米英イスの世界支配体制を終わらせるためには必要な人物だ。)


このPOLITICO44の記事は、まず、この得票率が2005年の大統領選挙でアフマディネジャッドが獲得した61.69%に非常に近いことを指摘します。次に記事著者は、選挙前に行われたアフマディネジャッドとムサビのテレビ・ディベートの様子を紹介し、その中で、腐敗政治家としてイラン人の間で鼻つまみ者になっているラフサンジャニ(元大統領)の息子にサポートされていることをばらされたムサビが、非常に不利になったことを語ります。

そのうえで、そのディベートの少し以前に行われた、ワシントンに本部を置くTerror-Free Tomorrowによって実施された電話による世論調査の結果、やはりアフマディネジャッドが20ポイントの差をつけていた事実を紹介します。

つまり、彼が30ポイント程度の差をつけて圧勝したとしても、決して不自然な結果とは言えない、ということになります。これを「不正選挙」呼ばわりするからには、それなりの意図があると思わざるを得ませんね。

(「不正選挙」といえば、アメリカが本場じゃねえか! ブッシュの2回の選挙を思い出せや! クッダラネエ!)

イスラエルのご機嫌伺いに血道を挙げる米国の腐れ政治家どもと、イスラエルと手を組んで利権再獲得の野望を成就しようと企む腐りきった亡命(旧パーレビ派)イラン人ども、そしてイランの政権転覆(それがうまくいかなきゃ戦争)をもくろむ強欲イスラエル右翼どもが、何とかしてオバマを動かしてこのイラン攻撃(でっち上げ「合法」クーデター)を成功させようとしているようですが、現在のところはオバマ自身は冷静な様子です。今後は分かりませんが。

この記事の作者は、こういった米国政治の動向を非常に心配し、オバマに、アフマディネジャッドのイランと、新しい中東の秩序について対話を重ねることを提案しています。

以下、やや長いですが、英文記事を貼り付けておきます。

**************************************

http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0609/23745.html
Ahmadinejad won. Get over it

By FLYNT LEVERETT AND HILLARY MANN LEVERETT | 6/15/09 12:01 PM EDT

Without any evidence, many U.S. politicians and “Iran experts” have dismissed Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s reelection Friday, with 62.6 percent of the vote, as fraud.

They ignore the fact that Ahmadinejad’s 62.6 percent of the vote in this year’s election is essentially the same as the 61.69 percent he received in the final count of the 2005 presidential election, when he trounced former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. The shock of the “Iran experts” over Friday’s results is entirely self-generated, based on their preferred assumptions and wishful thinking.

Although Iran’s elections are not free by Western standards, the Islamic Republic has a 30-year history of highly contested and competitive elections at the presidential, parliamentary and local levels. Manipulation has always been there, as it is in many other countries.

But upsets occur ― as, most notably, with Mohammed Khatami’s surprise victory in the 1997 presidential election. Moreover, “blowouts” also occur ― as in Khatami’s reelection in 2001, Ahmadinejad’s first victory in 2005 and, we would argue, this year.

Like much of the Western media, most American “Iran experts” overstated Mir Hossein Mousavi’s “surge” over the campaign’s final weeks. More important, they were oblivious ― as in 2005 ― to Ahmadinejad’s effectiveness as a populist politician and campaigner. American “Iran experts” missed how Ahmadinejad was perceived by most Iranians as having won the nationally televised debates with his three opponents ― especially his debate with Mousavi.

Before the debates, both Mousavi and Ahmadinejad campaign aides indicated privately that they perceived a surge of support for Mousavi; after the debates, the same aides concluded that Ahmadinejad’s provocatively impressive performance and Mousavi’s desultory one had boosted the incumbent’s standing. Ahmadinejad’s charge that Mousavi was supported by Rafsanjani’s sons ― widely perceived in Iranian society as corrupt figures ― seemed to play well with voters.

Similarly, Ahmadinejad’s criticism that Mousavi’s reformist supporters, including Khatami, had been willing to suspend Iran’s uranium enrichment program and had won nothing from the West for doing so tapped into popular support for the program ― and had the added advantage of being true.

More fundamentally, American “Iran experts” consistently underestimated Ahmadinejad’s base of support. Polling in Iran is notoriously difficult; most polls there are less than fully professional and, hence, produce results of questionable validity. But the one poll conducted before Friday’s election by a Western organization that was transparent about its methodology ― a telephone poll carried out by the Washington-based Terror-Free Tomorrow from May 11 to 20 ― found Ahmadinejad running 20 points ahead of Mousavi. This poll was conducted before the televised debates in which, as noted above, Ahmadinejad was perceived to have done well while Mousavi did poorly.

American “Iran experts” assumed that “disastrous” economic conditions in Iran would undermine Ahmadinejad’s reelection prospects. But the International Monetary Fund projects that Iran’s economy will actually grow modestly this year (when the economies of most Gulf Arab states are in recession). A significant number of Iranians ― including the religiously pious, lower-income groups, civil servants and pensioners ― appear to believe that Ahmadinejad’s policies have benefited them.

And, while many Iranians complain about inflation, the TFT poll found that most Iranian voters do not hold Ahmadinejad responsible. The “Iran experts” further argue that the high turnout on June 12 ― 82 percent of the electorate ― had to favor Mousavi. But this line of analysis reflects nothing more than assumptions.

Some “Iran experts” argue that Mousavi’s Azeri background and “Azeri accent” mean that he was guaranteed to win Iran’s Azeri-majority provinces; since Ahmadinejad did better than Mousavi in these areas, fraud is the only possible explanation.

But Ahmadinejad himself speaks Azeri quite fluently as a consequence of his eight years serving as a popular and successful official in two Azeri-majority provinces; during the campaign, he artfully quoted Azeri and Turkish poetry ― in the original ― in messages designed to appeal to Iran’s Azeri community. (And we should not forget that the supreme leader is Azeri.) The notion that Mousavi was somehow assured of victory in Azeri-majority provinces is simply not grounded in reality.

With regard to electoral irregularities, the specific criticisms made by Mousavi ― such as running out of ballot paper in some precincts and not keeping polls open long enough (even though polls stayed open for at least three hours after the announced closing time) ― could not, in themselves, have tipped the outcome so clearly in Ahmadinejad’s favor.

Moreover, these irregularities do not, in themselves, amount to electoral fraud even by American legal standards. And, compared with the U.S. presidential election in Florida in 2000, the flaws in Iran’s electoral process seem less significant.

In the wake of Friday’s election, some “Iran experts” ― perhaps feeling burned by their misreading of contemporary political dynamics in the Islamic Republic ― argue that we are witnessing a “conservative coup d’état,” aimed at a complete takeover of the Iranian state.

But one could more plausibly suggest that if a “coup” is being attempted, it has been mounted by the losers in Friday’s election. It was Mousavi, after all, who declared victory on Friday even before Iran’s polls closed. And three days before the election, Mousavi supporter Rafsanjani published a letter criticizing the leader’s failure to rein in Ahmadinejad’s resort to “such ugly and sin-infected phenomena as insults, lies and false allegations.” Many Iranians took this letter as an indication that the Mousavi camp was concerned their candidate had fallen behind in the campaign’s closing days.

In light of these developments, many politicians and “Iran experts” argue that the Obama administration cannot now engage the “illegitimate” Ahmadinejad regime. Certainly, the administration should not appear to be trying to “play” in the current controversy in Iran about the election. In this regard, President Barack Obama’s comments on Friday, a few hours before the polls closed in Iran, that “just as has been true in Lebanon, what can be true in Iran as well is that you’re seeing people looking at new possibilities” was extremely maladroit.

From Tehran’s perspective, this observation undercut the credibility of Obama’s acknowledgement, in his Cairo speech earlier this month, of U.S. complicity in overthrowing a democratically elected Iranian government and restoring the shah in 1953.

The Obama administration should vigorously rebut any argument against engaging Tehran following Friday’s vote. More broadly, Ahmadinejad’s victory may force Obama and his senior advisers to come to terms with the deficiencies and internal contradictions in their approach to Iran. Before the Iranian election, the Obama administration had fallen for the same illusion as many of its predecessors ― the illusion that Iranian politics is primarily about personalities and finding the right personality to deal with. That is not how Iranian politics works.

The Islamic Republic is a system with multiple power centers; within that system, there is a strong and enduring consensus about core issues of national security and foreign policy, including Iran’s nuclear program and relations with the United States. Any of the four candidates in Friday’s election would have continued the nuclear program as Iran’s president; none would agree to its suspension.

Any of the four candidates would be interested in a diplomatic opening with the United States, but that opening would need to be comprehensive, respectful of Iran’s legitimate national security interests and regional importance, accepting of Iran’s right to develop and benefit from the full range of civil nuclear technology ― including pursuit of the nuclear fuel cycle ― and aimed at genuine rapprochement.

Such an approach would also, in our judgment, be manifestly in the interests of the United States and its allies throughout the Middle East. It is time for the Obama administration to get serious about pursuing this approach ― with an Iranian administration headed by the reelected President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.


Flynt Leverett directs The New America Foundation’s Iran Project and teaches international affairs at Pennsylvania State university. Hillary Mann Leverett is CEO of STRATEGA, a political risk consultancy. Both worked for many years on Middle East issues for the U.S. government, including as members of the National Security Council staff.

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