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{̃}XR~܂ŊgU싞sE̝ssɉS}XS~̐_ސV@ 싞sE̎mā@sʐ^W
http://www.asyura2.com/16/senkyo214/msg/335.html
e 2016 N 10 12 22:43:12: QV2XFHL13RGcs@ifaMhg
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{̃}XR~܂ŊgU싞sE̝ssɉS}XS~̐_ސV
싞sE̎mā@sʐ^WPQ܂Ł@s

싞sE̎mā@PQ܂Ŏʐ^W

{Rɂ싞sEe[}ɂʐ^Wu푈Ƃ̋C@mꂴ鎖@싞vA{s{̎ssT|[gZ^[ŊJĂBsćuBav̎ÁBPQ܂ŁB

ȎOŎ؂jA쌴ɉ鎀̂ȂǎcsȎʐ^PXWB\̋kcPViUWjAcǎ̋A^ȂǂɊւĂj󂯂̂ƂB

@kćuQPIS҂ɓ싞mĂ炢AxƐ푈͂Ă͂ȂƊĂقvƘbĂB
@

 @@͂Aꗗ

Rg

 1. 2016N1012 23:36:55 : ko7D6voqkE : MqUbGQI7@3Y[61]
ʐ^̈́AB̒wǂ̕eEČ߂ƂĎ؂ĎN̂Beʐ^ŁAPXRVN̓싞NO疞B⒩N̓yYȂǂŁuSjeeEZnmvƑ肵Ĕ̔Ăʐ^Ƃ̂[1]B
܂̎ʐ^́Aa59Ni1984NjɒVu싞sEv̏؋ʐ^Ƃĝs񓹂ۂɂgpʐ^ŁA싞̌Ƃ̊Ԃł͔ɗLȎʐ^Ƃ̂[1]B

[1] 싞sE̎ʐ^Wu푈Ƃ̋C@mꂴ鎖@싞vœWꂽʐ^CL
http://deliciousicecoffee.blog28.fc2.com/blog-entry-6401.html
A̎ʐ^͏u싞vi싞sEjƂ͑S֌ŴȂʐ^I
̎ʐ^́AB̒wǂ̕eEČ߂ƂĎ؂ĎN̂Beʐ^łAPXRVN̓싞NO疞B⒩N̓yYȂǂŁuSjeeEZnmvƑ肵Ĕ̔Ăʐ^B
̎ʐ^́Aa59Ni1984NjɒVu싞sEv̏؋ʐ^Ƃĝs񓹂ۂɂgpʐ^łA싞̌Ƃ̊Ԃł͔ɗLȎʐ^I

lʐ^󂯂ŉ猟؂Ɂu푈Ƃ̋C@mꂴ鎖@싞vƑ肵Ďʐ^WJÂsćuBav\̋kcPV́AƂłȂyetI

umꂴ鎖vĕI
A_ސVy{Rɂ싞sEe[}ɂʐ^WzƖᔻɋLɂĂ̂AȔvpK_I
uBav\̋kcPV_ސVA{҂ɂłグĎdȂ̂B

 2. 2016N1013 07:34:43 : jejlUoLkrI : OBpKUmB@l54[1]
sʐ^ƂĂƂȂƂɂ邱Ƃ͏oȂB

 3. 엲[4439] koaQ7Jey 2016N1013 08:03:26 : b5JdkWvGxs : DbsSfawrpEw[4849]

E̝sʐ^̘bׂ͂Ĕے肳ĂF

u싞v143̎ʐ^ "싞sE"̓E\H
http://www.geocities.jp/pipopipo555jp/

uvpK_ʐ^ƁvY̖ڂ̐ߌx
http://www.nextftp.com/tarari/index.htm

 4. 2016N1013 10:20:40 : ko7D6voqkE : MqUbGQI7@3Y[62]
>>3. 엲[4439] koaQ7Jey 2016N1013 08:03:26 : b5JdkWvGxs : DbsSfawrpEw[4849]
> E̝sʐ^̘bׂ͂Ĕے肳ĂF

RI

> u싞v143̎ʐ^ "싞sE"̓E\H
http://www.geocities.jp/pipopipo555jp/

-> u싞v143̎ʐ^ "싞sE"̓E\H -> ʐ^ɂڎNEW ->
096 -> N(n-096) -> ے荪ւ̋^
-> ̒VЕḾAcsʐ^m"݂₰"ƂȂĂƂ@ɕĂ܂B"݂₰"ɂ́AxhRmB"̎"̎ʐ^ƂƂɁAxߎψȑO"Â"csʐ^Ă悤łBm"싞̍ŐVʐ^"ƂZ[Xg[Nɏ悹ĔĂ܂悤łB

܂Au"݂₰"ɂ́AxhRmB"̎"̎ʐ^ƂƂɁAxߎψȑO"Â"csʐ^Ă悤łvƂAû"csʐ^ĂvƎʐ^"싞sE"̂̂ł͂ȂƔF߂ĂB
Ȃ킿A엲́uE̝sʐ^̘bׂ͂Ĕے肳Ăv́A^ԂȑRB

>uvpK_ʐ^ƁvY̖ڂ̐ߌx
http://www.nextftp.com/tarari/index.htm

-> PDEɒmĂ 싞|̕ ->
VJSEfC[Ej[Y@ @PXRVNPQPW@EsEXeB[
CA1218B
싞̊ח͋sEƍ̋낵iłAŮԂƎc̃AJlƃhCcl̗EC銈ȂA󋵂͌Ȃ낵̂ɂȂĂł낤B̊OĺA̍U̒10̎ŝ̕߂ɂ̂ݓAقƂǎ̐㉿Ƃ邭炢̊댯B
iAJP471j

܂AuAJlƃhCcl̗EC銈ȂEE̍U̒10̎ŝ̕߂ɂ̂ݓEEvƂB͍U̓싞s͂POlłAJlƃhCcl̗EC銈ޓ̖~ƌƁB
Ȃ킿A{̂ROlsEꂽƂ̎咣͐^ԂȑRł邱ƂĂB

 5. 엲[4442] koaQ7Jey 2016N1013 10:34:20 : b5JdkWvGxs : DbsSfawrpEw[4852]
>>4
>͍U̓싞s͂POlłAJlƃhCcl̗EC銈ޓ̖~ƌƁB
>Ȃ킿A{̂ROlsEꂽƂ̎咣͐^ԂȑRł邱ƂĂB

POlƂ͓̂싞̐l
ROlƂ̂͏Cf^nŜł̋sE

Ȃ񂩂ĂȂ

 6. 2016N1013 10:52:27 : ko7D6voqkE : MqUbGQI7@3Y[64]
>>5. 엲[4442] koaQ7Jey 2016N1013 10:34:20 : b5JdkWvGxs : DbsSfawrpEw[4852]
> POlƂ͓̂싞̐l
ROlƂ̂͏Cf^nŜł̋sE
Ȃ񂩂ĂȂ

́u싞sE@ROlvł͂ȂAuCf^nsE@ROlvƎ咣ċH
엲̓ӂ̑RB
́u싞sE@ROlv咣ĂAuCf^nsE@ROlvƂ͉]ĂȂ[1]B

엲́uE̝sʐ^̘bׂ͂Ĕے肳ĂFv͉RA͔ے肵Ȃ̂ŁARfł鎖͔F߂悤B

[1] ɂuROl싞sEvlXRo^̐^݂̐̐e͒
http://ironna.jp/article/2567
ؑ
āAuROlȏv̋]҂o싞sEɊւ鎑A{ɂ荑A@փlXŔuELYvɓo^܂B
@ROlƂɂďGĂ܂傤B
@{R싞sɔA싞ɂ͍ۓIɏZl퓬sׂی삷ړÏS悪ݒuĂ܂B
@SψψWE[x́A싞킪n܂PQPOtLɓ싞s̐luQOvƋLĂ܂B
@̌A{RɂsÊƑAψ̔F͂PQPVtȍ~тāuQOlvł܂B
@Ɛlɑ΂Aψ̔F͂Ȃ萳młƂĂ܂B
@̂Ȃ̐HƖɓY܂ψɂƂāA싞sт̒j̈S̐l𐳊mɔc邱Ƃ͂ǂĂKvł܂B
@܂usEv̂Q{ɈS悪UꂽAX}CX͑̒l𓮈ĐlsAR{̓싞̐luQTȂQVvƐ肵Ă܂B
@RQWɔ싞ېV{싞so^Z̐́uQVVlvł܂B
@svcȂƂłB
@sEOɐlQO܂̓싞sŁuROlȏv́usEvsA̋sEA싞s̐l͂QVVlƋtɑĂ킯łB
@̐lڂu^v̐lƂ邽߂ɂ́AsEɁAɂ߂ĒZԂɂROSOlK͂̓{R̉̓싞sւً̋}ڏZȂΐ܂B
]hȓ싞s̓싞sELOقKꂽlij
@ƂAsEɂZXƐ΂̂Ƃ̓싞sɑXڏZĂȂƁAlQO܂̓싞sŁuROlȏv́usEvsƂ͕s\Ȃ킯łB
@ЂƂsvcȂƂɁAё򓌂͈x펞{Rɂu싞sEvᔻƂ͂܂łB
@܂łȁusEvȂǂȂ̂悤ɁAłB

 7. 2016N1013 11:23:31 : Gir3rbMEVc : k6xo8uzGgoU[17]

@@ 싞sEɊւĂ͊ɌĂB
@@ ɂȂďԂĂǂȂ̂łȂB

@ @s싞Ɋւ鎖Ft
@ @ɓیRٔ@@@PXSWNPPP
@ @攪́@ʗ̐푈ƍ߁icssׁju싞sEv̕

@ @u{R̂Ăŏ̘ZTԂɁA싞Ƃ̎ӂŎEQꂽʐlƕߗ̑́A\ȏłƂĂB̌ς肪֒łȂƂ́AƂ̑̒ĉ[A\ܖܐɋy񂾎ɂďؖĂB̒ĉ͂܂̂̑命ɔĂƂ񂶂ĂB̐́A{RɂāÂĂĂꂽAgq]ɓ܂ꂽA܂͂̑̕@ŏꂽ肵lXvZɓĂȂ̂łBvt
@ @http://blog.livedoor.jp/ekesete1/archives/43850486.html

@@ {{͂́wɓیRٔx󂯓ĂB́u،vuL^vɂĎF肪ȂĂ̂A܂ĂȂ҂VONɂǂȔ؂Ŕےł̂BɎ̈ꕔɝsƂĂAċsEŜے肷邱Ƃ͏oȂ낤B

 8. 엲[4443] koaQ7Jey 2016N1013 12:48:39 : b5JdkWvGxs : DbsSfawrpEw[4853]
>́u싞sE@ROlvł͂ȂAuCf^nsE@ROlvƎ咣ċH

싞sƂ͓̂싞(l20l)łȂ̎܂œ

uCf^nŜŋsEROlvƂ͎̂̉Đl̒

̂̌̒ł͓싞sŜłROlsEɂȂĂ񂾂

 9. 2017N206 23:17:20 : hvDg28qQKs : FIegHVh54rI[3]
ĐRu싞sEv
Eɑi{̙l
The Alleged 'Nanking Massacre'
Japan's rebuttal to China's forged claims

|{Y 匴Nj
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/unko/tamezou/nankin/alleged/note.html
S

mnq싞sErɂĂ͗lXȕ\܂ŎgĂBႦ΁ANanking Massacre (싞sE)Athe Rape of Nanking (싞\s)ANanking Atrocities (싞cs)ANanking lncident (싞) ȂǂłBcpuCiEfC[ China Dailyv(N) ȂǂǂނƁAߔNA{͎Ƃ Nanking Massacre gĂ邱Ƃ{ɕ키ƂƂBȂł́q싞jErƏ̂ĂB

mnWVFAEEtH[QuACXE̕싞̌FƕΌvwEx(gX) N\ꌎܓ|܎ŁB

mOnACXEwUECvEIuE싞x̔wiɒ{̉eƂ̌ɂẮAlcaKuwwUECvEIuE싞x̉Adv(wYtHxЕYtHA㔪N㌎)⃍XEgE}[úw푈͔CQ[xœ{𖳗͉AAWA̎xz_Ăv(wrohnxwفAN\l)ȂǂQƁBȂcpuCiEfC[vZZZNl\tɂƁA싞sEƏ،Ă錳{AjY푈̋{RɂlNQAlψn[O̍ێi@ٔɒijkŕ\ÅÅgDulWv(C) SʓIɎxĂƂ肵ƂB

mlukςɊւŏIc菑v@{͐SNꌎ\Z̏ȂɓYtc菑ȂĊesC_Ԃ̎Rʂێނׂɑ݂̋cȂČ肷ׂen_̂̌F߂B̊e̐̂n_͉A[AkAVÁARƏAAbiARABAtAyюRCւƂB

mnON\AiVɎxߒԌRiߊƂĒɕCƂJꂽaVćAF]ɑ΂uiߊɑ΂Aڕsgj悭A܂x߂ɂ͊ǑvĂ̂ŁA̓_ɂĂ\ӂׂƂvƏqׂAĂɐM𑗂ꂽB(wVcVxꔪ|Z)

mOnuS Safety ZonevɂĂ͂قɂu Neutral Zonevu Refugee ZonevƂĂѕA݂ȓwƎvĂB싞UɎQY(ml\)̒ɂ΁A싞Sψ(񐭕{gD)\ꌎ\Ɏw肵uv(ɁuSvuSnсvƌĔt)ƁAR(싞qR)\񌎈Ɏw肵uvƂ͕ʂłBuv́ASψݒ肵uSv̂قڐ̂ł(ufLɌ싞S̒ᔽƐԏ\̗p vwsx\N㌎Ac@ls)B

܂Sψ͓̓ǂ̋ȂA܂ێx@͂Ȃ܂܈Iɓ璆́uSvݒuB́uSvɒꂽg̈S߂ēݎn߂B̓SJR͓{Rɂ싞U肵\񌎈ɁAeuvݒ肵̂łBƂ낪AAm炸ɓ{́uSvƁuv𓯂ƌāAłSψ̈ӎv𑸏d킯łB
ȂASψ́uvO(CHȓ)́uSvɏ\̓e݂Ďsê݂Ȃ炸A~ۂsc܂œA邵{Rɂ|܂ŖWQB̌ʁA{RڊǗuvł͂قƂǖ肪NȂɂ炸ASψǗeł͗D⋭ƂɂȂB
mlnۂɂ́AĆuSvɒ̔sc񂾂߁A{ŔuSv|BƂ낪Asc͂kׂ̃tXdEɓ݁Aߕ߂邱ƂłȂB

m܁nYu싞ɂāv(wsx\N܌Ac@ls)B

mZnuɓیRٔL^ZvAxYҁw푈 싞csW ꊪx(؏XA㔪ܔN)Bٔɕٌ쑤ؐlƂďo삵MZY(싞{gَQ)͐鐾Ŏ̂悤ɏ،Ă(ΐq󂯂)B
u{R͂̏uSnсvɏFȂ̂ł܂B̗ŔAA̒n̈ʒuARォ猩ē싞sŐ퓬sꂽꍇÄSۏႷ̂ɓsAA̒nɒ̍ƋɋZĂAOAψ̂̒n̒mۂAOsc̑̍D܂ʕq邱Ƃh~AẮuvێ邾̎͂Ȃł܂(̏[łĆuSnсv̏ꍇɂ́A{R͂F߂܂)B()

CɂSn(uWLmE][v)(){F߂̂́AA̒n͏̎xߒłAWLm_n߈ψŠȋCԓxĂłƁBAψ͐퓬̂ꍇA퓬eی삵A퓬I͂΂炭̊Ԉޓ~삷邪An̍s͓{ȒS͂̉ɂ邱ƂF߁Aψ͂Ɋ֗^ʂƂn߂疾炩ɂƁBOA̒nɗאڂdEǂ̍DӓI͂߁Aψ͐퓬ńuvێ͂ƔF߂ꂽƁBlAn̈ʒuɌڂ݁A퓬߂ōsꂽꍇÁuSv𑸏d邱ƂłƔF߂ꂽƓ̗RɊÂ̂ł܂v
mnw싞jx(c@lsЁAN)lŁBu~v͈ȉ̒ʂB
uRSɍ]ȊB싞͐ɕ͂̒ɍ݂Bǂ̑吨݂΍̌͂SQĈꗘȂB҂ӂɍ]J̒n͒̋sɂĖ̎{ȂB̍FˁAR˂ȂǌÐցA喏WAR̐̊BR͒R҂ɑ΂Ă͋ɂ߂ďsɂĊA烂̖OyѓGӂȂRɑ΂Ă͊ȂĂVƂAɎĂ͔Vی삷̔MӂBċMRpƂȂ΁A싞͕KЂƂBĐڂ̕DɋAA\Ňoc͑SAƂȂBĖ{iߊ͓{R\MRɊB싞𕽘aɊJAčL̏uɏołv

mn̓{ŔARÊƂuֈߕvuֈߑvƌĂсAۖ@ᔽƔFĂB̔F͓ٔɂĂ̗pAuֈߕv́uthe Chinese plain-clothes soldiers who hid thier wepons and pretended to be civilians (BsɋU̕m)vƉp󂳂ꂽBAֈߕSɓSψ́uformer soldiers (m)vƕ\ĂB́uֈߕvɑ΂F̈ႢA{RƈSψ̑Η𐶂ނƂɂȂB

mnsE_[fBuj[[NE^CYvON\񌎔Buhqnѓ̏QRɂďĂꑱB[Ăꂽ̂̈ɒRˉn̒̍ZB싞̎͗̂ڂ鍕ɕ܂ꂽBa\ZLȓ̌Q܂RɏĂꑱ炾BԂőOɍsƁAROAR˓̒JŜRĂ̂A{h͌BRˉ̊H𑖂čFˉqɍsƁȂ͏ĂāApЂłB̐ԂɔȂ̏ZAɂ͂΂̕āA낼싞ւƕĂBĎX~܂ẮAẲ䂪Ƃx邽ߔ߂ɐUԂĂv

mnxYҁw푈 싞csW 񊪁x(؏XA㔪ܔN)ZŁBȂA싞Sψ͓싞ח̈ON\񌎏\l痂N񌎏\܂ŁAZ\ʂ̕쐬B͎Ƃē{gوA\ʂ̓AJgٓɂĂ̂łB̕ɒʂԍĂ܂Ƃ߂̂A{Oږ̏iҁwDOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETYZONE^싞S枃āx(KELLY & WALSH, LIMITED, ON)łB̓{́w싞csW 񊪁xɎ߂ĂB̖M{ł́w싞S̋L^xƂB܂Aʂԍɏ]B

mOnDr. Lewis S. C. Smythe, War Damage in the Nanking Area, December, 1937 to March, 1938, (Shanghai: Mercury Press, 1938) Table.1. Ȃw싞csW 񊪁xɌfڂĂ铯̖Mɂ΁A̕\uƑƑ͒lv́uvɂ͎̂悤ɋLĂBu\񌎖ꌎɂē{RǂɂčsꂽsSȓo^ɂƂÂāASψ̃o[͒肵Ƃł́A̓싞̐l͖\ܖlłāATԑOɔނ炪ƂɐTdɐ肵͂Ə̂łBꂪ肵Ă݂Ƃł́AO{̐l͓\ܖȂ\łāÂ̎̂ƂǂʐlXA܂ړ̓r̐lXBl͓\񖜈S܏\lłB܌OɎŝT̒nœo^ꂽZ(ւ܂ނA炩ɈÔ̑̒n܂܂Ȃ)͓\lłv(Of܈)

mlnḾAXsEPcEw،E싞sEx(؏XA㔪lN)

m܁nw،E싞sExlŁB

mZnuɓیRٔL^ܔvAxYҁw푈 싞csW ꊪx(؏XA㔪ܔN)llܕŁBu싞n@@@Glߍs񍐁v͈ȉ̒ʂB
uǍo

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Ae\҂͂ꂼꕶȂĊ֌WeʂɈڒAs{͊e撬̕ۍbサAx@͊ex@ǂサAeXSӂɔCȂ̊eĉ͊e̐ɉ钲̑Ώۂm肵āAȂĒ̏d邱ƂcB
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ȏ̂ƂRɂ肱̌ܕS]ُ͉̒Ȃ鍢oĒ҂ɂāAʂ̒ӂ𕥂ĐTdATK̕@uAɂ킽sꂽWcjEɊւMdȂ鎑l閈XXRAm肹EҊɎO\ɒBÂقm؂𓾂ҍv\炴iȂB
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mnƗe^҂Ni邽߁AlܔN\񌎔AfgpɐݒuꂽBǒ͎Ȍ̂iEaEL[iB

mnw،E싞sExZŁB

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싞֊҂

Notes
[1] The so-called 'Nanking Massacre' has been expressed in various ways, for example, Nanking Massacre, the Rape of Nanking, Nanking Atrocities, Nanking Incident etc. In recent years, the CCP (the Chinese Community Party) has mainly called it 'Nanking Massacre' in a semi-government English paper, the China daily. Therefore we follow it.

[2] Joshua A. Fogal, "The Controversy over Iris Chang's Recent Book, The Rape of Nanking". Sekai (November 1999), p252-p257.

[3] The very cause of which Iris Chang was motivated to write her book, called The Rape of Nanking was when she attended the Global Memorial Conference of the 57th Anniversary of the "Rape of Nanking" held in California, in 1994, sponsored by the 'Global Alliance for Preserving the History of World War II in Asia'. This Alliance was centered to develop the sales campaign of her book, and to pursue the movement of accusation within the U.S. against the war crimes committed by Japan. This Alliance also held a forum, called 'International Citizen's Forum on War Crimes and Redress' at the Japan Socialist Party's Headquarters in December 1999. To this forum, many researchers sponsored by the CCP attended, and this proved that they were cooperating with the CCP to develop the movement of accusation against the war crimes committed by Japan.

[4] The KMT, which in essence was the government of the Republic of China, represented a loose alliance of militarists, bureaucrats, landlords and commercial interests.

[5] In five major 'Bandit Suppression campaigns,' starting in December 1930 and lasting until 1935, Chiang Kai-Shek attempted to exterminate the Communist forces in China. These campaigns were launched as follows: (1) December 1930; (2) May 1931; (3) June 1931; (4) April 1933; (5) October 1933.

[6] United States. Dept. of States, United States relations with China, with special reference to the period 1944-1949 (Washington. D.C., U.S. Government Office, 1949) read as follows:

In January 1936 the Chinese Communist Party publicly offered the "hand of friendship" to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek if he would take up arms against Japan. On August 26, 1936, the Chinese Communist Party proclaimed to the Kuomintang, "we are prepared to form a strong revolutionary united front with you as was the case during... the great Chinese Revolution of 1925-1927... [that] is the only proper way to save our country today."
Coming at a time of growing patriotic resentment against Japanese aggression, the stepped-up demands for a "united front" by the Chinese Communist Party were an effective propaganda weapon for use against the troops to which the National Government had assigned the task of "bandit suppression" in northwest China. By the end of 1936 the army of Chang Hsueh-liang, the former warlord of Manchuria, was in no mood to fight against the Communist forces. In December 1936 the Generalissimo and his staff visited Sian in Shensi Province to map out a sixth "Bandit Suppression" campaign. Rather than carry out Nationalist orders to resume operations against the Communists, Chang Hsueh-liang decide to "arrest" the Generalissimo.
[7] The Boxer Protocol read as follows :

Articles 9. The Chinese Government has conceded the right to the Powers in the Protocol annexed to the letter of January 16, 1901, to occupy certain points, to be determined by an agreement between them, for the maintenance of open communication between the capital and the sea. The points occupied by the powers are :
Huang-tsun, Lang-fang, Yang-tsun, Tientsin, Chun-liang-cheng, Tang-ku, Lu-tai, Tang-shan, Lan-chou, Chang-li, Chin-wang-tao, Sham-hai-kuan. (How the Far Eastern War was begun edited by Shuhsi Hsu, Shanghai : Kelly & Walsh, Limited, 1938, p.19.)
[8] On July 11, 1937, when hearing that Lieutenant General KOHZUKI Kiyoshi was assigned as the Commanding General of the Expeditionary Army in China, the Emperor Showa (Hirohito) said to his Chamberlain USAMI, "directly tell General KOHZUKI the non-expansion policy, and also be aware of the sensitive situations which many foreign interests entangle." And, the Imperial letter was sent to the General. (KOJIMA Jo, The Emperor Showa III, pp.189-190.)

[9] On July 29, 1937, some 3,000 Chinese soldiers proceeded to raid Japanese shops, inns, and private homes. Approximately 250 of the 380 Japanese residents of Tungchow were slaughtered.

[10] Karl Drechsler, "Deutshland-China-Japan 1933-1939", Das Dilemma der deutschen Fernostpolitik (Berlin : Akademie-Verlag, 1964)

[11] The so-called 'Scorched-earth policy' was namely a Chinese traditional tactic by which everything of valuable such as assets and houses in the field would be burnt down so that nothing might be left for enemy.

[12] HIDAKA Shinrokuro, the councilor of the Japanese Embassy to Nanking at that time, testified in his affidavit in the IMTFE as follows :

In other cities than Nanking where the Chinese Army retreated, public functionaries of municipal offices or local personages remained behind the military retreat and coordinated between the incoming Japanese Army and the general public, so that their presence resulted in making smooth relations between the Japanese Army and the general public.
When Nanking surrendered the city was completely in a state of anarchy. On 17th, right after the occupation, I witnessed the followings :
When the Chinese commander of the Nanking Garrison retreated before Nanking surrendered, all the military and civilian organs disappeared and ofticials absconded from the city all together. Neither a municipal government nor a police organ existed. No responsible person relating to the municipal administration was available. All the stuffs necessary for a daily administration such as documents to record resident registration and real estate were taken away. The police department was dissolved and no policeman was witnessed. Only a couple of private guard men belonging to each Embassy and legation were seen on respective premises. (The Tokyo War Crimes Trial , pp.21457-21458.)
[13] To put it more precisely, since Chinese stragglers in Shanghai took refuge in the Safety Zone, the Japanese Army tried to mop up the Safety Zone. However, these stragglers immediately ran into the French concession bordering the Safety Zone, so that the Japanese Army could not arrest them.

[14] HIDAKA Shinrokuro testified in the IMTFE as follows :

The Japanese Army did not officially approve the above-mentioned zone, the so-called 'safety Zone.' The reasons were (1) that the location was thought inconvenient for safekeeping, from a tactical point of view, in case of a battle in the city (2) that high ranking Chinese officers and their staff lived there, (3) that the committee did not have enough power to keep defeated Chinese soldiers and other undesirable persons out of the zone and to maintain its 'neutrality.' (The 'Safety Zone' in Shanghai was considered to differ on these points and was approved by the Japanese Army.) (The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, pp.21459-21460.)
The reason for which the plan (the Safety Zone in Shanghai) was approved by Japanese authorities was as follows :
(1) The Area was purely a Chinese town and it was clear that Father Jaquinot and other committee member were all impartial and disinterested.
(2) The committee would take in and protect non-combatant Chinese when there was a battle, and relief and protection would continue for a little while after the battle was over, but the committee would agree not to interfere in the government and supervision of the area, which was to be completely in the hands of the Japanese Army.
(3) As the authorities of French concession adjacent to the area willingly cooperated the committee was thought to have enough actual power to maintain 'neutrality' when there was a battle.
(4) Judging from the location of the area, it was believed possible to maintain 'safety' in the area despite there being a battle near here.
(The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, pp.21461-21463.)
[15] The Hague Convention of 1905, Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Article 26

[16] Languages spoken in each region varied so much that communication among soldiers coming from different regions was difficult for each other.

[17] Shuhsi Hsu (ed.), Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone (Shanghai : Kelly & Walsh, Limited, 1939) pp.14-15.

[18] The IMTFE was established on April 29, 1946 until November 13, 1948. As to the IMTFE, see Antonio Cassese and B. V. A. Roling (Contributor), The Tokyo Trial and Beyond (Polity Press, 1995).

[19] According to the Document No.17 issued by the Safety Zone Committee, dated on December 17, the number of refugees whom the Safety Zone Committee managed to accommodate in eighteen places of refugee camps in the Safety Zone were only about 50,000 Chinese people among 250,000. Another 200,000 were living in the 'new residential district' where Japanese troops managed.

[20] Dr. Lewis S. C. Smythe was recording the survey result with regard to the population of Nanking in the following manner in his book War Damage in the Nanking Area (Shanghai : Mercury Press, 1938).

Table 1 Families studied and estimated population
* On the basis of incomplete registrations carried out by the military authorities between the end of December and the end of January, members of the International Committee estimated the population of Nanking at that time to approach 250,000, a figure decidedly above their deliberately cautious guesses of earlier weeks... We venture an estimate of 250,000 to 270,000 in late March, some of whom were inaccessible to the investigators, and some of whom passed by; 221,150 are represented in the survey. On May 31, the residents registered in the five district offices of the municipal government (including Hsiakwan, but apparently no other sections outside the gates), numbered 277,000.
[21] Summary report on the Investigations of Japanese war crimes committed in Nanking, prepared by the Procurator of the District Court, Nanking
1. The Progress of the Investigations.

As soon as the orders for the Investigation of Japanese war crimes were received, the people were notified by means of printed documents of the official proclamations, and the following 14 organizations in Nanking were notified of them; Nanking Municipal Government; the Military Affairs Committee; Nanking Central Bureau of Investigative Statistics; Metropolitan Police; Branch Headquarters of the Kuomintang; Branch Headquarters of the Military Police; Nanking Chapter of the Three People's Rights Youth Organization; Merchant's Association; Agricultural Association; Industrial Worker's Association; Lawyer's Association; Medical Doctor's Association; Nanking Chapter of the Red Swastika Society (Translator's note, a religious organization); and the Procurator of the District Court. The Procurator of the District Court asked the representative of respective organizations to gather in the conference room of the District Court at 2:00 p.m. on Nov.7, 34 of the republic year and held the 1st meeting. In the meeting the organization of the Nanking investigation committee of Japanese War Crimes was decided and established.
The meeting also confirmed to prevent from duplicated investigations by means of deciding objects of investigations each organization would make, taking consideration of characteristics of each organization.
During investigations, as the enemy's deception and disturbance were severe the mind of the people was dispirited. Not only there existed very few people who voluntarily stated about the crimes of murders, but also there existed many people who did not speak like a cicada in winter, denied the facts and did not state for the sake of appearances even if the member of committee visited them. Besides such a situation, the committee could not contact some people because of house moving or disappearance.
For the reasons mentioned so far, since these over 500 cases were to be investigated with extreme difficulty, the cautious investigation was made paying particular attention, by means of various interviews and inquiries. Whenever obtained vitally important evidence on the mass murders executed over several times, each evidence was examined thoroughly. As the result of the investigations over 300,000 victims were reported, and it is believed that over 200,000 more are not yet to be confirmed besides.
2. Classification of Japanese War Crimes
(6) Particulars Regarding Other Atrocities
The materials investigated up to this time discloses more than 340,000 persons killed, more than 4,000 houses burnt or destroyed, 20-30 persons raped of killed for refusing intercourse, and 184 persons missing.
3. War Crimes and associated materials
(2) Evidence of mass murders
The number of victim killed totaled 279,586.
2,873 were killed in the HSIN-HO District. (This evidence furnished by SHENG ShihCheng and CH'ANG K'ai -sing, who buried the bodies.)
More than 7,000 were killed in the neighborhood of the Army Arsenal and in HUASHEN-MIAO just outside the South Gate of NANKING. (This evidence submitted by JUI Fang-yuan, CH'ANG Hung-ju, and YANG Tu-t'sai, who buried the bodies.)
Approximately 57,418 persons were killed in the TS'AO HSIEH-HSIA District [Straw Shoes Gorge]. (This evidence submitted by a victim, LU Su).
More than 2,000 were killed in the HAN-CHUNG-MEN [Hanchung Gate], (this evidence submitted by two victims who later recovered, WU Chang-te and CH'EN Yung-ts'ing.)
More than 3,000 were killed in LING-KU-SZU [Ling Gu Monastery]. (This evidence submitted by KAO Kuan-wu, a traitor, and also obtained from an epitaph, WU-CHU-KU-SIPEI, meaning, 'a tombstone extolled by nobody.')
Furthermore, the total number of bodies buried by the CH'UNG-SHAN-T'ANG [Advance Benevolence Society]. (Translator's note; a charity institution.) and the HUNGWAN-TZU-HUI [Red Swastika Society]. (Translator's note; a religious organization) totaled more than 155,300. (The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, pp.4540-4548.)
[22] It was set in GHQ on December 8, 1945 to prosecute A class suspect of war criminals. Chief procurator Joseph B. Keenan was a chief of the Section.

[23] Statement made by Lu Su to the procurator of the Nanking District Court was as follows :

Upon entry of the enemy troops into Nanking, refugees of Chinese civilians of both sexes and all ages, as well as retreating soldiers, totaling 57,418, were interned by Japanese troops in four to five villages at Mu-Fu Hill. Many died since neither water nor food was given. Many were frozen to death. In the evening of Dec. 16th, 1937, those who were still alive were marched off to Tsao-Hshie-Hsia [Straw Shoes Gorge], at Shia-Kuen [Hsiakwan], in a column of four, while each two were bound together by lead wire.
There they were machine-gunned, followed by repeated bayonet thrusts. Corpses were burnt by kerosene and, at last, the remains of the burnt corpses were thrown into the Yangtze River...
I was then working in the Police Office. During street fighting, an enemy shell wounded my thigh. As I was then hiding at Ta-Mao-Tung, at Shang-Yuen Gate, very near the scene of massacre, I was therefore able to witness this tragedy. (The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, pp.4538-4539.)
[24] The Good Man of Nanking, p.197

[25] The Battle of Nanking, p.351. Battle of Nanking Editorial Committee estimates that Chinese soldiers were killed in action with 12,366 from December 4 to 12 evening, based on the Nanking Garrison Battle Report.

[26] The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, p.4601

[27] The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, p.4593-4594

[28] Clarence E. Gauss, U.S. total consulate to Shanghai, sent the Secretary of State in Washington the letter of confidential report, on January 5, 1938 (Record of U.S. Embassy to China, Correspondence American Embassy Nanking), and it ran as follows :

Enclosed is the memo regarding the situation of Nanking after Japanese troops occupation that Dr. S. Bates (professor of sociology and history in the Nanking University) wrote. The copy of this memo is the one that A. Steele of the Chicago Daily News handed the total consulate personnel of Shanghai.
[29] As to this case, Rev. John G. Magee testified in the IMTFE as follows :
Rev. John G. Magee... We, foreigners were looking outside from the balcony of the house and actually witnessed a Chinese was killed. The Chinese was walking along the street before this house with a long silk gown, two Japanese soldiers challenged him from behind, and he was so frightened, he was trying to get away. He hastened his pace, and was trying to get around a corner in a bamboo fence, hoping there was an opening, but there was no opening. The soldiers walked in front of him and couldn't have stood more than five yards in front of him, and both of them shot him in the face. (The Tokyo War Crimes Trial , pp.3900-3901.)

[30] Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p.78. as follows :

185. On the morning of January 9, Mr. Kroeger and Mr. Hatz saw a Japanese officer and soldier executing a poor man in civilian clothes in a pond inside the Safety Zone on Shansi Road, just east of the Sino-British Boxer Indemnity Building.
Note : We have no right to protest about legitimate executions by the Japanese army...
[31] Robert O. Wilson, associate in Surgery at the University Hospital in Nanking testified following the cross-examination in the IMTFE as follows :
Counsel OKAMOTO : About how many patients did you turn away, do you remember the ballpark figure?
Wilson : I would have no way of telling that, principally because my work was in the operating room and I was there busy most of the time day and night for a few weeks after the occupation. The others outside the operating room handled the outpatients and had to turn away patients when there were no beds. (The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, p.2552.)

[32] John G. Magee testified following the cross-examination in the IMTFE as follows :
Counsel : Now, how many of these acts of murder did you personally witness, Mr. Magee - approximately?
Magee : I thought I made that clear in my testimony. I only personally witnessed the killing of one man. (The Tokyo War Crimes Trial , pp.3929-3930.)

[33] Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p.1 12.

[34] Rabe was recording about Chinese officers in his diary as follows :
"Shortly before eight o'clock Colonels Lung and Chow arrive (Ling has marched off by now) and ask if they can take shelter in my house. I agree. Before Han and I left for home, these two gentlemen deposited 30,000 dollars in the committee's safe." (The Good Man of Nanking , p.64.)

[35] The Safety Zone Committee frequently requested the Chinese Troops (Nanking Garrison) to leave from the Safety Zone to defend its neutrality. However, Commander Tan refused the demand. If the Japanese Army had known this fact, they would attack the Safety Zone. Thereon, Rabe and other members of the Safety Zone Committee made the memo for a press release lying that 'there were no Chinese soldiers in the Safety Zone.'

Rabe was writing in his diary dated on December 5 regarding the details as follows :
"Together with Dr. Bates and Sperling I pay a call on General Tang, who is in charge of the city's defense, in order to get his consent to have all military personnel and establishments removed from the Zone at once. Imagine our amazement when General Tang tells us that this is quite impossible, that at best it will be another two weeks before the military can vacate the Zone. A nasty blow. It means that the Japanese condition that no Chinese soldiers are to be allowed in the Zone will not be fulfilled. For now at least we cannot even think of claiming to have a 'Safety Zone', at most it's a 'refugee zone.' The matter is discussed at a long committee meeting and a text prepared for release to the press, because if we don't want to see our work destroyed, we dare not let the press learn the whole truth yet..." (The Good Man of Nanking , p.50.)
[36] Gerhard Krebs, "German Military Advisers Reconsidered," Gunji Shigaku vol.33 (Tokyo : The Military History Society of Japan, 1997)

[37] The Goodman of Nanking, p.190.

[38] Radhabinod Pal, Dissentient Judgment of Justice Pal, (Tokyo : Kokusho-Kankoukai, 1999) p.606.

[39] J. Rabe described a similar sight in his diary as follows :

23 November... A steady stream of wounded men are arriving at Hsiakwan station. Dr. Smythe sends some student volunteers to the station to receive them. (The Good man of Nanking , p.29.)
13 December... Three of us committee members drive out to military hospitals that have been opened in the Foreign Ministry, the War Ministry, and the Railway Ministry, and are quickly convinced of the miserable conditions in these hospitals, whose doctors and nurses simply ran away when the shelling got too heavy, leaving the sick behind with nobody to care for them... The dead and wounded lie side by side in the driveway leading up to the Foreign Ministry. (The Good man of Nanking , pp.65-66.)
[40] The Tokyo NichiNichi carried a special dispatch sent from Shanghai on December 8, 1937 as follows :

Since the morning of December 7, Tang Sheng-zhi, commander-in-chief of the Nanking Garrison has further bolstered security in the city, fearing those residents will become violent amid the turmoil. Anyone who seems the least bit suspicious is gunned down. Chinese newspapers report that 100 persons have been shot dead so far.
[41] The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, p.21413.

[42] Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, vol.1, p.22.

[43] The Justice, Radhabinod Pal in his dissenting judgment at the IMTFE asserted that "China also did not want to give the name of 'war' to this hostility before Japan became involved in war with the United States of America by her attack on Pearl Harbor. China did not give it the name of "war" perhaps because she needed the assistance of the so-called neutral countries who were anxious to avoid being openly at war. America also did not give it that name : perhaps she desired to escape the disabilities of her neutrality legislation whereby the shipments of arms and munitions of war to belligerents were automatically forbidden. America certainly could have openly acknowledged a state of war." (Radhabinod Pal, Dissentient Judgment of Justice Pal, Tokyo : Kokusho-Kankoukai, 1999, p.581.)

[44] The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, pp.21895-21897.

[45] T. Durdin wrote in the New York Times dated on January 9, 1937, as follows :

It may be that Tang made some efforts to save the situation on Sunday by arranging for a general withdrawal under protection of small units left to hold up Japanese penetration far into the city. Appearances indicate otherwise, and in any case the situation was not saved and Tang's departure, unknown even to many members of his own staff, left the army leaderless and was the signal for complete collapse.
[46] For example, the China Press in Shanghai, January 25, 1938 wrote as follows :
Claiming that many Chinese army officers and other ranks were seeking refuge in the International Safety Zone established in Nanking following the evacuation of the capital by Chinese troops, Colonel Nagai, army spokesman, announced the report of the Nipponese gendarmerie in Nanking at yesterday's press conference...

It was ascertained, the report claimed, that high officers of the Chinese army were hiding in buildings, foreign embassies and legations after these buildings were evacuated by their staffs. Up to December 28, it said, 23 Chinese officers, 54 non-commissioned officers, and 1,498 privates were seized by the Japanese in the various buildings in the zone. Among them, it is claimed, was the commander of the Nanking peace preservation corps, Wang Hsing-lau, "who masqueraded as Chen Mi" and was in command of the fourth branch detachment of the international refugee zone, Lieutenant-General Ma Pou-shang, former adjutant of the 88th Division, and a high official of the Nanking Police, Mi Shin-shi.
General Ma, it is claimed, was active in instigating anti-Japanese disorders within the zone, which also sheltered Captain Hwan An and 17 men with a machine-gun and 17 rifles, while the report states that Wang Hsing-lau and three former subordinates were engaged in looting, intimidating and raping.
In dugouts adjoining foreign embassy and legation quarters evacuated by their foreign staffs, the report continued, were found caches of arms. A search in one particular dugout disclosed :
One light artillery gun
21 machine guns of Czechoslovakian manufacture with 60 rounds of ammunition
three other machine-guns
10 water-cooled machine guns with 3,000 rounds
50 rifles with 420,000 rounds of ammunition
2,000 trench mortars shells
500 artillery shells.
[47] As to the original, refer to page 186 and 187 in The Battle of Nanking.

[48] The Battle of Nanking, p.329.

[49] This is Yomiuri, August 1998

[50] Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, vol.1, p.142.

[51] The Battle of Nanking, p.325-327.

[52] The Battle of Nanking, p.193.

[53] As shown in paragraph 2, it is understood that his principle was not to 'immediately execute' stragglers picked out of 'the Safety Zone' but to 'intern' them into a camp first of all.

[54] As described in paragraph 4, any unit except the selected 'mopping-up unit' has been forbidden to enter the 'Safety Zone'.

[55] As understood if read paragraph 4 and 5, the Japanese Army has been extremely sensitive over that the language issue will result in unnecessary friction with the westerners who live in Nanking, that is, the member of the Safety Zone Committee.

[56] As to how thoroughly enforced the principle that intended to prevent looting, WAKISAKA Jiro, testified by means of the affidavit in the IMTFE as follows :

Immediately after my units entered Nanking, a certain paymaster lieutenant found a Chinese ladies' shoes left off on the way while he was out to discharge an official business. He brought that shoes back to his quarters in order to show its wonderful fashion to his comrades. A military police, however, found out this fact and submitted a document to the court-martial on suspicion of plunderage. The lieutenant, shedding tears in my presence, asserted his innocence, and as I admitted him to be innocent, I respected to my superior official to that effect.
I remember that this case was finally found to be a minor offense not liable to prosecution. The supervision of the Japanese military police in Nanking was extremely strict, and an exposure without mercy was shown even to any minor offenses. (The Tokyo War Crimes Trial , p.32607.)
[57] As to this case, John G. Magee testified following the cross-examination in the IMTFE as follows :
o A counsel : And how many acts of robbery did you personally witness, whether you actually knew it was robbery or yourself were robbed, that you can remember?

o Rev. Magee : I remember, as I said before, that I actually witnessed of the robbing of those electric iceboxes. (The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, pp.3929-3930)
[58] Nankins Incident Source Material, vol.1, p.107.

[59] Guo Qi, The Nanking Massacre, Zhongwai Magazine Publishing, Taipei, 1979.

[60] IINUMA Mamoru, ex-Lieutenant-General, the chief of staff under MATSUI, the Shanghai Expeditionary Force testified in the IMTFE as follows :

I was told that some troops removed articles of furniture but they said that they did so to facilitate quartering for troops. They said that when in requisition they compensated for the loss, but in most cases managers of those houses fled, so they put an evidence note of requisition at respective houses to guarantee the compensation.
A few soldiers removed articles of furniture privately and some removed articles of furniture belonging to foreigners, but the matter was settled by returning the articles in the question to the owners or by compensating for the loss, and the offenders were punished. Of course Army Headquarters did never order to commit unlawful acts nor admitted them. (The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, pp.32651-32652.)
[61] The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, pp.4593-4594.

[62] The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, pp.2633-2634.

[63] TSUKAMOTO Hirotsugu, judge advocate of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force from August 30, 1937 to February 8, 1938, testified in the IMTFE as follows :

I am convinced that I was strict enough to punish those who violated the military discipline, being charged with the Commander MATSUI's orders and in conformity with the Field Service Legislation. So strict was the attitude of the Judicial Department of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force even to trifling crimes as well as excessively severe punishment to crimes that each unit often criticized it with sharp comments. (The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, p.21562.)
[64] Artillery Second Lieutenant OSUGI Hiroshi, the leader of an observation section of the 1st Battalion, the 3rd Artillery Regiment, the 3rd Division testified in the IMTFE as follows :

In the evening on the 13th of December 1937 I went within the walls (Chungshan Gate) only a kilometer from the city gate but I saw military police already posted at the banks and government offices with signs of off limits to Japanese soldiers...
On the 13th of December, I joined my unit at Tang-chui-chen and led them to Tushanchen in the south of Nanking. At this time, according to the instructions of the higher commandant, I strictly forbade my soldiers to go out on passes. Even going out on official business, the soldiers were ordered not to enter the southwest corner quarters of the city of Nanking as they were set aside as refugee's quarters. At that time, I heard from my colleagues that this prohibition was due to the danger of the armed defeated enemy soldiers wearing civilian clothes who pretended to be refuge in these quarters. (The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, pp.32590-32591.)
[65] J.Rabe was writing to his diary as follows :

26 December, later
And now the Japanese authorities have come up with the fabulous idea of erecting a military bordello, and with hands clenched in horror, Minnie [Vautrin] is forced to watch as authorized underling force their way into her Girls Assembly Hall filled with hundreds of gungyangs [=Virgins]. She is not going to hand over even one of them willingly. She would rather die on the spot; but then something unexpected happens. A respectable member of the Red Swastika Society, someone whom we all know, but would never have suspected had any knowledge of the underworld, calls out a few friendly words into the hall-and lo and behold! A considerable number of young refugee girls step forward. Evidently former prostitutes, who are not at all sad to find work in a new bordello. Minnie is speechless! (The Good Man of Nanking, p.99.)
[66] Nanking Incident Source Material, vol.1, pp.155-156.

[67] Miss Minnie Vautrin was assigned to the representative of the refugee reception centers located in Ginling College of Humanities and Sciences in which 4,000 of only women and children refugees were accommodated.

[68] There were a few rapes by Japanese soldiers. As to the rape cases, OGAWA Sekijiro, the chief of Judicial Affairs Department of the 10th Army, testified in his 'affidavit' in the IMTFE as follows :

During my moving to Nanking from November 5, 1937 to December 14, 1937, I dealt with about twenty cases of offenses against military discipline and public morals. In the course of my dealing with crimes or public morals, I found it very difficult to decide whether the cases were fornication with female consent or violation.
The reason was that on the part of the Chinese women some of them were not so rare to take a suggestive attitude towards Japanese soldiers, and once found as having committed adultery with Japanese soldiers by their husbands or other people, they suddenly changed their attitude and asserted exaggeratedly that they had been raped. Whether adultery or rape, however, I punished indictees in accordance with the law, weighing the relative importance of the facts. (The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, pp.32675-32676.)
[69] SUZUKI Akira, The illusion of a great Nanking Massacre; New version (Tokyo: Asuka Shinsha, 1999) pp.306-313.

[70] SATO Shinju, "I took the photos and eyewitnesses in Shanghai and Nanking." Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, vol.1.

[71] John W. Dower is expressing in War without Mercy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986) pp.15-18. as follows :

Shortly after the United States entered World War Two, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall summoned Frank Capra, the Hollywood director, and asked him to prepare a series of orientation films for viewing by American troops...
Only one film in the series was devoted exclusively to the war in Asia. Titled The Battle of China and completed in 1944, this was an epic paean to the resistance of the Chinese people against Japan's aggression...
Viewed by some critics as Capra's most exaggerated portrayal of pure good versus pure evil, The Battle of China was temporarily withdrawn because it omitted any mention whatsoever of problems among the Chinese themselves...
[72] HATA Ikuhiko, "The Nanking Atrocities: Fact and Fable", Japan Echo, vol.25, No.4 (August 1998) pp.47-57.

[73] ARA Ken-ichi, Interviews with Witness of the Nanking Battle, p.209.

[74] The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, p.21563.

[75] The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, p.21913.

[76] The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, pp.32626-32627.

[77] For example, the CCP printed the following article, entitled "Support for massacre diary writer" in the governmental English paper, the China Daily dated on April 4, 1999.

NANJING [Xinhua] - AZUMA Shiro, a Japanese soldier who took part in the massacre of 300,000 people in Nanjing in 1937, has lost a series of lawsuits in Japanese courts over attempts to reveal details of the mass killings in his wartime diary. Recently, however, the 87-year old man has found strong support in Nanjing, the capital of Jiangsu Province. An exhibition dealing with Azuma Shiro's court trials has been on display in Nanjing since early February.
[78] HORA Tomio (ed.), Source Material Relating to the Nanking Massacre, vol.1 (Aoki Shoten, 1985) pp.378-380.

[79] Timperley, What War Means: The Japanese Terror in China, p.59.

[80] Chiang Kai-Shek, The collected wartime messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, 1937-1945 (New York: The John Day Company, 1946) pp.83-88.

[81] League of Nations Official Journal 19th year, No.5-6.

[82] Nanking Incident Research Group (ed.), Nanking Incident Source Material, vol,2: Chinese Reference (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1992)

[83] SUZUKI Akira, The illusion of a great Nanking Massacre: New Version (Tokyo: Asuka Sin-sha, 1999)

[84] UEMURA Shin-ichi, History of Japanese Diplomacy: China Incident (Tokyo, Kashima Institute Publishing, 1971)

[85] Hillel Levine, In search of Sugihara, p.168. as follows :

It is around this time in December 1938 that the most authoritative proclamation regarding Jews was made. Attributed to the Gosho Kaigi, it virtually dictated - though other proclamations would follow-norms of thought and action for the time to come :
No.1 Outline of Responses to Jews: To maintain good will and close relations with both Germany and Italy is central to the diplomacy of the Empire at the present time. So on principle we should certainly avoid tolerating Jews in our Empire whom our allies so vehemently reject. But taking the attitude of shunning them completely, as do the Germans, does not accord with the spirit of racial equality which our Empire has insisted on for many years.
Not only that but we must consider the fact that we need to introduce foreign capital for economic construction to accomplish the war in this state of emergency which the Empire now faces. And also we must avoid making relations with the United States worse. It could cause disadvantageous results. So we should treat [Jews] in accordance with the Guidelines on the left [below] :
Guidelines: 1. We will treat the Jews living in Japan, Manchuria, and China at present with fairness, in the same manner as we treat other foreigners and we will not take special measures to reject them. 2. We will treat the newly arrived Jews to Japan, Manchukuo, and China fairly, generally within the regulations of controlling the entry of foreigners. 3. We will avoid making special efforts to invite Jews to Japan, Manchuria, and China. But this policy dose not include people who are worth using such as capitalists and technologists.
[86] The China Daily dated on January 15, 1999, "'Rabe's Diary' hits big screen"

[87] According to the Sankei Shimbun dated on November 27, 1996, the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service has completed the report, titled Japan - China Relation, Present and Future Prospective, and their meanings to the United States. The report points out one of its characteristics which is the accusation made by the CCP has been using this accusation 'to stir out its internal nationalism and to put Japan in the defensive position, in order to gain economical and trade benefit from Japan.'

[88] For the detailed information how the U.S. had developed the anti-Japanese, and pro-Chinese activities in the pre-war U.S. are provided in NAGAO Ryuichi's book, titled America's intellectuals and Far East (Tokyo University Publication, 1985). America's famous diplomat George F. Kennan wrote his book, titled American diplomacy, 1900-1950 (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1952), and he expressed his painful regret that the pre-war American diplomacy had been pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese which allowed the Continental China and North Korea to become inclined to the Communism.

On May 3, 1951, in the hearing before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate of the United States, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur also said, "It is own personal opinion that the greatest political mistakes we made in a hundred years in the Pacific, was in allowing the Communists to grow in power in China." (the New York Times dated on May 4, 1951)
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