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核軍縮定めた新START、失効なら米ロの軍拡誘発 ロシア、外貨準備の米ドル比率引き下げ 人民元保有は拡大
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投稿者 うまき 日時 2019 年 4 月 02 日 14:34:39: ufjzQf6660gRM gqSC3IKr
 

ワールド2019年4月2日 / 11:37 / 2時間前更新
核軍縮定めた新START、失効なら米ロの軍拡誘発

Reuters Staff
1 分で読む

[ワシントン 1日 ロイター] - 核兵器配備を制限する米ロ間唯一の軍縮条約である「新戦略兵器削減条約」(新START)が失効すれば双方が相手側の意図をはかるのが一層困難になり、両国に軍拡のインセンティブを与えることになる──。非営利の調査グループ「CNAコープ」による研究結果が1日、公表された。

新STARTの期限切れはまた、米国やロシアなどの核保有国に核軍縮を求めている核拡散防止条約(NPT)に対する信頼を損なう可能性もある。

今回の研究は、新START消滅に伴う結果に関してこれまでに公表された中では最も包括的な内容だ。新STARTは2021年2月に期限を迎えるが、双方が合意すれば5年間延長できる。

トランプ米政権は延長するかどうかについて検討を進めている。新STARTを巡ってはこれまで、トランプ大統領が悪いディールだとして非難しているほか、ボルトン米大統領補佐官(国家安全保障問題担当)も長らく反対姿勢を示している。ロシア側は延長の準備があるとしているものの、米国の違反だと自国がみなしている点について最初に話し合いたいとしている。

米国務省に政権の検討状況についてコメントを求めたが、今のところ返答は得られていない。

CNAコープの研究結果(英文)は以下のアドレスで確認できる。

bit.ly/2JUdSvW
https://jp.reuters.com/article/usa-russia-nuclear-idJPKCN1RE05E


ビジネス2019年4月2日 / 11:07 / 2時間前更新
ロシア、外貨準備の米ドル比率引き下げ 人民元保有は拡大
Reuters Staff
1 分で読む

[モスクワ 1日 ロイター] - ロシア中央銀行が1日公表したデータによると、同国の金・外貨準備高に占めるドル建て資産の比率は昨年9月末時点で22.6%で、1年前の46.2%から大幅に低下した。

一方、人民元の比率は14.4%と1年前の1.0%から急上昇。ユーロも23.9%から32.1%に上昇した。

中銀は外貨準備の構成比率の変化について半年ずらして公表している。

金・外貨準備における金の比率は16.6%と、1年前の16.7%とほぼ変わらなかった。
https://jp.reuters.com/article/russia-central-bank-idJPKCN1RE04W

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report explores risks and US policy options for a
specific scenario: The New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) expires with no follow-on treaty in
tow. We identify the key risks and uncertainties the
United States and Russia would face after New START
and develop a portfolio of policy options for mitigating
them. We also identify the impact US-Russian nuclear
dynamics after New START may have on China’s
nuclear policy and posture, and then explore potential
policy options for the US-China relationship. By
exploring the risks of a world without a treaty, as well
as the value and limitations of arms control options
outside of a treaty framework, this report also provides
a frame of reference as the United States and Russia
prepare for the near-term decision on New START
extension and the longer-term decision on how to
approach its eventual expiration.
Our working definition of arms control for this
study is any form of cooperation between potential
adversaries designed to reduce the risks of war and
nuclear escalation and/or restrain arms competitions.
When we use the term “nuclear arms control without
a treaty,” we are referring to cooperative options that
serve these objectives through means other than
a treaty.
In practice, the United States has relied upon
strategic nuclear arms control with Russia to further
these objectives by fulfilling one primary role and
two secondary roles in US strategy:
? Primary Role: Fostering a predictable nuclear
relationship with Russia through transparency
and binding constraints on nuclear forces.
? Secondary Roles: Strengthening US nuclear
non-proliferation strategy and contributing
to sustaining US extended deterrence and
alliance solidarity.
RISKS AFTER NEW START
If New START expires without an imminent
replacement treaty, the United States would face
increased risks and uncertainties in its relationship
with Russia, its nuclear non-proliferation strategy,
and its ability to sustain solidarity within the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
From Transparency to Opacity
Without New START’s cooperative transparency
practices, the US intelligence community would
likely devote more resources to monitoring Russian
strategic nuclear forces but have less insight and
less confidence in its analytical judgements. The
United States would face an opportunity cost of
diverting scarce national technical means (NTM),
such as satellites, and technical analysts from other
missions. Russian defense officials would also navigate
increased uncertainty and lose the ability to confirm
that the United States has not reversed its New START
reductions. Neither country would have the same
degree of confidence in its ability to assess the other’s
precise warhead levels. Worst-case scenario planning is
also more likely as a result.
Over the longer term, both countries are likely to face
greater uncertainty about each other’s strategic nuclear
forces and operations. Understanding of day-to-day
postures and movements of forces will diminish and
both will have less insight into the characteristics and
DETERRENCE AND ARMS CONTROL PAPER NO. 1 | IRM-2019-U-019494 | 1
Challenges to Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Extended
Deterrence
Washington and Moscow would face heightened
credibility challenges within the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and would no
longer have their bilateral arms control framework
as a tangible example of cooperation under their
Article VI obligations to work toward complete
nuclear disarmament. The narrative of a renewed
arms race could fuel discontent within the NPT and
elevate alternative mechanisms, such as the Treaty on
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, that would be
less effective for reducing nuclear risks and could have
counterproductive consequences.
If US allies perceive the United States as mismanaging
its relationship with Russia and failing to put
forward a serious nuclear risk reduction strategy, it
would also face greater challenges uniting NATO
around a common security strategy. Some NATO
states might see a domestic backlash against nuclear
burden sharing.
China After New START
China postures its nuclear forces to provide an assured
ability to retaliate after a nuclear attack, with the
United States as its pacing threat. In this sense, China
has been a beneficiary of the predictability provided
by US-Russian nuclear arms control agreements.
US-Russian nuclear interactions after New START
could exacerbate the factors underlying China’s
nuclear expansion, though the precise impact is
impossible to predict. These dynamics could drive
further quantitative increases in China’s theater and
intercontinental-range delivery vehicles and nuclear
warheads or qualitative changes in China’s nuclear
posture, such as such as longer ballistic missile
submarine patrols, keeping a portion of mobile
operations of new strategic nuclear systems. Based
on current trends, increased opacity between US and
Russian strategic nuclear forces would unfold within
the broader context of growing mistrust and diverging
perceptions about strategy, intentions, and perceptions
of theater-range or non-strategic nuclear systems, nonnuclear capabilities, and the strategic concepts guiding
how each sees these systems fitting together.
No Constraints on Strategic
Nuclear Forces
The loss of legally-binding constraints on US and
Russian strategic nuclear forces would also confront
each country with near- and long-term risks and
uncertainties. In the mid-to-late 2020s, both countries
will have the capacity to exceed New START limits
in different ways. Each can increase their available
warheads by hundreds, but neither has the capacity
to significantly alter the relative balance by exceeding
New START limits if the other chooses to do so as well.
Based on their existing policies, however, each country
would have logical reasons to increase strategic nuclear
force levels as a hedge against the other surpassing
the New START limits. The loss of New START’s
transparency measures exacerbates this dynamic.
Compounding uncertainties, such as US and Russian
strategic nuclear force levels and investments in the
2030s, cloud assessments about an unconstrained
US-Russian nuclear relationship over an extended
period of time.
2 | IRM-2019-U-019494 | NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL WITHOUT A TREATY?
ballistic missiles on launch-ready status or dispersed,
and adopting a Launch Under Attack option. While
the United States might conclude these changes do not
have a military impact, Japan might perceive them as
undermining the US security commitment. Currently
the United States and China have no cooperative
framework for insulating their nuclear relationship
from the end of New START and other developments
in the global nuclear landscape.
OPTIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL
WITHOUT A TREATY
Transparency without a Treaty
There are multiple ways the United States and Russia
could cooperate to sustain a window of transparency
between their strategic nuclear forces without a treaty,
but they would be imperfect substitutes at best.
The United States and Russia could continue to
provide biannual exchanges of aggregate numbers of
deployed strategic delivery vehicles, nuclear warheads,
and deployed and non-deployed launchers; the total
number of each type of deployed strategic delivery
vehicle and the total number of warheads deployed
across it; and the number of deployed strategic
delivery vehicles, warheads, and launchers at each
declared base.
A modified version of New START’s notification
regime could underpin the biannual data exchanges.
This regime would differ from New START’s
notification practices by requiring pre-notification
for all changes in declared data. The purpose of this
modification would be to augment US and Russian
efforts to independently verify information they
receive through the data exchanges and improve
confidence in their assessments of the other’s deployed
nuclear forces. Some pre-notifications, such as changes
to deployed strategic nuclear warheads, could create
nuclear security risks and would require further study
before being implemented.
Emulating onsite inspections through NTM could
potentially help improve each side’s respective
confidence in deployed warhead data exchanges
and notifications. Several times a year, each country
could select a declared ICBM or SLBM base, and the
other country would then provide a list of deployed
missiles at the site and the number of warheads
deployed on each. The “inspecting” country would
then select one missile from the list and inform the
“inspected” country. The inspected country would
prepare the system for remote inspection, removing
the front section shroud and covering individual
reentry vehicles. Rather than an “eyes on” examination,
however, the inspecting country would view it via
satellite imagery.
The United States and Russia could also carry forward
the elimination and verification procedures for
retired strategic nuclear systems. Under New START,
there are specific measures for dismantling strategic
delivery vehicles, their launchers, and bombers and
positioning them so that the other country can observe
them with NTM for 60 days. This practice will be
important for both countries as they continue to retire
old systems and field new ones. Transparency into
elimination procedures would help each country avoid
worst-case scenario assessments about the relative
size of each other’s forces during their respective
recapitalization programs.
The United States and Russia could hold confidential
briefings on new strategic systems that each country
introduces into its arsenal. The briefings could include
the type of technical information that each shares
under New START and perhaps even an exchange
of photographs. Neither country would have the
DETERRENCE AND ARMS CONTROL PAPER NO. 1 | IRM-2019-U-019494 | 3
independent verification that comes though the onsite
exhibitions, where they can examine, measure, and
draw the new system firsthand; however, they would
have a body of data to compare with information
collected through NTM.
The United States and Russia could agree to forgo
sophisticated denial operations against the other’s
efforts to monitor its strategic nuclear forces. This
would be a minor modification to New START’s
provision on non-interference with the use of NTM
for monitoring treaty compliance. The purpose of this
pledge would be to acknowledge that both countries
would be less secure if one dramatically misestimates
the size and composition of the other’s strategic
nuclear forces.
Lastly, the United States and Russia could establish an
expert-level working group to improve understanding
of their respective strategies and concepts. The group
would agree to an agenda of strategic topics, guiding
concepts, and current and developmental weapon
systems, with the understanding that both sides would
have the opportunity to ask questions about topics on
the list during working group sessions and would be
expected to provide substantive answers. This forum
would not be limited to strategic nuclear forces; it
could also include discussion of theater-range nuclear
weapons, missile defenses, and a host of other types
of systems.
Restraints on Strategic Nuclear Forces
Without a Treaty
We identify one cooperative US-Russian option for
restraining strategic nuclear force levels without a
treaty and an alternative the United States could adopt
if Russia is uninterested in mutual restraint.
The United States and Russia could pledge, in the
form of parallel political commitments, to remain at
or below New START’s limits after the treaty expires.
Each country’s restraint would be contingent upon the
other’s reciprocation. There is an alignment of US and
Russian interests in staying at New START levels.
For Russia, refraining from uploading additional
warheads onto its ballistic missiles would be a
reasonable price to pay for the United States forgoing
expansion of US delivery vehicles and warheads.
For the United States, this arrangement would spare
it the challenges and uncertainties of sustaining
parity with rising Russian warhead levels while
the United States implements its modernization
program under a constrained budget and uncertain
political circumstances. Both countries could
point to continued cooperation in managing their
nuclear relationship.
If Russia is uninterested in mutual restraint without
a treaty, US policymakers have an alternative option
of staying at New START levels regardless of Russian
strategic nuclear force structure decisions. Our
analysis demonstrates the United States could meet
its nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, and
assurance objectives at New START levels even if
Russia exceeds them by hundreds of deployed strategic
warheads. Additional Russian warheads would not
improve Russia’s ability to hold dispersed US ballistic
missile-carrying submarines and nuclear bombers at
risk; nor would they improve Russian defenses against
limited US nuclear response options. Thus, US forces
would remain sufficient for deterring both large-scale
4 | IRM-2019-U-019494 | NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL WITHOUT A TREATY?
and limited nuclear attacks under these conditions.
Importantly, this assessment is contingent upon the
current composition of US strategic nuclear force; the
US nuclear posture is resilient to increases in deployed
Russian warheads because it is composed of a triad of
strategic delivery vehicles.
Staying at New START levels might better position
the United States to mitigate negative reactions within
the NPT and disarmament constituencies in allied
nations. It would enable the United States to avoid a
quantitative arms competition it does not need to enter
and could potentially lose. Russia has ample upload
capacity on its missile force and can produce new
nuclear warheads; the United States cannot currently
produce new nuclear warheads and will actually
reduce its ballistic missile force, and thus its warhead
upload capacity, through it modernization program in
the 2030s.
US-China Options
We identify two options for establishing a more
predictable nuclear relationship with China if
New START expires with no replacement.
The United States should acknowledge that China
possesses a credible nuclear deterrent. The case for this
change in US declaratory policy stems from that fact
that vulnerability to Chinese nuclear weapons is an
inescapable strategic reality for the United States. As
a result, the US-Japan alliance would be better served
by establishing that the United States does not need to
be invulnerable to Chinese nuclear weapons to extend
deterrence and that it is willing to accept nuclear risks
on behalf of its ally. Acknowledging China’s credible
nuclear deterrent (i.e., mutual vulnerability with
China) might elicit Chinese cooperation in putting the
nuclear relationship on a more predictable path. This
change in US declaratory policy is best thought of as
a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for reducing
uncertainty in US-China nuclear interactions.
The United States should also put forward a structured
proposal for annual nuclear weapon information
exchanges and dialogue with China. The information
exchange would be reciprocal but asymmetric,
acknowledging the United States and China have
vastly different outlooks and experiences regarding
cooperative transparency, and subsequently, each
would have different obligations. The United States
would provide China with detailed information
about its deployed strategic nuclear force levels and
composition, comparable to the information provided
in New START’s biannual data exchanges. In return,
China would disclose, on a confidential basis, the
aggregate size of its nuclear warhead stockpile, the
aggregate number of nuclear-capable delivery vehicles
in its force, and the breakdown by delivery vehicle
type, including theater-range ballistic missiles.
The purpose of the annual dialogue would be to
improve each other’s understanding of how their
actions are being perceived by the other side and
the steps the other side might take in response. Both
countries would provide briefings on new nuclear
systems that they plan to introduce in the following
year. They would also explain how they view
developments in the other’s strategic posture that they
see as affecting their country’s nuclear policy, posture,
and planning. It would also establish a pattern of
strategic engagement that has the potential to mature.
DETERRENCE AND ARMS CONTROL PAPER NO. 1 | IRM-2019-U-019494 | 5
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 2019
We explore a scenario?the end of US-Russian
treaty-based arms control?that is plausible but has
not yet come to pass as of early 2019. The United States
still faces a near-term decision on New START
extension; the longer-term decision about what, if any,
follow-on treaty to pursue; and the larger challenge
of how to sustain a balanced approach to nuclear risk
reduction that integrates diplomatic and military
tools in a changing international environment. Our
scenario-based analysis of risks and policy options
after New START has implications for each of these
issues. Thus, the report concludes with several
recommendations for US nuclear policy in 2019,
while New START is in effect.
Extend New Start
The United States should agree to extend New START
until 2026. New START will continue to provide
predictability with Russia, limiting its deployed
strategic warheads and giving the United States a
window into Russia’s modernized arsenal for an
additional 5 years. Extension will also support
US non-proliferation and extended deterrence
strategies. Finally, extension would give the
United States more time to prepare for what comes
after New START.
Prepare for the End of New Start
Whether its 2021, 2026, or sometime in between,
New START will expire in the next decade, and the
United States must prepare. This report’s options
provide a strategy for a world with no treaty-based
arms control. The United States should also explore
continuing New START’s provisions beyond 2026
through a formal amendment to the treaty. This
step would require both Russian agreement and
approval from the US Senate and Russian Duma.
Although neither country would be fully satisfied
with this arrangement, if policymakers perceive this
study’s options as inadequate for mitigating the risks
of a world with no treaty, sustaining New START
would be a preferable alternative. The United States
should also explore a treaty with asymmetric limits
on deployed strategic warheads. Our analysis of the
United States staying at New START levels even if
Russia exceeds them suggests that such a treaty would
not compromise the United States’ ability to meets
its deterrence and extended deterrence objectives,
provided it retains a triad of delivery vehicles.
Reinvigorate and Modernize Nuclear
Risk Reduction
In several important areas, we identify trends
that increase nuclear risks and would continue
to grow even if New START remained in force in
perpetuity. The end of treaty-based arms control
would aggravate these challenges, but preserving
New START practices would not solve them. For
instance, US and Russian threat perceptions appear
to be both intensifying and diverging with regard to
each country’s respective strategies and intentions,
non-strategic or theater-range nuclear weapons, and
non-nuclear capabilities. US uncertainties about the
trajectory of China’s nuclear posture, and the potential
negative implications for the United States and Japan,
are also likely to increase amid a more competitive
US-China relationship.
As a result, the United States should reinvigorate and
modernize its approach to nuclear risk reduction in
two ways.
6 | IRM-2019-U-019494 | NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL WITHOUT A TREATY?
First, the United States should put forward precise,
structured proposals for dialogue with Russia and
China regardless of New START’s status. The strategy,
concepts, and systems working group framework we
develop would facilitate better understanding between
the United States and Russia as their strategic postures
evolve and diversify. Pairing acknowledgement of
China’s credible nuclear deterrent with a proposal for
a US-China information exchange and dialogue is the
best option for reducing uncertainty in the nuclear
component of the US-China relationship.
Second, the United States needs to broaden its
approach to arms control beyond verifiable limits on
nuclear weapons and explore how to apply new forms
of arms control cooperation to contemporary threats.
It should adopt a more elastic conception of arms
control, beyond just treaties, that focuses on clarifying
perceptions and expectations about nuclear and
non-nuclear military operations and capabilities. This
effort should start with the premise that the objectives
of arms control are to reduce the risks of war, nuclear
escalation, and arms competitions, not solely to reduce
numbers of weapons.
Sustain and Explain the
Balanced Approach
Integrating US military and diplomatic tools in a
comprehensive strategy continues to provide the best
means for reducing nuclear dangers. The United States
must prepare to sustain support for this balanced
approach even if Russia and China are uninterested
in arms control cooperation. Persuading allies and
partners that setbacks in arms control do not mean
that the United States is giving up on using all elements
of national power to manage the existential danger
from nuclear weapons is essential. Explaining that
all of US nuclear policy, including retaining credible
nuclear forces, serves the same goals as arms control
and functions in concert, not as counterweights, will
help the United States make this case.
https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IRM-2019-U-019494.pdf
 

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